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Abstract 
 
 The modern relationship between the Vatican and the state of Israel is rooted in a 
much deeper history of relations between Judaism and Christianity. In the main, this 
relationship was fraught with tensions and animosity, as early Christian writers chastised 
and demonized Judaism, ensconcing a hostility that endured for centuries. The advent of 
political Zionism in the nineteenth century renewed Roman Catholic fears of a Jewish-
dominated Palestine, where religious sites sacred to Catholics would fall under the 
political jurisdiction of a Zionist state. In 1904, Pope Pius X granted an audience to the 
prominent Zionist Theodor Herzl, in which he reminded his guest that the Roman 
Catholic Church could never endorse or support the creation of a Jewish home in 
Palestine. This was to remain the essence of papal policy on Palestine for decades to 
come. 
 This study examines the relationship between the Vatican and Zionism from the 
Balfour Declaration (1917) to the creation of Israel in 1948, as well as Vatican attempts 
to constrain the nascent state in the years after its birth. More specifically, it considers the 
transnational nature of Roman Catholic responses to Zionism and the creation of Israel. 
The Vatican was supported in its anti-Zionist stance by an international network of 
national Catholic hierarchies, lay Catholic organizations and an active Catholic press. 
Leading this international Roman Catholic lobby against Zionism were the Catholic 
bishops of the United States. From the 1920s through the 1950s, American Catholic 
leaders had become crucial intermediaries in the relationship between Washington and 
the Vatican. Speaking as both loyal American citizens and as devout Roman Catholics, 
iv 
 
the bishops were uniquely positioned to transmit the Vatican‟s policy objectives to the 
American government. The American bishops were also instrumental in advocating 
Vatican positions on Zionism at the United Nations, evidence of the importance of the 
American Catholic Church, and its various organs, in disseminating the positions of the 
Vatican to the international community.  
 Through an examination of a comprehensive range of primary materials, this 
study demonstrates that an understanding of the Vatican‟s relationship with Zionism and 
the nascent Israeli state must take into account the transnational Roman Catholic 
consensus on the future of Palestine, an advocacy led by American Catholics, who 
represented the leading edge of Vatican attempts to shape the future of Palestine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords 
 
Christianity, Cold War, Israel, international relations, Judaism, Palestine, Roman Catholic 
Church, transnational history, United Nations, Zionism 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study, with much love, is dedicated to my parents, Johanne and Erminio.  
I could have asked for no more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 This study, like all doctoral dissertations, was the product of many hands. Though 
a single scholar claims credit for the completion of such a task, the road to its end is 
always paved by the selfless and generous advice, encouragement and support of fellow 
researchers, scholars, archivists, students, librarians, friends and family. It is a road that is 
rarely travelled alone and in this sense, I have been remarkably fortunate. My doctoral 
colleagues at Western have contributed to these pages more than they know, providing 
advice, counsel, humour and friendship often just as I needed it most. In this regard, I 
would like to give particular mention to Tim Compeau, Craig Greenham, Tea Gucciardo, 
Richard Holt, Mark Humphries, Marilla McCargar, Ryan O‟Connor, Heather Stephenson, 
Marina Soroka, Jane Whalen, and Nic Virtue. You all have a hand in the pages that 
follow. In London, Toronto and Valencia, my good friends Jim Apostolopoulos, Richard 
Corneil, Neil Hrab, Ryan Mangel, Philip Savas, Klaus and Zahava Schieman-Burckhardt 
and Murray Watson also played a role in getting me to this point- thank you all for your 
unfailing friendship and support. Anna and Graziana, thank you for your love and 
support. 
 Among the archivists who were most generous with their time and guidance were 
Nicholas Scheetz of Georgetown University‟s Special Collections, Heidi Christein of the 
archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit, and William LaFevre of the Walter P. Reuther 
Library at Wayne State University. In the nick of time Annie Gruber, archivist at New 
York‟s Catholic Near East Welfare Association, provided me with a cache of 
correspondence that immeasurably enhanced the study. Maria Mazzenga, of the archives 
vii 
 
of the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C., deserves special mention for 
her encouragement and advice. Closer to home, the assistance of Claire Callaghan, Chief 
Librarian at King‟s University College, and Elizabeth Mantz, history subject librarian at 
Western‟s Weldon Library, was sincerely appreciated. 
 The department of history at the University of Western Ontario provided support 
from the earliest stages to the final weeks of submitting the draft. Chris Speed, the 
department‟s graduate secretary, was always available to answer a myriad of questions, 
and always made it pleasant to visit the office. Among faculty members, Dr. Margaret 
McGlynn, Dr. Francine McKenzie, Dr. Eli Nathans and Dr. Robert Wardhaugh deserve 
special mention for their generosity, advice and counsel. The study is immeasurably 
better for their input. I also extend sincere thanks to my examining committee, who 
provided invaluable feedback and advice to improve the work further. My external 
examiner, Dr. Charles Gallagher of Boston College, provided sage advice and 
encouragement as the project neared completion- thank you kindly.  
 My master‟s supervisor, Dr. Peter C. Kent of the University of New Brunswick, 
sparked my interest in the Vatican‟s role in international affairs. His patience, confidence 
and advice were instrumental in vesting me with the confidence to pursue doctoral 
studies. Last, but not least, my biggest debt of gratitude belongs to my doctoral 
supervisor, Dr. Robert Ventresca. From the early weeks of research to the final days of 
submitting this manuscript, he provided an unfailing and patient confidence that saw me 
through to the end. When it comes to supervisors, I know I was blessed. I am eternally 
grateful for his wise counsel, time and patience, but above all, for his friendship. Thank 
you sincerely. 
viii 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Title Page          i 
Certificate of Examination        ii 
Abstract and Keywords        iii 
Dedication          v 
Acknowledgments          vi 
Table of Contents         viii 
Abbreviations          x 
Introduction          1 
Chapter 1  The Vatican, American Catholics and Zionism, 1897-1939  18 
 The Holy See and Zionism, 1897-1922     25 
 Storm Clouds Over Europe: 
 The Vatican and American Catholics Move Closer    59 
 
 “The Mangiest, Scabbiest Cat Ever”: 
 The American Catholic Political Lobby Matures    69 
 
 The Vatican, American Catholics and Political Zionism, 1922-1939 77 
 
Chapter 2  Toeing the Roman Line: 
  American Catholics, the Holocaust and the Palestine Question 94 
 
 The Wartime Strategic Embrace:  
 American Catholics, the Vatican and Washington    95 
 
 Into the Abyss: The Pope and the Shoah     102 
 
ix 
 
 American Catholics, the Holocaust and Zionism    109 
 
Chapter 3 “Impatient Zionism” and the Transnational Catholic 
  Crusade for the Holy Land      141 
 
 Cold War Consensus: The Vatican, American Catholics and Truman 142 
 
 Non Possumus: A New Roman Catholic Crusade for the Holy Land 156 
 
 The UN Partition Plan and the Birth of the „Corpus Separatum‟, 
 1947-1948         173 
 
 The NCWC „Office for UN Affairs‟ and the „Jerusalem Question‟  179 
 
 The CNEWA and the „Palestine Question‟     196 
 
Chapter 4 Chimerical Triumph: The International Catholic Orbit  
  and the Corpus Separatum      209 
 
 The Dies Fatalis: The Roman Catholic Church and the Birth of Israel 210 
 
 Israeli and American Zionist Groups Respond to the Catholic Threat 233 
 
 Digging In: Israeli Consolidation and a Renewed American 
 Catholic Offensive        241 
 
 The International „Catholic Orbit‟ and the Palestine Question  267 
 
 The Ostensible Triumph of the „Catholic International‟: 
 The Revival of the Corpus Separatum     273 
 
Chapter 5 Final Struggles: Defeat and Retreat of the „Catholic Orbit‟, 
  1950-1958        295 
 
 Miss Zizzamia Goes to Geneva      298 
 
 Jerusalem Calling: Israeli Parry, Roman Catholic Riposte   310 
 
 Schaefer‟s UN Office Orchestrates a Final Push    321 
 
x 
 
 Conclusion         335 
 
Bibliography          345 
 
Curriculum Vitae         360 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ACPC   American Christian Palestine Committee 
AJC   American Jewish Committee 
AZEC   American Zionist Emergency Council 
CAIP   Catholic Association for International Peace 
CCA   Churches of Christ in America 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CNEWA  Catholic Near East Welfare Association 
DC   Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy) 
IUCW   International Union of Catholic Women 
IDF   Israeli Defence Force 
NCCJ   National Conference of Christians and Jews 
NCCM  National Council of Catholic Men 
NCCW  National Conference of Catholic Women 
NCPPRM National Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights in 
Mexico 
NCWC  National Catholic Welfare Conference 
NCNS   National Catholic News Service 
PCC   Palestine Conciliation Commission 
PCI   Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) 
UN   United Nations 
UNCIO  United Nations Conference on International Organization 
UNSCOP  United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
ZOA   Zionist Organization of America
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 On the morning of 30 December 1993, in the Vatican‟s Sala Regia, a 
„Fundamental Agreement‟ was signed by Mgr. Claudio Celli, Vatican Assistant Secretary 
of State, and Yossi Beilin, Israel‟s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, which paved the 
way toward full diplomatic relations between the two parties.
1
 Though this agreement 
between the Vatican and Israel was, on one level, a political document undertaken by two 
sovereign subjects of international law for the purpose of exchanging ambassadors, it was 
also emblematic of a more significant rapprochement. The tensions that characterized the 
relationship between the Vatican and the state of Israel, particularly in the decade after 
1948, had their roots much deeper in the historical relationship between Roman 
Catholicism and Judaism. The Roman Catholic Church, in the main, had historically 
viewed Judaism as a fallacious and pariah faith, and the Jews a group destined to wander 
the earth for their complicity in the death of the Christian saviour, Jesus Christ. The 
„historical‟ proof of this theology, according to numerous early Christian theologians, 
was evidenced by the first century destruction of Judaea at the hand of the Romans: the 
overthrow of the Jewish king, the fall of Jerusalem, the destruction of the Temple, and the 
dispersal of the Jewish people.  
                                                          
1
 While the original agreement settled the property rights of the Roman Catholic Church in Israel, the 
issue of Jerusalem was not raised in the document, despite the fact that the Vatican, down to 1993, 
continued to hold the official position that the city should be internationalized. As a result of these 
negotiations, the Vatican named Andrea Cordero Lanza di Montezomolo its first apostolic nuncio to Israel 
in 1994. For a fuller analysis of the accords, see Marshall J. Breger, ed. The Vatican-Israel Accords: 
Political, Legal and Theological Contexts (Notre Dame, 2004). 
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 Down to the twentieth century, papal aversions to the return of the Jews to 
Palestine continued to be shaped by this fundamental conviction. This theological view, 
of course, also shaped the Vatican‟s opposition to political Zionism, particularly as this 
movement gained momentum from the late nineteenth century onward. The idea that the 
Jews might return to Palestine to establish sovereign control there and that the most 
sacred Holy Sites of Christianity, directly related to the life and death of Christ, might fall 
under their jurisdiction, was unthinkable to the popes of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, discovered this in 
1904 when he was received by Pope Pius X in Rome. “The soil of Jerusalem,” the pope 
informed his guest, “is sacred to the life of Jesus Christ. As head of the Church, I cannot 
say otherwise. The Jews did not recognize Our Lord and thus we cannot recognize the 
Jewish people.”2 In essence, the statement made clear that the Church, for reasons both 
historical and theological, could not endorse the creation of a Hebrew home in Palestine. 
As the Zionist movement gained momentum in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, and particularly after the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Vatican opposition Jewish 
territorial sovereignty in the Holy Land (Terra Santa) grew more entrenched. In the 
decisive years after 1945, a period which witnessed the birth of the Israeli state, Vatican 
anti-Zionist policies were put to the test, first in attempts to block the partition of 
Palestine at the UN, and next to secure Jerusalem and its environs as an international, 
sovereign corpus separatum, independent of either Israeli or Jordanian control.
3
 
                                                          
2
 See Uri Bialer, The Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1967 
(Bloomington, 2005): 2. 
3
 A corpus separatum (Latin for ‘separated body’) was the phrase used to describe Jerusalem’s theoretical 
extraterritoriality during the debates on the partition of Palestine at the UN. The 1947 UN Partition Plan, 
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 In recent decades, a small but very good body of scholarship has emerged that 
examines the Vatican‟s response to the rise of political Zionism and to the creation of the 
state of Israel, as well as papal relations with the nascent state in its formative years. 
Sergio Minerbi‟s The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (1990) 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical roots of the Vatican‟s position on 
political Zionism in the early years of that movement.
4
 Minerbi traces the Vatican‟s 
anxiety towards the potential of Jewish sovereignty over the Holy Sites of Palestine, as 
well as the active, and often frenetic, diplomacy of papal nuncios in opposing the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 (in which Britain pledged to support the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine). The failure of the Vatican to secure even the most modest of its demands, as 
Minerbi skilfully delineates, was but a prelude to setbacks later in the century. Livia 
Rokach‟s The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine (1987) provides a 
competent overview of Vatican reactions to developments in the territory from the 
Balfour Declaration to the Six Day War (1967).
5
 More comprehensive is Andrej Kreutz‟s 
Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (1990), which explores the evolution of 
papal policy on the Palestine question, but which also examines the Vatican‟s relationship 
with the Palestinian national movement through the twentieth century.
6
 George Irani‟s 
The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in fact, proposed a corpus separatum for Jerusalem and its surrounding territory, which encompassed the 
towns of Bethlehem, Ein Karem and Abu Dis.  
4
 See Sergio Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) 
5
 See Livia Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine (London: Saqi Books, 1987) 
6
 See Andrej Kreutz, Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) 
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1962-1984 (1986) complements Kreutz‟s analysis, with a particular focus on papal policy 
in the region after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).
7
 A number of articles by 
Silvio Ferrari have more specifically examined the Vatican‟s quest to secure access to the 
Holy Sites of Palestine in the postwar years, as well as delineating failed papal attempts 
to secure an internationalized Jerusalem in the same period.
8
 More recently, Uri Bialer‟s 
Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1967 
(2005) examines Israeli perspectives on the relationship with the Vatican in the post-1948 
period, revealing the extent to which Tel Aviv considered the Vatican a genuine threat to 
the interests of the nascent state.  
 While this study builds upon these works, it ranges beyond the existing 
historiography by examining two important aspects of the Vatican‟s relationship with 
Zionism and the state of Israel. The first half of the study examines the fundamentally 
transnational nature of Roman Catholic attitudes towards political Zionism, with a 
particular focus on Catholics in the United States. The second half of the study examines 
the Vatican‟s political efforts to constrain Zionist ambitions in the post-1945 decade, with 
a focus on the political advocacy of American Catholics on behalf of the papal secretariat. 
I contend that the transnational consensus that existed among Roman Catholics on the 
question of Zionism, combined with the growing power and influence of the Catholic 
Church in the United States, gave American Catholic leaders a unique ability to transmit 
                                                          
7
 See George Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1962-1984 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986) 
8 See Silvio Ferrari’s “The Holy See and the postwar Palestine issue: the Internationalization of Jerusalem 
and the protection of the Holy Places.” International Affairs (Summer 1984):261-283; “The Vatican, Israel 
and the Jerusalem Question, 1943-1984.” The Middle East Journal 39, 2 (Spring 1985): 316-331. 
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the Vatican‟s Palestine policy both to the UN and to the most powerful capital in the 
world. As such, American Catholics became the leading advocates of papal policy on a 
number of postwar questions, including Palestine. 
 In this sense, my focus here is the fundamentally transnational character of 
Vatican diplomacy on the question of Zionism and in its relations with Israel. In recent 
decades, a growing body of scholarship has examined diplomatic and international 
relations through a transnational lens.
9
 As defined and practised by scholars such as Akira 
Iriye, Ian Tyrell, David Thelan and Patricia Clavin, transnational history concerns the 
movement of people, ideas, technologies and institutions across national boundaries. In 
the field of international relations, transnational history seeks to range beyond the 
examination of relations between sovereign governments and their diplomats to consider 
the influence of a range of non-governmental actors who influence global affairs, 
including international cultural, religious and ideological organizations and bodies, 
diaspora communities, multinational corporations and the international media.  
                                                          
9
 Transnational perspectives have been employed by historians in various forms throughout the twentieth 
century. Annales historian Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean in the Age of Phillip II (1949), could be 
considered a forerunner of the transnational genre, as he explores geographic, economic and 
demographic influences while political influences, and specifically the role of European rulers, were 
considered the ephemera of history. Political scientists Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane edited a 
collection of essays on transnational politics, Transnational Relations and World Politics (1970), which 
further defined the field and which included an essay by sociologist Ivan Vallier on the Roman Catholic 
Church as a transnational actor. More recently, a collection edited by Akira Iriye and Thomas Bender, 
Rethinking American History in a Global Age (2002), presented the perspectives of a number of leading 
scholars in the field of transnational history, specifically addressing the challenge of writing national 
histories in an increasingly globalized and interconnected age. On further attempts to define the field, see 
David Thelan, ‘The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History’, Journal of 
American History, 86, 3 (1999); Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’, Contemporary European 
History, 14, 4, (Nov., 2005): 421-439. 
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The definition offered in 1972 by political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye, that transnationalism describes “contacts, coalitions and interactions across state 
boundaries that were not directly controlled by the central policy organs of government” 
appeared to outline the essence of the  concept.
10
 For historians employing a transnational 
perspective, however, arriving at a unitary definition has proven somewhat more elusive, 
particularly as the body of scholarship in the area of transnational history has expanded in 
the last decade. Thelan has characterized transnational encounters as “border crossings”, 
examining how particular values, ideologies and cultures passed through and over 
national boundaries, often with ethnic and political diaspora communities, in the process 
transforming nation-states and rendering political boundaries increasingly less 
important.
11
 More recently, Clavin has challenged more traditional definitions by 
contending that rather than view transnational communities as fixed or bound networks, it 
is more accurate to view them as more malleable structures where individuals, groups and 
ideologies wither away to be replaced by new groups and ideas.
12
 The very survival of 
these networks, posits Clavin, was dependant on their flexibility and malleability. While 
Clavin‟s definition can be accurately applied to the historical development of a number of 
twentieth century transnational communities, it is less applicable to Roman Catholic 
transnationalism in the decades before the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), when 
orthodoxy and ideological consensus, as opposed to malleability, characterized the 
international Church. In this sense, the form of transnationalism I examine in this study is 
                                                          
10
 Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye, eds. Transnational Relations and World Politics, xi. 
11
 See Thelan, ‘The Nation and Beyond’, 968. 
12
 See Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’, 438-439.  
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more akin to the traditional definitions offered by Keohane, Nye and Thelan, among 
others.  
 The Roman Catholic Church, as an international religious organization which 
maintains an extensive network of national hierarchies and which oversees nearly three 
thousand territorial dioceses around the world, represents the quintessence of a 
transnational actor in global affairs. Much of the existing historiography on Vatican 
diplomacy, however, including work on the relationship between the Vatican and Israel, 
has centred on traditional channels of diplomatic exchange; namely popes, nuncios and 
apostolic delegates (papal diplomats), ministers and heads of state.
13
 This focus has 
proven fruitful in examining the Vatican‟s formal relations with nation-states, particularly 
in the area of concordat (treaty) negotiations, whereby the Church has sought specific 
guarantees and rights for Roman Catholics in a given state or territory. Papal nuncios also 
played a crucial role in transmitting papal policies and demands to national governments, 
as the history of Vatican relations with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Communist 
Poland so vividly illustrates. 
 A strict focus on high diplomacy, however, does not adequately explain the 
Vatican‟s postwar relationship to Zionism and the Israeli state. In the United States, 
which was home to the most powerful national branch of the international Roman 
Catholic Church, the apostolic delegate in Washington did not often communicate papal 
                                                          
13
 Robert A. Graham, S.J.’s Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane 
(1959) remains a forceful examination of the structure and method of the Vatican’s diplomatic activities. 
More recently, essays in Peter C. Kent and John Pollard’s Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age (Westport, 
1994) have explored papal diplomacy in a range of twentieth century contexts. For a perspective on 
modern papal diplomacy, see Thomas J. Reese’s Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the 
Catholic Church (Cambridge, 2003). 
8 
 
demands on Palestine directly to the American government. These policies, instead, were 
commuted to the American bishops through their national council, the National Catholic 
Welfare Council (NCWC) in Washington D.C. The bishops, in turn, coordinated a 
pervasive campaign designed to steer American and United Nations (UN) policy on Israel 
toward lines amenable to the Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church. This 
campaign extended beyond the bishops themselves, and encompassed lay Catholic 
organizations, sub-committees of the NCWC, and papal associations under the 
jurisdiction of American Catholic leaders. The American Catholic press was also 
deployed in the battle for public opinion, as both the Vatican and the American bishops 
were cognizant of the potential clout of the „Catholic vote‟ in Washington‟s policy 
considerations. American Catholic activism, moreover, came at the head of an 
international Roman Catholic lobby on Palestine, hence the importance of considering the 
transnational dimension of the Vatican‟s relationship to Zionism and the nascent Israeli 
state.  
 In recent decades, a small body of scholarship has explored the transnational 
character of Vatican diplomacy. Sociologist Ivan Vallier‟s 1972 essay „The Roman 
Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor‟ delineated the multi-faceted organization of the 
international Church, which pursued its objectives not only through the Vatican 
secretariat and its network of papal diplomats, but also through a global network of 
religious and lay Catholic organizations.
14
 Vallier‟s focus, however, remained 
contemporary, and did not explore the historical dimensions of Vatican transnationalism. 
                                                          
14
 See Ivan Vallier, ‘The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor’ in Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye’s Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, 1972): 129- 152. 
9 
 
More recent scholarship by Lisa L. Ferrari and Jeffrey Haynes has similarly considered 
the contemporary aspects of Vatican transnationalism, examining papal attempts to shape 
questions on social justice, bioethics and migration through its international network of 
national hierarchies, religious and lay organizations.
15
 My own research seeks to examine 
this transnational aspect of papal diplomacy as it applied to the historical relationship 
between the Vatican and Zionism, positing that Roman Catholic transnationalism was a 
more potent a force in the first half of the twentieth century than it was in the decades 
after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). 
 This study is indebted to the work of Peter D‟Agostino, whose Rome in America: 
Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism (2005) explored the 
transnational nature of Catholic ideology from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 
interwar decades.
16
 D‟Agostino posits that Catholics in the United States “forged an 
imagined community with myths, shared symbols and a calendar of prescribed rituals,” 
with the Holy See in Rome comprising the spiritual and physical centre of this 
community.
17
 He reveals how American Catholics demonstrated solidarity with the popes 
through public rituals and political agitation that distinguished Catholics from their non-
Catholic neighbours. D‟Agostino traces this American Catholic exceptionalism through 
reaction to the Roman Question and the rise of Mussolini‟s Fascist regime. Throughout 
                                                          
15
 See Lisa L. Ferrari’s ‘The Vatican as a Transnational Actor’ in Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence 
Reardon and Clyde Wilcox, eds. The Catholic Church and the Nation State: Comparative Perspectives 
(Washington, 2006): 33-50; Jeffrey Haynes, Religion, Politics and International Relations (New York, 2011): 
173-211. 
16
 Peter D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism  
(Chapel Hill, 2005). 
17
 Ibid, 7. 
10 
 
the nineteenth century, American Catholics rose to the defence of papal demands for 
territorial sovereignty (the Roman Question), a position which placed them at odds with 
Protestant, Jewish and liberal Americans, the latter whom regarded the emergence of a 
unified, democratic and anti-clerical Italy as the liberal and progressive realization of 
millennial hopes.  
Similar patterns emerged with American Catholic sympathy and support for 
Mussolini and Fascist Italy. As D‟Agostino outlines, American Catholics (particularly 
Italian Americans) followed the lead of papal Rome in participating in rituals legitimizing 
Mussolini‟s regime, as the Italian embassy in Washington forged strong relations with the 
bishops and Catholic laity. American Catholic sympathy for Fascist Italy was 
demonstrated, on a political plane, by demands that Washington repeal its embargo on 
Rome during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936, as outlined in chapter one of this 
study. The absence of an anti-Fascist movement among American Catholics, moreover, 
underscored a solidarity with papal Rome (which had come to endorse Mussolini‟s 
regime after 1929), and again generated frictions between Catholics and their non-
Catholic fellow citizens. 
 American Catholic attitudes towards Zionism through the first half of the 
twentieth century dovetail neatly with the patterns revealed by D‟Agostino. I contend, in 
fact, that the Vatican‟s diplomatic efforts to shape the Palestine question in the first 
decade of the Cold War must be understood in the context of this shared transnational 
opposition to Zionism. As chapter one outlines, such a consensus did exist between Rome 
and the American bishops from the time of the Balfour Declaration onward. This was 
despite frictions between Rome and the American bishops earlier in the century, when 
11 
 
papal fears of doctrinal and theological autonomy in the American Church led to a 
crackdown.
18
 The Catholic consensus on Zionism, in fact, grew stronger in the interwar 
decades, as the Zionist lobby itself grew more powerful and strident. This transnational 
Catholic reticence to Zionism also proved remarkably resilient. Even the Holocaust, 
which would create significant pockets of sympathy for Zionism in the United States, did 
not fundamentally alter the Vatican nor American Catholic opposition to the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine. While American Catholics expressed sympathy with the plight 
of European Jews, often in language more explicit than that of Pope Pius XII, they 
stopped firmly short of endorsing the Zionist program. When a Catholic leader did 
express sympathy with Zionism, as the case of New Orleans‟ Archbishop Joseph 
Rummel illustrates in chapter two, the Vatican moved quickly to suppress it, evidence of 
the unanimity Rome would demand on the question. 
 In the postwar period, this transnational consensus melded into political action, 
with American Catholics at the forefront of efforts to shape developments on postwar 
Palestine. A number of factors had made the American bishops leading voices in the 
international Church. Through the interwar decades and during the war, leading 
archbishops such as Detroit‟s Edward Mooney, New York‟s Francis Spellman and 
Chicago‟s George Mundelein had cultivated close ties with President Franklin Roosevelt 
and the Democratic Party. Institutionally, the Catholic Church in the United States had 
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expanded steadily after the First World War, bolstered by waves of Catholic immigration 
from Europe and high birth rates. This growth boosted the financial might of the 
American Church. As John F. Pollard‟s recent study of Vatican finances reveals, New 
York, Boston and Chicago, in that order, were the three wealthiest archdioceses in the 
world by 1939.
19
 The Vatican, increasingly isolated in Europe and anxious to tap into the 
resources of the American Church, grew progressively closer to the American episcopate 
in the interwar years. This was firstly through the creation of associations such as the 
Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA), which was placed entirely in the 
hands of the American bishops, and which would play an important role in postwar 
Roman Catholic efforts in on Palestine. The Vatican also placed American prelates in 
ever higher positions of authority in the papal secretariat, another sign of the interwar 
„turn‟ towards the American Catholic Church. President Roosevelt‟s creation of a 
„personal representative‟ to the Holy See in 1939, moreover, appeared to signal ever 
closer relations between the papacy and the United States.  
 As the postwar era dawned, it appeared that Washington, the Vatican and the 
American Catholic bishops did comprise an informal, yet ideologically cohesive strategic 
alliance that was primarily committed to the containment and rollback of Soviet 
communism. On the question of Palestine, however, a distinctive American Catholic 
lobby emerged which clearly diverged from Washington‟s policy on the territory. On this 
issue, the American bishops clearly took their ideological and political lead from Rome. 
The transnational consensus that D‟Agostino revealed on the Roman Question and 
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Mussolini‟s Italy had survived the war intact, manifesting itself forcefully on the question 
of Palestine. And as in previous cases, American Catholic positions on Zionism placed 
them at odds with Protestants, Jews and liberals, a majority of whom had come to support 
the creation of a Jewish home in the territory. The Vatican had high hopes that the 
American bishops, given their ties in Washington, increasing financial might, and 
growing public profile, and given their role as lynch-pins in the Vatican-American 
relationship, might be uniquely endowed to transmit the Vatican‟s postwar designs both 
in Washington and at the UN. Roman Catholic political pressure, both from Rome and 
the various organs of the American Church, however, were ultimately unable to alter the 
policy direction of Washington on the Palestine question. Throughout the postwar years, 
President Harry Truman and American policymakers remained committed to a cautious 
and seemingly malleable line designed to appease both opponents and proponents of the 
internationalization of Jerusalem, while remaining a steadfast ally of the nascent Israeli 
state. Chapters three, four and five of this study trace the rise, and ultimate demise, of this 
American Catholic lobby on Palestine.  
 As this study is centred on the institutional responses of the American Catholic 
Church to the rise of political Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel, it has drawn 
heavily on a number of important archival collections in the United States. The papers of 
the NCWC, housed at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., were 
indispensable to this work. The NCWC was the American bishops conference, and as 
such, it was the administrative nerve-centre of the political activities of the American 
episcopate. The communications of the Holy See to the American bishops, moreover, was 
most usually channelled through the secretary general of the NCWC, making these papers 
14 
 
essential to delineating the relationship between the Vatican secretariat and American 
Catholic leaders. This collection also contains the papers of the Office of UN Affairs, an 
NCWC mandated NGO which advocated the positions of the Vatican at the UN from 
1946 onward. The papers of Catherine Schaefer, who directed the UN Office from 1946 
to 1972, and who worked tirelessly to promote the Roman Catholic position on Palestine 
at the world body, are also found in this collection. The papers of Schaefer‟s assistant, 
Alba Zizzamia, who spearheaded a number of important initiatives on the Palestine 
question in her own right, have also been examined. 
 Also in Washington are the National Archives and Record Administration 
(NARA) collections and the archives of Georgetown University (Georgetown Special 
Collections), both of which have been consulted for this study. NARA holds the papers of 
Myron C. Taylor, who served as „special representative‟ to Pope Pius XII for both 
President Franklin Roosevelt and President Harry Truman from 1939 to 1951. Taylor‟s 
papers are vital to illuminating the relationship between the Vatican and Washington 
from the beginning of the Second World War through the early Cold War, as well as 
being an important window on the mind of the Vatican secretariat, particularly as it 
related to Palestine. The Taylor papers also contained the extensive correspondence of 
Truman with New York‟s Cardinal Spellman on the Palestine question, which is 
examined in chapter four of this study. The „Palestine Notebook‟ of Dean Rusk and 
Robert McClintock, also at NARA, provide valuable insight into the views of the 
American delegation to the UN during the crucial period of 1946 to 1949. Georgetown‟s 
Special Collections hold the papers of a number of figures germane to this study, 
including Senator Robert F. Wagner, Edmund Walsh and Wilfred Parsons, as well as the 
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papers of America, an American Jesuit magazine that exemplified the transnational 
Roman Catholic consensus on Zionism. 
 Other archival collections have also been utilized. The papers of Archbishop 
Edward Mooney, housed at the archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit, have revealed the 
views of a leading American bishop of the era, who was raised to Cardinal by Pope Pius 
XII in 1946, and who served as chairman of the NCWC from 1935 to 1945. Also in 
Detroit are the archives of the Walter P. Reuther Library, at Wayne State University, 
which hold the papers of Philip Slomowitz, influential editor of the Detroit Jewish News, 
and an outspoken critic of Roman Catholic attacks on Zionism. In the late stages of 
preparing this manuscript, I was also granted preliminary access to the papers of Mgr. 
Thomas McMahon, which are housed at the archives of the Catholic Near East Welfare 
Association (CNEWA) in New York. These papers, which were heretofore unavailable to 
scholars, provide important details on the diplomatic efforts of McMahon who, as the 
acting head of the CNEWA between 1944 and 1955, functioned as the de facto Vatican 
envoy to Israel. McMahon‟s meetings and correspondences with a number of key figures, 
including President Harry Truman, James McDonald (the first American ambassador to 
Israel), David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, various high-ranking 
ministers in the Israeli government, prominent American Zionist leaders, and King 
Abdullah of Jordan, among others, reveals his unique role as an unofficial yet crucial 
intermediary in early Cold War Vatican-Israeli dialogue. McMahon‟s close working 
relationship with New York‟s Cardinal Francis Spellman, the most powerful figure in 
postwar American Catholicism (and whose papers remain closed to scholars), further 
underscores the significance of these records. I have been afforded full access to 
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McMahon‟s papers when they have been catalogued in their entirety by the summer of 
2012. 
Anyone studying the Cold War Vatican must contend with the fact that its papers 
for the postwar period remain closed. In spite of this, a number of available sources 
provide a window on the Vatican‟s Palestine policy during the period of this study. For 
the war years, the eleven volume Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde 
Guerre Mondiale (ADSS), published between 1965 and 1981, provides a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the Vatican‟s reaction to the Holocaust, as well as its inflexible 
stance on the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine.
20
 The Myron C. Taylor papers also 
reveal the Holy See‟s position on developments in Palestine. Supplementing these is 
Ennio Di Nolfo‟s Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 1939-1952 (dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor) 
(1978), a published collection, based on Taylor‟s papers, which includes numerous 
references to the Palestine question.
21
 The NCWC papers, which contain ample 
correspondence between the apostolic delegate (the Vatican‟s representative to the 
American Catholic Church), and the American bishops, have also proven valuable.  
 In this study, I have also examined a wide cross-section of the American Catholic 
press. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the weekly newspapers of the various 
archdioceses and dioceses (the diocesan press) were published under the editorial control 
of the NCWC‟s Press Department and local bishops. As such, the editorial lines of these 
papers could accurately be described as the official mind of the Church on a variety of 
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social and political questions. The overwhelming consensus in the diocesan press on the 
Palestine question only underscores this fact. I have also examined a number of large-
circulation American Catholic journals which lay outside of the editorial control of the 
NCWC, such as the Jesuit weekly America, the Paulist Catholic World and the lay 
Commonweal, to illustrate that this consensus on Palestine extended beyond the diocesan 
papers. Contrarian views were not selectively weeded out- virtually none were found. 
 I have also utilized the Catholic press because, from the beginning of the Second 
World War, and particularly after 1945, the Vatican encouraged and often instructed 
Catholic editors in the United States to disseminate the Roman Catholic position on 
Palestine widely. This was particularly so after the American Catholic lobby was 
countered by an active campaign in the American Jewish press which sought to diffuse 
the criticisms of Zionist tactics in American diocesan newspapers. Concern about 
negative reportage in the American Catholic press reached all the way to Tel Aviv, where 
government officials, including David Ben-Gurion, urged moderation on Catholic editors, 
and encouraged a vigorous response from Jewish papers. The Catholic press, as such, 
became a key tool in the American Catholic lobby on Palestine, particularly as sympathy 
for Zionism among non-Catholics burgeoned after 1945. 
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Chapter 1 
 Origins: The Vatican, American Catholics and Zionism, 1897-1939 
 
 The Vatican‟s hostility to political Zionism in the 19th and 20th centuries, and its 
disapproval of the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, is a policy which has 
its roots deep in the history of relations between Christianity and Judaism.
1
 Its origins, in 
fact, extend back to the life, and particularly the death, of Jesus. The charge that Jews had 
been responsible for the murder of the Christian saviour spawned an entrenched 
antagonism for Jews and for Judaism among early Christian theologians and Church 
leaders. In short order, the deicidal Jews became the archetypal evildoers and outcasts in 
Christian societies. References to deicide could be found in the gospels, but it was the 
Church Fathers who ensconced notions of Judaism‟s inferiority and depravity in the early 
Church. Christian writers such as Origen, Tertullian, Augustine and John Chrysostom, 
among others, interpreted the New Testament in a manner which made antagonism to 
Judaism appear as a part of the very mission of Christ. Portrayals of Jews as rapacious 
hypocrites, children of hell and of the devil, haters of and rejected by God, and deicidal 
were found throughout the early Christian scriptures. By the 6
th
 century, such attitudes 
had been absorbed by civil authorities and ensconced into legal codes. The Justinian 
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Code (534), which for centuries would serve as a juridical guidepost in the West, 
removed Jewish rights and classified them, with other non-Christians, as heretics. Later 
laws, published “in the name of our Lord and God Jesus Christ,” punished Jewish 
marriages as “abominable,” forbade circumcision of converts, and limited ways in which 
Jews could worship.
2
 
 Roman Catholic resistance to the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine could also be 
traced to the early Church, and was strongly linked to the notion of Judaism as a pariah 
faith. That the Jews had lost their place as the „chosen‟, in the eyes of God, and had been 
supplanted by Christianity was prophesied, according to these writers, by the fall of Israel 
to the Romans. The destruction of the temple at Jerusalem in 70 CE, and the dispersal of 
the Jewish peoples appeared to confirm this Christian triumph over Judaism. Tertullian 
considered the Roman victory over the Jews, and the loss of their capital, as evidence of 
God‟s abandonment of the Jews and their punishment in this life and the next. Ambrose, 
the 4
th
 century bishop of Milan, and his famous disciple, Augustine of Hippo, both 
identified Jews with the fratricide Cain, who was condemned to wander the earth as 
suffering examples to Christians who might be tempted to revolt against their faith. The 
Christian identification of the Jews with Cain repudiated, in essence, the very notion of a 
permanent Jewish home in Palestine, or anywhere. According to Christian teachings, the 
Jews were no longer the divinely chosen witnesses to God‟s moral message, but a 
rightfully suffering pariah group, condemned to eternal wandering for their mortal sin 
against Christ.  
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 The emergence of this increasingly virulent Christian anti-Judaism, which denied 
the right of Jewish settlement in the Holy Land, coincided with the growing presence of 
Christian groups in Palestine itself. This began in earnest during the reign of Constantine 
the Great (306-337), who had famously promulgated the Edict of Toleration which had 
ended Christian persecution in the Roman Empire. Constantine‟s mother, Helena, 
reputedly made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where she uncovered the remnants of the True 
Cross and the tomb of Christ, discoveries which were intended to suggest Christianity‟s 
ancestral and legitimate stake in the territory. Over the next several centuries, an 
ambitious program of building, which included the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem 
and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (the reputed site of Christ‟s 
resurrection), appeared to cement the official presence, and primacy, of the Christian 
Church in Palestine. The fall of Christian Palestine to Muslim invaders, beginning in the 
7
th
 century, only served to inspire the Crusades, which sought to expunge the „infidels‟ 
from the most sacred territory of the Christian faith. Though the Crusades were officially 
launched to dislodge the Muslim caliphates from the Holy Land, European Jews were 
frequently brutalized by departing Christian armies, still considered guilty of a much 
more grievous injury to Christ, his crucifixion. It was against this theological and 
historical backdrop that a Roman Catholic opposition to the very idea of a return of the 
Jews to Palestine was forged, a view which persisted into the 20
th
 century. 
 For centuries after the Crusades, the Holy Places continued to be the focus of 
inter-faith disputes, given that Palestine was also home to sites sacred to Judaism and 
Islam. Because the territory held such symbolic and historic importance to Christianity 
and Islam, the rival monotheistic faiths of Europe and the Near East, Palestine was also a 
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contested pawn in wider imperial struggles, as the history of the Crusades so vividly 
illustrates. Disputes between Christian groups themselves over the administration and 
control of holy sites were also prevalent. At sites such as the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Basilica of the Nativity in Bethlehem, Roman Catholic 
and Greek Orthodox churchmen struggled bitterly for control, echoing larger imperial 
struggles between the various Catholic empires of Western Europe, loyal to the popes, 
and Byzantium, which historically had opposed papal supremacy. 
 Ottoman suzerainty over the region from the sixteenth century forward created 
further challenges for Christian groups in Palestine. The Ottoman Sultans tended to 
favour Orthodox Christians in Palestine, who were their own subjects, at the expense of 
Latin (Roman Catholic) Christians, who were the subjects of European powers with 
whom the Sultans were frequently at war. As a result of frequent tensions between Latin 
and Orthodox Christians, and on occasion between Christians, Jews and Muslims, the 
Ottoman Government decreed in 1757 a modus vivendi between the faiths, an agreement 
that sought to prevent future disputes over jurisdiction by preserving the status quo, as it 
existed in 1757, in perpetuity. The edict, which became known as the „Status Quo‟ 
agreement, applied to most of the sacred sites in Palestine, including Jerusalem‟s Wailing 
Wall, Tomb of the Virgin and the Sanctuary of the Ascension, and Bethlehem‟s Basilica 
of the Nativity and the Field of the Shepherds. The agreement, which was reaffirmed by 
Istanbul in 1853, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Paris (1856), which ended the 
Crimean War. Britain adopted the Status Quo into its Palestine Mandate in 1917, and as 
22 
 
late as 1947, Orthodox Christian representatives at the United Nations (UN) appealed to 
the juridical validity of the 200 year old edict.
3
 
In the wake of the Status Quo agreement, the Holy See came to rely increasingly 
on the French crown, which maintained sound relations with the Ottomans, to defend its 
interests vis-a-vis the sultan, a position which France exploited to advance its own 
political and diplomatic ambitions in the Near East. By the nineteenth century Russia, 
which sporadically allied with the Ottomans, also accorded protection to the Greek 
Orthodox churches in Palestine, ostensibly to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians 
and their Holy Places.
4
 As Ottoman power declined throughout the century, the interest of 
the European Great Powers in the region intensified, with the alleged objective of 
protecting pilgrimage sites providing a flimsy cover for larger political, strategic and 
economic ends. 
 The history of relations between the Holy See and what would become the State 
of Israel originated in this 19th century competition of the European Great Powers for 
                                                          
3
 United Nations representatives on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) referred to the Status 
Quo agreement between 1947 and 1949 in determining the validity of claims made by Orthodox 
churchmen in Palestine. See ‘United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Committee on 
Jerusalem- The Holy Places: Note on the History of the Status Quo, Working Paper Prepared by the 
Secretariat’, 8 April 1949, National Catholic Welfare Conference (hereafter NCWC), Office of the General 
Secretary (hereafter OGS), Archives of the Catholic University of America (hereafter ACUA), Box 44, File 
22. 
4
 The best scholarly examination of the Holy See’s confrontation with pre-state political Zionism remains 
Sergio Minerbi’s The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York, 1990). My brief 
examination here is indebted to this work. Competition between France and Russia in the Near East, 
under the auspicious guise of protecting the Christian ‘Holy Places’ of the Ottoman Empire, lay at the 
heart of the dispute that would culminate in the Crimean War (1854-1856). Both Napoleon III and 
Nicholas I, citing previous treaties, claimed jurisdiction as trustee and protector of Christian pilgrimage 
sites. For a succinct treatment of the diplomatic intrigues leading to the war, see Norman Rich, Great 
Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (Boston, 1992), 101-122. 
23 
 
influence and strategic advantage in the Near East.
5
 This strategic contest for advantage 
in the Near East and central Asia, which historians would come to label the „Great 
Game‟, also drew the Holy See into the political and diplomatic intrigues of the region. In 
short order, the contest for Palestine drew all of the powers into the territory, each 
seeking a stake in the Holy Land. In 1841, in an effort to check the expansionist leanings 
of imperial Russia, Great Britain and Prussia established a Protestant bishopric in 
Jerusalem. France and Austria-Hungary, as nominal allies of the Holy See, represented 
papal claims against Orthodox and Protestant challenges. The Holy See itself jumped into 
the fray, preferring not to leave its bidding entirely to its Catholic allies. In 1837, Pope 
Gregory XVI had extended the authority of the Melkite (Arabic Eastern Catholic) 
patriarch of Antioch to Alexandria and Jerusalem, re-establishing a Catholic ecclesiastical 
structure in Palestine absent for centuries.
6
 In 1847, the Latin (Roman Catholic) Patriarch 
was finally re-established in the Holy Land, and the Uniate Churches (Syrian Catholic, 
Maronite, Armenian, Chaldean Catholic), though small by comparison, were re-organized 
and strengthened in order to undertake new missions.
7
 
 From the 1850s to the end of the century, the Roman Catholic Church opened 
dozens of new hostels for pilgrims, and even more schools, hospitals, clinics and 
orphanages for the local Catholic population. These institutions were staffed by more 
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than thirty male and female religious orders, sent by the Holy See to establish a firmer 
presence in the Near East. As the Ottoman grip on the region weakened in the latter 
stages of the century, over 100 new churches and chapels were constructed or re-
constituted in Palestine, evidence of a Christian revival in a land so long under the 
sultanate‟s yoke. 
 This does not suggest that the Holy See maintained strained relations with 
Istanbul. On the contrary, Ottoman administrators allowed Roman Catholic religious a 
generous degree of autonomy in establishing communities and administering to their 
faithful, cognizant of Istanbul‟s weakening position in Europe, and mindful of the 
papacy‟s influence with heavily Catholic powers such as France, Austria-Hungary, Spain 
and Italy. Amicable relations with the Ottomans allowed the papacy to protect and to 
cultivate the growing population of Christian Arabs in the region which, though small in 
number, were beginning to exert a widening influence in Palestine. Christians Arabs, 
unlike Muslims, were disproportionately urban and middle class. Because their 
occupational distribution was most similar to that of the Jewish population, Christians 
were generally more concerned about commercial competition from the small Jewish 
population than from their Muslim compatriots.
8
 These indigenous Christian groups, who 
spoke Arabic and were considered, along with Muslims, as Arabs, would form the 
nucleus of both Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist movements in Palestine, and would play 
a role in the Holy See‟s policy towards the region well into the twentieth century.9 
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The Holy See and Zionism, 1897-1922 
 From the start, the founders of modern political Zionism understood the 
importance of harmonizing the goals of Jewish nationalism with the Holy See‟s position 
in Palestine.
10
 To this end, Zionist leaders actively sought the support and sanction of the 
Roman Church. The importance of protecting the sanctity and security of Christian sites 
was well understood by leading Zionist figures. Theodor Herzl, spiritual father of 
political Zionism and author of the seminal Der Judenstatt (The State of the Jews), the 
foundational manifesto of modern Zionism, expressed this in an 1896 meeting with 
Cardinal Antonio Agliardi, the papal nuncio in Vienna. “The sanctuaries of 
Christendom”, Herzl assured the nuncio, “would be safeguarded by assigning to them an 
extra-territorial status such as is well known to the law of nations. We should form a 
guard of honour about these sanctuaries, answering for the fulfillment of this duty with 
our existence. This guard of honour would be the greatest symbol of the solution to the 
Jewish Question after eighteen centuries of Jewish suffering.”11 Herzl stressed that 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth would be excluded from a future Jewish state, 
internationalized, and possible placed under the authority of the Holy See, pledges that 
would be repeated by a succession of Zionist leaders down to 1948.
12
 Herzl would be the 
first Zionist leader, however, to encounter the Holy See‟s ambiguous yet ultimately 
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disproving attitudes towards Zionism. In his diary, he confided that he left the meeting 
with doubts about Agliardi‟s sincerity, fearing that the nuncio regarded the goals of 
political Zionism untenable and at odds with papal designs for the territory. 
 Herzl‟s scepticism of Vatican support was piqued again the following year. In 
May of 1897, on the eve of the first World Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, the 
Roman Catholic Church issued its first official statement on Zionism. The Jesuit 
newspaper, Civiltà Cattolica, which closely mirrored the Vatican‟s line on international 
affairs and inter-faith relations, proclaimed its position on a Jewish homeland as Zionist 
delegates arrived in Basle: 
One thousand, eight hundred and twenty-seven years have passed since the 
prediction   of Jesus of Nazareth was fulfilled, namely that Jerusalem would be 
destroyed...As for   a rebuilt Jerusalem, which might become the centre of a 
reconstituted state of Israel,   we must add that this is contrary to the predictions 
of Christ himself who foretold that   „Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the 
Gentiles, until the time of the Gentiles be   fulfilled‟ (Luke 21:24), that is...until 
the end of the world.
13
 
 
In no uncertain terms, the statement clarified Rome‟s opposition to political 
Zionism on both theological and political grounds, and announced that the Church could 
not support the ultimate aims of the Zionist movement. 
 Perhaps more definitive was Herzl‟s rebuff during a visit to Rome in January 
1904. He was afforded the opportunity of audiences with both Pope Pius X and the 
Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, evidence of his growing prestige as leader of 
the Zionist movement. The granting of the audience itself was also a sign of the Pope‟s 
benign relationship with Judaism, in contrast to the coarser attitudes of his nineteenth 
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century predecessors. Both Pius X and Merry del Val, in fact, were known for their 
strong relationship with the Italian Jewish community. As the pope pointed out to Herzl, 
“I have always been on good terms with Jews...after all, there are bonds other than those 
of religion: courtesy and philanthropy. These we do not deny the Jews. Indeed, we also 
pray for them.”14 Merry del Val emphasized that “the history of Israel is our heritage, it is 
our foundation”, and spent nearly an hour in intimate conversation with Herzl.15 Both 
Pius X and his Secretary of State, however, categorically refused any support for the 
Jewish nationalism espoused by Herzl and his followers. As Merry del Val explained to 
Herzl, since the Jews had denied the divinity of Christ, “How can we, without 
abandoning our highest principles, agree to their being given possession of the Holy Land 
again?”16 The pope echoed his resolute Secretary in delivering his verdict to Herzl. “We 
cannot give approval to the movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to 
Jerusalem, but we could never sanction it. The soil of Jerusalem, if it was not always 
sacred, has been sanctioned by the life of Jesus Christ. As the head of the Church, I 
cannot tell you anything different.” It was at the end of this audience that Pius X issued 
his infamous challenge to Zionism. “If you come to Palestine to settle your people there,” 
he informed his guest, “we shall have churches and priests ready to baptize all of you.”17 
 With this ended Herzl‟s brief meeting with Pius X. While the pope offered Herzl 
general platitudes to the Jewish people, he could not sanction the ambitions of political 
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Zionism, despite Herzl‟s persistent assurances that Christian sites would never fall under 
Zionist jurisdiction. The theological position of the Church, which had historically 
shaped the Holy See‟s international policy, placed it at irreconcilable odds with Zionist 
aspirations. It was a position, from Rome‟s standpoint, that could not be „negotiated 
around‟.  Several months after Herzl‟s visit, Merry del Val elaborated on the Vatican‟s 
position in an interview with the Viennese Zionist journal Die Welt: 
  How can we deliver up the country of our redeemer to a people of a different 
faith?   Whenever a bad book appears or an ugly picture which mocks us, or a 
newspaper    which defames us- then... we find the Israelite behind it...Yet the 
Church would do   nothing to impede the Zionists effort to obtain, “a home in 
Palestine secured by public    law...” For that is quite another matter...If the Jews 
believe that they can ease their lot   in the land of their fathers, that is a 
humanitarian question in our view. The foundation   of the Holy See is apostolic; 
it will never oppose an undertaking that alleviates human   misery.
18
 
 
The Vatican, then, would not oppose migration of the Jews to Palestine on 
humanitarian grounds, but on theological grounds it could not support Zionism as a 
political movement, nor could it endorse the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
This was repeated to Heinrich York Steiner, as associate of Herzl, just weeks after the 
latter‟s Roman visit. Merry del Val assured Steiner that if the Jews wanted to establish 
agricultural colonies in Palestine, he would regard it as a humanitarian endeavour and not 
impede it.
19
 The Secretary of State, however, did not anticipate mass immigration leading 
to Jewish domination of the country, as would become the case by the later 1920‟s. 
                                                          
18
 Die Welt, 1 April 1904. Quoted in Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, 101. Die Welt, which was edited by 
Herzl, is not to be confused with the German national daily newspaper of the same name, which was 
launched in 1946. 
19
 Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961), 407. Quoted in Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 33. 
29 
 
 The Vatican‟s position was to alter little through to the Balfour Declaration of 
1917. From Herzl‟s visit forward, the Vatican came to realize that political Zionism 
posed a greater danger to its interests in Palestine than did any other Christian group or 
the Ottomans. As the Roman Catholic Church regarded itself as the one true faith, the 
Vatican realized the need to espouse a firm anti-Zionist position, while preventing the 
Church from being branded anti-Semitic. Though anti-Zionism could be explained as a 
rational policy, consistent with the Church‟s historical mission to safeguard its Holy Sites 
related to the life of Christ, charges of anti-Judaism or anti-Semitism could only impede 
the Holy See‟s larger objectives. This was particularly important as the global Zionist 
movement gained momentum in the years leading to war. It was a fine balance, however, 
that the papacy, with its diverse international flock, its network of national hierarchies, 
and its quasi-independent press (which included hundreds of diocesan newspapers), could 
not always manage.
20
 
 Following Steiner‟s visit, nearly thirteen years would pass before the Vatican 
would receive another Zionist delegate. By the time Pope Benedict XV received Nahum 
Sokolow in 1917, however, the state of international relations had been significantly 
altered. While the World Zionist Organization (WZO) had been plagued by infighting for 
several years after Herzl‟s death in 1904, it had grown to become a formidable and multi-
national movement by the eve of the First World War.
21
 The growth of international 
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Zionism was fuelled by a rapid out-migration of Russian Jews escaping persecution and 
pogrom. From 1881 to 1914, nearly 170,000 Jews fled Russia, the majority heading for 
Germany, Britain and the United States. As a consequence, Berlin, London and 
Washington acted as international hubs of the movement through the war years. These 
states, in turn, remained keen to cultivate Zionist loyalties to further the war effort, an 
objective complicated by the fact that Germany would oppose both Britain, and 
eventually the United States, on the battlefields of Europe. All Zionists agreed, however, 
on the principle of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
 Sokolow‟s April 1917 visit to the Vatican came amidst this flush of optimism for 
the Zionist movement, in the afterglow of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which 
assigned the fate of Palestine to Britain and France after the inevitable fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, and as it appeared likely that the Allies would prevail over the Entente. 
Sokolow‟s confidence was further buoyed by Sir Mark Sykes, who had visited the 
Vatican a week earlier. In private conversations with Mgr. Eugenio Pacelli (the future 
Pope Pius XII), Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and Pope Benedict XV, Sykes came away with a 
strong impression that the Vatican was at last prepared to accept the aspirations of 
political Zionism.
22
 Sykes discussed the “immense difficulties which surrounded the 
question of Jerusalem...and the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greeks besides the 
aspirations of the various Powers.”23 Pacelli informed Sykes that the Vatican was not 
opposed to British protection of the Holy Places, and additionally that he did not oppose 
the Jewish settlement of Palestine, so long as the Holy Places remained under foreign, 
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and preferably Christian, jurisdiction. Sykes, on his part, assured Pacelli that the Zionists 
had no intention of annexing these sites. After brief meetings with Gasparri and Benedict 
XV, Sykes remained convinced of the Vatican‟s goodwill. On 14 April 1917, Sykes 
apprised Sokolow of his meetings in Rome: 
I visited Msgr. Pacelli, and was received in audience by His Holiness. On both   
occasions I [stressed] the intensity of Zionist feeling and the objects of Zionism.   
I was careful to impress that the main object of Zionism was to evolve a    self-
supporting Jewish community...which should...be a proof to the non-Jewish   
people of the world for the capacity of Jews to produce a virtuous and simple    
population...I further pointed out that Zionist aims in no way clashed with 
Christian   desiderata in general, and Catholic desiderata in particular, in regard to 
the Holy    Places.
24
 
 
 Sokolow saw Pacelli on 29 April, followed by meetings with Gasparri on 1 May 
and Benedict XV on 4 May. Despite his optimism, buoyed by Sykes‟ letter, he was 
careful to present the Zionist program in a most moderate vein, wary of altering the 
Vatican‟s apparent change of view.  With Pacelli and Gasparri, he was careful to 
downplay notions of a Jewish state or of Jewish political domination of Palestine.
25
 To 
Benedict XV, Sokolow characterized Zionist goals as the preservation of historical 
Judaism with its spiritual and moral traditions, rooted in as it was in scripture. To this 
end, he stressed, it was not necessary to encourage large-scale Jewish immigration to the 
Holy Land, or to alter the existing demographic balance in Palestine. The central issue, 
according to Sokolow, was to “inspire world Judaism by a new model of idealism”.26 
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Sokolow‟s Vatican visit would ultimately produce a mixed bag of messages.27 
Despite presenting his aims in moderate terms, Pacelli was sceptical, pressing his visitor 
for a more rigidly defined outline of Zionist territorial demands. On hearing Sokolow‟s 
general explanations of Zionist aims, Pacelli commented:  
 
    That is not enough. Borders must be determined, what the Holy Places are must 
be   defined, for on this there are differences of view: some hold that they mean 
all the   country, others- that they are only a few isolated sites. We must know in 
advance   what you demand, in order to avoid conflicts and competition between 
us.
28
 
 
While Sokolow had intended to speak in generalities, and to present Zionism as a 
moderate and logical program, Pacelli continued to press for clarification on territorial 
specifics, indicative of his later demands for the territorial sovereignty of Jerusalem, 
Nazareth and Bethlehem after the establishment of Israel. Sokolow had clearly 
underestimated the Vatican‟s territorial claims, which amounted to a virtual partition of 
Palestine. Pacelli indicated that the reserved area, which would be off-limits to Zionist 
claims, was to extend well beyond the Holy Places themselves and would cover 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and its surroundings, as well as Tiberias and Jericho. 
Pacelli explained, cordially though firmly, that the legal and political status of the region 
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would have to be established directly through negotiations between the Holy See and the 
Powers, and that the Zionists would be expected to abide by their decisions.
29
 
 Though Gasparri also emphasized the Vatican‟s territorial claims, he expressed 
sympathy with the plight of Jews in Russia, and with the basic aims of Zionism as 
presented by Sokolow. A number of topics were discussed including the general situation 
of the Jews and the desire for Palestine, the Holy Places and the Church‟s stand regarding 
them, and the Vatican‟s attitude towards Zionism. Gasparri assured Sokolow that the 
Vatican was not opposed to Jewish migration to Palestine, particularly if it was prompted 
by religious persecution elsewhere. He reminded Sokolow that the Church had 
condemned the persecution of both Catholics and Jews in Tsarist Russia, and that the 
Vatican would continue to condemn the religious persecution of Jews wherever it 
occurred. Though Gasparri‟s territorial demands differed little from those presented by 
Pacelli, as both were espousing the papal line, he did end the meeting with Sokolow on 
an affirmative note. “Naturally”, he exclaimed, “we are sympathetic to [Zionism]. You 
must do this and we will be extremely glad if you succeed in establishing the Kingdom of 
Israel.”30 
 On 4 May, Sokolow was received by Benedict XV in an audience lasting nearly 
an hour, longer than the allotted twenty minutes. It was a sign of the pope‟s eagerness to 
receive his visitor, and an implicit nod to the growing significance of the Zionist 
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movement. Like Gasparri, the pope expressed sympathy with the plight of persecuted 
Jews, and assured his guest that the Roman Catholic Church had no objection to the 
immigration of Jews to Palestine. On the return of persecuted Jews to the Holy Land, in 
fact, the pope expressed his approval, affirming to his guest that “...it is providential. God 
has willed it.”31 The pope concluded his meeting by repeating to Sokolow, several times, 
“Si, si, io credo che saremo buoni vicini” (Yes, yes, I believe we will make good 
neighbours), suggesting that the Pope, like Gasparri, approved of a Jewish „kingdom‟ in 
Palestine, so long as Roman Catholic sovereignty over religious sites and centres 
remained intact.
32
 Sokolow was sufficiently encouraged that he submitted a report to 
Chaim Weizmann suggesting that the Holy See‟s demands were finally dovetailing with 
Zionist ambitions for Palestine. Weizmann, relying on the report, felt confident enough to 
tell a London Zionist conference on 20 May that “we have assurances from the highest 
Catholic circles that they will view with favour the establishment of a Jewish National 
Home in Palestine, and from their religious point of view see no objections to it and no 
reason why we should not be good neighbours.”33 
 Sokolow‟s visit, however, would mark the end of Vatican ambivalence towards, 
and apparent sanction of, political Zionism for decades to come. The events of the next 
several years served to harden Vatican opinion on the subject, and hearkened the return of 
the firmly anti-Zionist line of previous decades. On 2 November 1917, British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration, drafted with the 
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assistance of Weizmann, Sokolow and the British Zionist Lord Walter Rothschild.
34
 The 
Declaration, which promised British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, 
contained assurances of protection to non-Jewish communities in Palestine, though it 
ominously neglected to discuss the rights of Palestinian Arabs, who constituted nearly 
90% of the population.
35
 The Declaration, followed by General Edmund Allenby‟s 
triumphant entrance into Jerusalem on 11 December, after British troops had captured the 
Holy City from the control of the Ottomans, aroused latent anxieties in the highest levels 
of the Vatican Secretariat. 
 The Vatican appeared initially relieved that Jerusalem had been wrested from the 
Ottomans by a Christian state, and Benedict XV had long considered Great Britain the 
ideal power to administer Palestine after the fall of the Porte. The Vatican‟s semi-official 
organ, L’Osservatore Romano, went so far as to call the capture of Jerusalem a “victory 
for the Christian civilization”; a sentiment echoed by the Catholic press the world over.36 
What concerned the Holy See‟s bureaucrats, however, was that the Balfour Declaration 
appeared to disregard papal claims to sovereignty over the Holy Places, making no 
mention of sites considered sacrosanct by the Holy See. In fact, the Declaration appeared 
to sanction the eventual Zionist domination of the whole country, including the Holy 
Places and the indigenous Arab and Christian populations. The day after Allenby‟s 
entrance into Jerusalem, Gasparri, speaking to the French attaché in Rome, confided that 
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since the Turks had left, the status of the Holy Places would re-emerge as a source of 
conflict between the Christian powers, and that “Zionism, of which Mr. Balfour had just 
made a gift to Palestine, would not fail to engender other conflicts.”37 In concluding, he 
added that it was “difficult to take a piece of our hearts away from the Turks in order to 
give it to the Zionists.”38 
 The next five years would mark a period of intense Vatican opposition to Zionist 
plans for Palestine, as it appeared that a Jewish state in the territory was rapidly moving 
from ideology to reality. Added to this in the fall of 1917 were fears of a „Bolshevistic‟ 
Zionism using the territory as a beach-head to further expansion, a concern that caused 
genuine disquiet in both Vatican and wider circles in the immediate aftermath of the 
Russian Revolution. Closer to home, the spectre of Italian Bolshevism also appeared to 
be looming larger, highlighted by waves of strike activity in 1919 and 1920. It was a 
predicament that further stoked papal fears of losing administrative sovereignty in 
Palestine. In the midst of such flux, the Vatican remained firmly committed to 
maintaining control of the Holy Places and the Catholic institutions in the territory, and 
maintained a vigorous antipathy to the notion of a „Jewish‟ Palestine.  
 Pope Benedict XV‟s pronouncements and allocutions increasingly reflected this 
growing apprehension. His March 1919 allocution to the College of Cardinals amounted 
to a forceful re-statement of Vatican policy, and was clearly intended to trumpet the 
Vatican‟s demands to the delegates of the Paris Peace Conference, who had been 
deliberating since January. The Pope explained that there was: 
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“...one matter on which We are most specifically anxious and that is the fate   of 
the Holy Places, on account of the special dignity and importance for which    
they are so venerated by every Christian. Who can ever tell the full story of all    
the efforts of Our Predecessors to free them from the dominion of the   infidels, 
the heroic deeds and the bloodshed by the Christians of the West   through the 
centuries? And now that, amid the rejoicing of all good men,    they have finally 
returned into the hands of the Christians, Our anxiety is   most keen as to the 
decisions which the Peace Congress at Paris is soon to   take concerning them. For 
surely it would be a terrible grief for Us and for   all the Christian faithful if 
infidels were placed in a privileged and prominent   position; much more if those 
most holy sanctuaries of the Christian religion   were given to the charge of non-
Christians...”39  
 
The Pope‟s subsequent statements on the issue reflected similar reservations on 
the rapidity of developments in Palestine, and the potential for Rome to lose control and 
influence in a territory inexorably bound to the tradition and history of the Church.  
 The Vatican‟s stiffest challenge to Zionism in this early period came in the form 
of official protests issued by Gasparri to the League of Nations in and to the British 
government in 1920 and 1922 which severely censured the British Mandate for Palestine. 
The Cardinal censured the Mandate as providing the Zionists a “privileged and 
preponderant position relative to other nations and faiths” in the territory, creating a 
situation which favoured continued Jewish immigration into the territory.
40
 Gasparri 
further critiqued the Balfour Declaration as incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty of 
Versailles, and with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that mandates 
were supposed to be a “tutelage” which one power assumed over “peoples not able to 
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support themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”41 The Vatican, 
accurately, did not consider the Zionists in Palestine to constitute such a fragile 
population. Gasparri reminded both the British government and the League that the 
Mandate, which purported to support “the well being and development of the peoples of 
Palestine”, in fact was becoming “an instrument for the subordination of the indigenous 
population for the advantage of other nationalities.”42 
The Vatican also tried to stir up opposition to the Mandate from „Catholic‟ states 
at the League, including France, Italy, Spain, Poland and Brazil. Though each of these 
powers had their own objectives for backing Rome, they all saw some utility in backing 
the Vatican‟s stand, if only to thwart British influence in a Jewish dominated Palestine. 
Italy and Spain, however, were wary of French influence in Palestine should the Mandate 
be defeated, given France‟s history as defender of the papacy. Poland, having regained 
independence only four years earlier, wielded little singular clout at Geneva, despite its 
willingness to toe the Vatican line. In the end, then, no such unified front materialized, 
despite Brazil‟s strenuous support of the Vatican position. As a first attempt by Rome to 
rouse a „Catholic international‟ in opposition to Zionist aspirations, it was a failure.43 In 
July 1922 the League of Nations approved the Palestine Mandate, and in December it 
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officially came into force. The rebuff spoke volumes on the limits of post-Versailles 
Vatican diplomacy, despite the reputed support of traditional Catholic allies at Geneva. 
Papal failure to achieve results based on conventional diplomacy, especially 
considering the nominal support of powerful allies, was particularly stinging to the 
Vatican, given that the fate of the Holy Land was the one issue on which it felt it had a 
sound and persuasive case. One certainly could argue that the Roman Catholic Church 
had an ancestral and legitimate stake in the question, yet this amounted to little in the end.  
The defeat of the Vatican in 1922 undoubtedly opened the door to closer co-operation 
with less traditional partners. The American Catholic Church, which to this point had 
played a minimal role in advocating papal policy would, given its growing financial 
might and reputed influence in Washington, steadily assume a more central position in 
the „Catholic international‟ throughout the interwar period. A brief examination of the 
rise of the American Church, which expanded rapidly in the period before the First World 
War, contextualizes the growing post-1918 alliance between the Holy See and the 
American Catholic hierarchy.  
The Rise of Roman Catholicism in the United States  
 The Roman Catholic Church in the United States has a presence that extends back 
to the Spanish missions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the earliest 
communities found in what are now the states of Florida, Georgia and Texas. French 
colonization in the eighteenth century expanded the Catholic presence to the Louisiana 
Territory districts, as well as the Great Lakes region. Freedom of worship was guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution of 1791, though Roman Catholics were traditionally 
eyed with suspicion by the Protestant majority of the early Republic. As the Catholic 
40 
 
population grew, so too did Protestant fears that Catholics undermined the ideals of 
liberty, democracy and republicanism upon which the young nation had been founded. 
Anti-Catholic nativism manifested itself politically in the „Know Nothing‟ movement, 
whose leaders advocated the curbing of immigration from Catholic nations, and restricted 
its membership to Protestant males of Anglo-Saxon (and preferably British) lineage. 
Active in the mid-nineteenth century, the movement stoked fears that American Catholics 
pledged primary fealty to papal Rome, and that Pope Pius IX purported to subjugate the 
United States through mass Catholic immigration, co-ordinated by Irish-American 
bishops (who were of course selected by the popes). The movement was not above the 
use of violence to intimidate Catholics, though it did not achieve the notoriety of the Ku 
Klux Klan in its anti-Catholic brutality.  
Despite these tensions, the Catholic population continued to swell throughout the 
nineteenth century. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803, and the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 
(where Spain ceded Florida to the United States) greatly augmented the American 
Catholic population, numbers that were bolstered further still by waves of Irish and 
German immigrants throughout the century. By 1850, Roman Catholics comprised the 
largest single Christian denomination in the United States, numbering nearly seven 
million. Buttressed by heavy Catholic immigration in the last half of the century, the 
American Catholic population tripled, to nearly 21 million, by 1890. This pattern 
continued into the twentieth century, when scores of Italian and Polish immigrants were 
added to the continuing influx of Irish and German Catholics. The majority of these 
groups settled in the cities of the eastern seaboard and Great Lakes regions, such as New 
York, Chicago, Boston, Detroit and Philadelphia, creating a demographic concentration 
41 
 
in the north-east that would shape the power-structure of the Church well into the 
century.  
 The growth of the Church in the first half of the twentieth century largely 
mirrored the American ascent over the same period, and it experienced a post-1945 boom 
which mirrored that of the nation itself. The United States emerged after the Second 
World War as the world‟s most powerful nation-state, rivalled only by the Soviet Union 
in measures of military, economic and strategic power. While the postwar boom did not 
arrive in Europe for nearly fifteen years after the war, it began in the United States before 
the defeat of Hitler‟s armies, and continued unabated for nearly twenty-five years. The 
rise in American prestige and power after 1945 was reflected by the American Catholic 
Church.
44
 Its leaders were hailed both for their efforts in support of the American war 
effort and for denouncing the evils of Soviet communism. Its parish populations were 
swelled by large numbers of Catholic immigrants from war-ravaged Europe, and the 
postwar economic upsurge greatly facilitated the church‟s ability to fill its coffers and 
raise its national profile. By the early 1950s, of the ninety million Catholics in the world, 
nearly a third lived in the United States. In the course of 150 years, the American 
Catholic population had increased from 150,000 to over 25 million, becoming the largest 
single denominational group in the nation, Christian or otherwise.
45
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 Despite this growth, the relationship between Rome and the American Catholic 
Church did not develop without strains. To Rome, the American Church was long 
regarded an outpost of the faith, a missionary and immigrant Church that was kept under 
the auspices of the Propaganda Fide (the branch of the Roman Curia tasked with 
missionary work and related activities) until 1908, though apprehensions continued even 
after this date. While nativists feared the influence of popes on American Catholics, 
American bishops struggled to create an identity for the Church that was both Catholic 
and American. This led to acute tensions between Rome and American Catholic leaders 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Pope Leo XIII decried the 
constitutional separation of church and state in the United States, which denied the 
Catholic Church certain privileges, particularly in education and the delivery of social 
services, which it enjoyed in many European states. In an 1895 encyclical, he encouraged 
American Catholic leaders to advocate for a closer relationship between the Church and 
the American government, particularly in education. This brought him into conflict with 
powerful figures such as Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore and Archbishop John 
Ireland of St. Paul, who believed that religious freedom and pluralism, as well as the 
separation of church and state, were beneficial to the Catholic Church in the United 
States. These men, leading figures in the so-called „Americanist‟ movement, further 
believed it unwise to attempt to influence government to favour Catholicism over other 
faiths, another position which created frictions with Rome. The Pope‟s 1899 encyclical, 
Testem Benevolentiae, censured the „Americanist heresy‟ and powerfully re-emphasized 
the authority of Rome in the Church, condemning what he perceived as a growing 
independence among the American episcopate. Gerald Fogarty contends that the tactfully 
43 
 
worded encyclical, while forceful, reflected the diplomatic skill of the Pope, and allowed 
him to defuse the Americanist dilemma without creating deeper rifts.
46
 
 Papal concerns over the independence of the American Church, however, 
persisted. Leo XIII‟s successor, Pope Pius X, issued a 1907 encyclical, Pascendi 
Dominici Gregis, which condemned „modernism‟ and „relativism‟ in the faith, a criticism 
of theological trends that attempted to synthesize modern philosophical and ideological 
thought into Catholic doctrine. It was aimed squarely at American and European 
churchmen engaged in such synthesis. His „Oath Against Modernism‟, released in 1910, 
was required to be taken by all clergy, religious superiors and seminary professors, and it 
mandated a strict adherence to Roman interpretations of scripture and theology. Though 
some chafed at such a prescribed fidelity, the Oath did manage to scuttle the creative 
interpretation of theology, even if the Roman curia continued to harbour suspicions of the 
American Church. 
As late as the early 1920s, an air of mistrust towards the American Church 
continued to permeate the Roman curia, extending to the Pope himself. Suspicions were 
aroused again when, upon the United States‟ entry into the First World War, the 
American hierarchy met collectively to establish a temporary council to coordinate 
Catholic support for the war effort. The group‟s first spokesman, John J. Burke (who 
edited the influential Catholic World) received the approval of Cardinal James Gibbons 
(of „Americanist‟ notoriety) to convene a meeting of the hierarchy in December 1917 at 
Washington‟s Catholic University of America. It was the first collective meeting of 
American Catholic churchmen in over three decades, and it resulted in the creation of 
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National Catholic War Conference, an emergency body that was dissolved at the end of 
the war.
47
 Gibbons had pledged Catholic support for the war in an open letter to President 
Woodrow Wilson in April 1917, when he powerfully outlined the collective duty of the 
American Church. In creating the National Catholic War Council, Gibbons reiterated the 
imperative of Catholic support. “The Catholic Church cannot remain an isolated factor in 
the nation”, he intoned to American Catholics.  
The Catholic Church possesses the spiritual and moral resources which   are at the 
command of the nation in every great crisis. Parochial,    diocesan and provincial 
limits must be forgotten in the face of the   greater tasks which burden our 
collective resources today. Today, as never before, the Catholic Church in the 
United States has an opportunity   for doing a nation-wide work. No one, 
honestly, doubts Catholic loyalty to the principles of the American nation. And 
from the hierarchy to   the clergy, and from the clergy to the people, the 
government expects   an impulse towards a perfect and efficient cooperation with 
all its agencies in carrying the war to success.
48
   
 
American Catholics did respond resoundingly to the war effort, enlisting in 
numbers that exceeded their proportion of the population.
49
 In pledging steadfast support 
for the war, and in backing that up with a collective and coordinated effort, the American 
bishops also earned considerable legitimacy in larger American society, and a degree of 
political capital in its dealings with Washington. Indeed, the function of the Council to 
express the collective will of the American episcopacy undoubtedly ushered in a new 
pattern in the relationship between the bishops and Washington- one in which the unified 
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demands of the Roman Catholic Church would become more difficult for policymakers 
and politicians to ignore. 
After 1918, Burke and Gibbons led a campaign to establish a permanent bishops‟ 
council, a reflection of the rising profile of the Church in American public life, 
particularly given the ardent support of Catholics for the war effort. Burke envisioned the 
new body as having a specifically political mandate- a collective voice that could 
advocate on behalf of American Catholics. It was a vision that grew directly out of the 
experience of the wartime council. In September 1919, at a gathering of representatives 
from 87 of the nation‟s 100 dioceses at the Catholic University of America, the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) was created as a permanent replacement of the 
wartime council. Archbishop Edward Hanna of San Francisco was elected as its first 
chairman, and it was decided that the organization would be centred around five 
departments- Education, Legislation, Social Action, Lay Organizations, and a Press 
Bureau- each headed by a bishop, coordinating the activities and advocacy of the Church 
on a national level. Hanna described the specifically political role of the nascent body “to 
deal directly with the United States government and its numerous departments on matters 
that affect Catholic interests.”50 Bishop Peter J. Muldoon of Rockford, Illinois, who 
served as the first chairman of the NCWC‟s administrative committee, also saw the utility 
of the new body to galvanize Catholic opinion in the United States, creating a more 
unified and forceful lobby. “We do not hesitate to say that some representative body 
could accomplish untold good by directing editors, teachers, and even the clergy, on 
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general matters pertaining to the welfare of the Church”, he wrote in 1919, as the bishops 
met to form the NCWC. “There is an incessant demand for instructions on „how to act‟ 
on many bills that are now before the legislatures of the country.”51 
While many American bishops were enthusiastic about the possibilities of 
speaking with a unified national voice, the idea caused apprehensions in Rome, where 
memories of the Americanist crisis had not subsided completely. Gibbons‟ involvement 
in the NCWC, given his role during that crisis, only added to the air of mistrust. In 
January 1922, the Holy See moved to suppress the NCWC, fearing that a collective voice 
for the American bishops could only lead to a revived and potentially more dangerous 
Americanism.
52
 On 6 February, Pope Pius XI succeeded Benedict XV on the papal 
throne, and was immediately presented with a petition from a wide swath of American 
bishops to save the NCWC, and was visited personally by bishop Joseph Schrembs of 
Cleveland, who eloquently advocated for the body‟s survival. Cardinal Gasparri, who had 
arranged for Schrembs‟ meeting with Pius XI, clearly foresaw the utility of the American 
hierarchy speaking with a unified voice, and imparted to the new pontiff its potential 
advantages. In what could only be considered a nod to the growing power of the 
American Church, the new pope overturned the dissolution of the new body, stipulating 
only that episcopal councils take place less often than every year, that attendance at 
NCWC meetings remain voluntary, and that its decisions not be binding to all bishops of 
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the American Church. The decision was a watershed moment in the relationship between 
the Holy See and the American hierarchy, and one that would usher in a new era of 
American Catholic political advocacy.  
Following its brush with disbandment, the NCWC quickly established itself as the 
leading voice, and political lobby, of the American Catholic Church. Opportunity to test 
the potency of this lobby soon presented itself. The repressive anticlericalism practised by 
the Mexican regime of Plutarco Calles, who had won the presidency in 1924, provided 
the NCWC its earliest opportunity to advocate for a specifically Catholic policy response 
on an international issue.
53
 A freemason, Calles initiated anticlerical legislation in June 
1926 which included the outlawing of religious orders, the exiling of numerous bishops 
and clergy on trumped-up charges, a suspension of the civil-liberties of the clergy, and 
denial of the vote to the entire hierarchy. Within weeks, the situation descended into a 
protracted struggle between Calles‟ anticlerical allies and the supporters of the Church 
and the conservative, traditional order (the „Cristeros‟). 
The response of American Catholics to the Mexican crisis was indicative of the 
growing confidence and unity of the Church, undoubtedly aided by the existence of a 
national body that could express a collective will. Catholic pressure comprised of public 
statements issued by the bishops, cloistered diplomacy conducted by high-ranking 
members of the hierarchy, and a broad-based press campaign, aimed at bringing public 
pressure to bear on issues dear to American Catholics. In September 1926, the American 
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bishops issued an open letter of sympathy to their Mexican co-religionists, assuring them 
that Catholics in the United States- both clergy and laymen- remained committed to their 
struggle for religious freedom and an end to persecutions, promising to stand with their 
Mexican brethren “to the end.”54 This was followed by the bishops‟ “Pastoral Letter on 
Mexico”, which was issued following the hierarchy‟s annual meeting in December.55 
This statement drew clear parallels between the bishops‟ concerns both as Catholics and 
as American citizens, juxtaposing the freedoms enjoyed by American Catholics with the 
denial of religious liberties in Calles‟ Mexico. The statement was carefully worded so as 
not to appear to advocate for direct American intervention in the Mexican crisis, 
particularly military intervention, but it was clearly intended to galvanize Catholic 
pressure in expecting a firmer policy response from Washington.
56
 
A wider campaign of public awareness was initiated by the NCWC between 1926 
and 1929, spearheaded by Baltimore‟s archbishop, Michael Curley, who had succeeded 
Gibbons upon the latter‟s death in 1921. Curley engaged in a direct political activism that 
his predecessor would have advised against. On the issue of Mexico, Curley was active 
on the lecture circuit, delivering public speeches that sought a wider civic awareness and 
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engagement on Mexican religious persecutions, and demands that Washington adopt a 
firmer hand on Calles. Through the NCWC, he also encouraged grassroots activism on 
the issue, and sought to mobilize organizations such as the National Council for Catholic 
Men (NCCM) and the National Council for Catholic Women (NCCW) to spread 
awareness of the plight of their Mexican co-religionists. In August 1926, the NCWC 
called upon the local chapters of the NCCM and the NCCW to petition state and national 
leaders, including the President, the Secretary of State and congressmen, to pressure 
Mexico to cease its persecution of the Roman Catholic Church.
57
 To expand the base of 
Catholic activism even further, the NCWC‟s administrative committee sought to form a 
national committee of laypersons dedicated to stimulating a moral public opinion which 
would prompt Washington to more definitive action, an initiative resulting in the creation 
of the National Committee for the Protection of Religious Rights in Mexico (NCPRRM), 
chaired by the prominent Catholic Judge Morgan J. O‟Brien.58 Beyond this, the NCWC‟s 
press department supplied diocesan newspapers with a steady stream of dispatches from 
Mexico, where the organization had stationed a number of correspondents, resulting in 
pervasive coverage of Mexican atrocities in the widely circulated Catholic press.
59
 This 
campaign of awareness mounted by American Catholics was in full swing months before 
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Pope Pius XI offered his own formal denunciation of the Mexican situation, which he 
offered in the November 1926 encyclical Iniquis Afflictisque. 
The NCWC‟s response also included direct political advocacy. This included a 
letter from the organization (which of course carried the weight of the entire American 
episcopate) directly to President Calvin Coolidge in April 1926. The letter, which 
requested the President‟s attention to the growing atrocities committed by the Calles 
government, was published widely in the diocesan press in May. The most profound 
aspect of the NCWC‟s advocacy on the Mexican crisis, however, was the role it played as 
an intermediary between the American government, the Vatican and the Calles regime. 
The organization‟s central figure in this matter was John J. Burke, whose efforts had been 
instrumental in its founding.
60
 Between 1927 and 1929, Burke functioned as an unofficial 
envoy of the Vatican to Calles, a role approved of and encouraged by Secretary of State 
Frank Kellogg, and Dwight Whitney Morrow, who had been named the American 
ambassador to Mexico in 1927. Morrow considered Burke to be a churchman of 
exceptional diplomatic skill and tact, and one who might be able to persuade Calles to 
cease his persecutions of the Church and allow for the return of the apostolic delegate, 
George Caruana. Significantly, this sentiment was shared by the apostolic delegate to the 
United States, Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, and the Vatican itself, which preferred an 
American churchman to conduct the delicate negotiations over its official delegate to the 
American Catholic Church. Before a series of meeting with Calles in 1928, Burke met 
with Fumasoni-Biondi to be briefed on the Vatican‟s demands, which included the return 
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of the exiled Caruana, as well as bishops and priests who had been spuriously ousted by 
regional officials. In his meetings with Calles, Burke presented the Vatican‟s demands 
first and foremost, underscoring his role as the pope‟s de facto envoy. His efforts were 
instrumental in achieving a modus vivendi with the Calles regime in 1929, which resulted 
in the lifting of a number of restrictions on the Mexican Church, and defusing a situation 
which had bedevilled Mexican-American and Mexican-Vatican relations.
61
 
The lobbying efforts of the NCWC during the Mexican crisis signalled the 
emergence of the American Catholic Church as an organized and unified political force. 
Washington‟s reliance on Burke to conduct negotiations with Calles was emblematic of a 
growing relationship between the NCWC, the American bishops and leading Catholic 
figures on one side, and the American government on the other. The fact that Burke was 
able to forge a satisfactory agreement in difficult circumstances only deepened esteem for 
the NCWC. It was a relationship that would grow much stronger in the 1930‟s, when 
Franklin Roosevelt would develop a remarkably close relationship with American 
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Catholics, and when American Catholics would again press their demands on a number 
of international questions, including Palestine. 
The NCWC‟s efforts on the Mexican crisis also drew the American Church closer 
to the Vatican. The entrustment of Burke to the negotiations with Calles might have been 
desired by Washington, but was consented to by Rome, a decision that spoke volumes on 
the Vatican‟s growing trust in the NCWC and the American bishops on political and 
diplomatic questions. In a 1927 letter to the four American cardinals, Pope Pius XI 
praised the “splendid zeal” of American Catholic activism on Mexico, and lauded the 
various elements of the American Church for “vigorously defending and furthering the 
cause of the Holy Roman Church.”62 He reserved particular praise for the NCWC, and its 
News Service, for bringing public attention to the Mexican situation. It was a far cry from 
the Vatican‟s grave suspicions of the NCWC just five years previous, and it similarly 
signalled a closer working relationship between Rome and the American bishops that 
would strengthen further in the next decade. The broadening political and social clout of 
the American Catholic Church, as evidenced by activism on Mexico, and the Vatican‟s 
cognizance of the fundraising potential of the growing Church, were at the core of this 
rapprochement.  
There were other signs in the 1920s of growing ties between the Vatican and the 
American Catholic Church, and as with Mexico, it involved the diplomacy of a prominent 
American Catholic and academic, Edmund Walsh S.J., who in 1919 had founded 
Georgetown University‟s School of Foreign Service (six years before the United States 
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Foreign Service existed). Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Vatican had hoped 
that a modus vivendi could be established with Moscow. The popes had denounced 
atheistic communism since the mid-nineteenth century, but the events of 1917 raised 
fresh fears of religious persecution in Russia and an expansion of bolshevism beyond its 
borders. The Vatican had hoped that religious freedoms could be secured in exchange for 
official recognition from the pope, an important legitimising and symbolic link for the 
fledgling Soviet Union.
63
 Part of the Vatican‟s outreach strategy was a pledge of 
assistance to famine-stricken regions of Russia, with a call to Catholics worldwide to 
raise funds for the endeavour.
64
 The relief mission, however, had a practical purpose as 
well- it allowed the Vatican to dispatch a legion of religious to the Soviet Union, 
providing Rome an important source of intelligence from inside the country. As in the 
case of Mexico, the Vatican chose an American prelate, Walsh, to coordinate the Papal 
Relief Mission from Moscow.
65
 Walsh, who would find later fame as a chief American 
consultant at the Nuremberg Trials, was uniquely suited to the role. Between 1922 and 
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1924, he was in constant telegraphic contact with Rome, apprising the Vatican on the 
condition of the Catholic Church under Soviet rule. Though he was recalled from 
Moscow in 1924, allegedly because of his brusque (the Russians said “American”) 
diplomatic manner, he did manage to open up a dialogue between the Vatican and the 
Soviets.
66
  
Despite his recall, the mission initiated an increasingly intimate working 
relationship between the Vatican and the American Church. Upon his return from Russia, 
Walsh was sent by Pope Pius XI to Washington with a letter for President Warren 
Harding on the urgent need for Russian relief. While in the capital, Walsh was also able 
to secure significant amounts of Catholic aid for Russia, a development that impressed 
upon the Pope the financial might, as well as the fervent spirituality, of American 
Catholics. In 1926, after consulting with the apostolic delegate in Washington, Fumasoni-
Biondi, Pius XI created the Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) as a 
permanent umbrella organization for Vatican aid in Russia and the Near East. The 
fundraising capacity of American Catholics was undoubtedly the key factor in the placing 
of the new association in the hands of the American bishops. The example of the 
Vatican‟s Russian relief efforts between 1921 and 1923 had clearly demonstrated to the 
Vatican the fiscal might of the American faithful. Of the nearly two million dollars raised 
by Catholics worldwide, over three quarters came from the United States.
67
 The 
CNEWA‟s charter stipulated that funds raised (though mass stipends, special collections 
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and donations) would be forwarded directly to the Vatican‟s Sacred Congregation for the 
Oriental Church, and were to be dispensed at the behest of the Pope himself. The 
association‟s „Annual‟ for 1927 suggested that Catholics who joined the CNEWA pledge 
“a yearly minimum of one dollar”, and expressed “the Holy Father‟s hope that every 
American Catholic who can possibly do so will join this association.”68 Given a Catholic 
population of nearly twenty million in the United States, the fundraising potential of the 
new association was considerable. The creation of the CNEWA had, in effect, allowed 
the Vatican to tap into the vast financial might of the American Church while retaining 
firm control of the disbursement of funds. 
The new association was intended to provide Catholic assistance to Russia, 
Greece, Palestine and central Europe (the very regions where the Vatican feared a 
declining influence) and it was placed entirely in the hands of the American Catholic 
Church. In March 1926, the Vatican named Walsh the CNEWA‟s first president.69 In 
September, Walsh described “the wish of the Holy Father to form a permanent society 
somewhat like the International Red Cross or the American Near East Relief. It will be a 
centralized Catholic distributing agency which can materially assist the Holy See to meet 
the daily demands made on the Holy Father for assistance in humanitarian works, 
education, and in social welfare work all over the world, as well as in distinctly religious 
and missionary activities.”70 Its charitable efforts occasionally extended beyond the Near 
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East, such as a $100,000 donation made by the Holy Father, through the CNEWA, to 
victims of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, a donation which raised the domestic 
profile, and fundraising capability, of the association.
71
 Its board comprised the leading 
archbishops in the United States, and included cardinals William O‟Connell of Boston, 
Denis Dougherty of Philadelphia, and Patrick Hayes of New York.
72
 In entrusting the 
new association to the American bishops, the Vatican expressed “complete confidence in 
the [American] bishops, and the Holy See leaves to them full liberty in the practical 
working out of this project.” On the organization of the CNEWA‟s departments and 
functions, Cardinal Luigi Sincero, head of the Pontifical Mission for Russia, expressed 
that “the Holy See relies, as always, on the judgement of the American bishops.”73 
The placing of the CNEWA in the hands of the American episcopate was another 
sign of the Vatican‟s growing trust in, and reliance upon, the American Catholic Church, 
an alliance girded by the fiscal power of the American faithful. The CNEWA, as the 
singular Roman Catholic aid organization for Russia and the Near East, was tasked with 
collecting funds from every American diocese, with proceeds placed “at the direct 
disposal of the Holy Father himself.”74 Its objectives for 1927 included the 
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commencement of a Russian seminary at Rome, as well as aid for Russia, Greece, Syria 
and Palestine. A target amount of one million (American) dollars was set by the Vatican, 
a figure that was surpassed by June.
75
 The success of the CNEWA attracted attention 
beyond Catholic circles. Herbert Hoover, who at this time served as Secretary of 
Commerce, lauded the work of American Catholics in this sphere, connecting the 
alleviation of famine and disease to the combating of bolshevism and other anti-
democratic forces. A number of mainstream, secular newspapers echoed Hoover‟s 
sentiments.
76
 
The generosity of American Catholics, as well as the stalwart leadership of the 
American episcopate and clergy, did not go unrecognized by the Vatican. In June 1927, 
Pius XI praised the American Church, which had “once more demonstrated its traditional 
loyalty to this Holy See, manifested in their spirit of generosity.”77 In the same year, he 
credited them further with underwriting the Vatican‟s program for the “safeguarding of 
international peace through international understanding,” praising the “great, permanently 
organized body of American Catholics forming a solid phalanx” behind him, “unfailing 
in their loyalty and devotion.”78 In October 1928, he again extolled the leadership of the 
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American bishops in their development of the CNEWA. “We are indebted to you, 
Venerable Brothers,” he exclaimed, “in who the sacred hierarchy of the United States 
finds its personification, and without whom nothing ever could or can now be 
accomplished.”79 He further praised the American Church for “the substantial financial 
help given Us in support of two works of religion which are the object of intense daily, 
and, ...harrowing concern of Our Apostolic ministry.”80 The first of these were funds for 
the Propaganda Fide, the Vatican office tasked with carrying the faith to non-Catholic 
regions and states. The second “work” was funds for the Roman Catholic Church in 
Palestine, where the Vatican clearly sought to bolster its institutional presence in the 
midst rising Arab-Jewish tensions. The Pope urged the bishops to keep in mind “that East 
which once was a most flourishing garden of the Catholic Church and which later, 
separated, or rather torn, from the Church, fell into so wretched a plight, spiritual and 
material as well; that East which now as never before fills Us with hopes so strong and so 
sweet of seeing her return to the One Fold, but which for this very reason is more than 
ever beset and tempted by propaganda (only too well equipped with worldly resources of 
every kind) hostile to Christ and His Church.”81 As early as 1928, then, it was clear that 
American Catholic money was supporting the Roman Catholic institutional presence in 
Palestine, a territory now firmly on the radar of the Vatican secretariat. Though the 
Vatican would ultimately fail in its efforts to normalize relations with Moscow, the 
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CNEWA would remain central to Rome‟s outreach in the Near East, and would play a 
vital role in postwar Palestine.  
Storm-Clouds Over Europe: The Vatican and American Catholics Move Closer  
Increasing diplomatic isolation in Europe was another factor drawing the Vatican 
closer to both the American Catholic Church and Washington in the later 1920‟s. The 
decade, however, had started with a sense of optimism. Following its rebuff from 
participating in the Versailles negotiations, the Vatican spent much of the 1920‟s 
attempting to solidify its relations with Europe‟s secular governments. Vatican criticisms 
of the Versailles Treaty, mainly that it was an arbitrary and punitive settlement bound to 
create future discord, created strains between the papacy and the victorious powers, 
particularly France. In Vatican circles, German weakness was considered a portent to 
further unrest, and Gasparri sought a return to the „balance of power‟ that had preserved 
European stability for much of the nineteenth century. He still sought, however, to 
normalize relations with France, the „eldest daughter of the Church‟, which had been 
severed two decades previous over tensions in church-state relations and anticlericalism. 
Gasparri engaged in careful diplomacy with France, and instructed apostolic delegates in 
London, Brussels, Madrid and Rome to counsel moderation on Paris. This strategy of 
outreach, which included the canonization of Joan of Arc in 1920, led to the re-
establishment of Franco-Vatican relations in 1921.
82
 
 The signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925 was another source of optimism for 
the Holy See. The treaties, considered a keystone to political and economic recovery at 
                                                          
82
 Stewart A. Stehlin, “The Emergence of a New Vatican Diplomacy during the Great War and its 
Aftermath”, in Kent, Pollard, Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age, 79. 
60 
 
the time of their signing, did create a genuine atmosphere of optimism among European 
statesmen for the remainder of the decade.
83
 Under its terms, Germany was re-integrated 
into the European states system, and the powers entered into a mutual non-aggression 
pact. In addition, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations, and a withdrawal of 
Allied troops from the Rhineland was ordered. The Vatican regarded the Locarno as a 
sensible revision of the lopsided Versailles Treaty, and Gasparri expressed a cautious 
optimism to foreign diplomats that European relations were finally on a stable course.  
In the afterglow of Locarno, the Vatican set about securing its legal position with 
a number of European governments through the concordat, a church-state agreement 
which preserved the traditional social and civic privileges of the Roman Catholic Church, 
as well as securing tax-exempt status for its considerable land and property holdings. The 
agreements furnished mutual benefits, providing lay governments an orderly relationship 
with both the Church and their Catholic populations (which, in many cases, comprised 
the majority). In a short span, the Holy See completed concordats with Latvia (1922), 
Poland (1925), Lithuania (1927), Romania (1927) and the German states of Rhineland, 
Westphalia and Saarland (1929). The German concordats paved the way for the 
Reichskonkordat (1933), an agreement which appeared to normalize relations between 
the Holy See and Nazi Germany. The most important negotiations completed by the Holy 
See in these years, however, were the Lateran Agreements of February 1929, which 
offered Italian recognition of the sovereignty of the pope in the Vatican City, in return for 
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papal recognition of the Kingdom of Italy (and Mussolini‟s Fascist regime), and the 
exchange of ambassadors. In addition, the agreement provided an indemnity paid to the 
Holy See to settle accounts outstanding since Italian unification in 1860, and provided 
guarantees on the position of the Church in Italian society.
84
 The agreements appeared to 
settle, once and for all, the tensions between the popes and the Italian state (the „Roman 
Question‟) which had bedevilled this relationship for six decades. By the end of 1929, 
then, it appeared that the Holy See had buttressed its position with a number of important 
European states, and had re-established its position as an independent, neutral and 
apolitical „moral arbiter‟ in continental affairs.  
The optimism of the mid-to-late 1920‟s, however, would prove to be short lived, 
not only for the Holy See but for the wider continent. The economic crash of 1929 
strained pre-existing political fault-lines, and renewed the Vatican‟s diplomatic anxieties. 
Gasparri‟s cherished „balance of power‟, which he had advocated since 1919, and which 
created for the Holy See the political space to exercise influence, eroded rapidly in the 
1930‟s. Just as it appeared that the papacy had re-integrated itself into the postwar states 
system, economic deterioration and political crises, combined with the rising hostility of 
totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany, once again placed the Vatican in a precarious 
                                                          
84
 See Peter C. Kent, The Pope and the Duce: The International Impact of the Lateran Agreements (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 2. On the domestic impact of the Lateran Accords, see D.A. Binchy, Church 
and State in Fascist Italy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Francesco Margiotta Broglio, Italia e 
Santa Sede dalla grande Guerra alla conciliazione (Naples: Moroni, 1966). For Mussolini, the Accords 
cemented his seizure of power, completing the matrix of institutional structures supporting his regime. He 
based his dictatorship on a series of compromises with the traditional institutions of the Italian state: the 
monarchy, the armed forces, the industrial community and the Church. The Lateran Accords completed 
this process, putting to rest the longest standing grievance of Italian unification, and providing Mussolini 
and the Fascist state an enhanced international prestige. See Adrian Lyttleton, The Seizure of Power: 
Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929 (London: Scribners, 1973), 429-432. 
62 
 
position. As the organizational centre of a universal church which had to deal with the 
particular needs of national groups, it had always been subject to pressure from all sides 
and factions, representing varied individual and state interests.
85
 The deterioration of 
European affairs after 1930 would create for the Vatican, however, an increasingly 
challenging balancing act. 
 Despite completing a concordat with the Nazi government in 1933, relations 
between Rome and the new regime quickly deteriorated. Though Gasparri and his under-
secretary had severe doubts about Nazi sincerity at the signing of the agreement, fears of 
bolshevism and a paucity of options led to its completion. True to form, Berlin 
disregarded most elements of the accord, and the Roman Catholic Church in Germany 
was offered little protection against Nazi arrogance and ruthlessness. From the early 
1930‟s forward, Pius XI made no secret of his disdain for the Nazi state, despite papal 
expectations of a functioning modus vivendi with the Nazi state. It was a position that did 
little to enhance Vatican-German relations.
86
 Rome‟s relationship with Fascist Italy held 
up somewhat better, as the Lateran Accords had appeared to create a genuine 
rapprochement, according the Church the social and political latitude to pursue its 
mission. Cooperation between the Vatican and the regime appeared to reach an apex in 
1935, when Italian priests and bishops lent active support to the Italian invasion of 
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Abyssinia during the Italo-Ethiopian War.
87
 From this point forward, however, Vatican-
Italian relations began to regress. The creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936, which 
drew Italy firmly into the German orbit, created strains between Pius XI and Mussolini 
which would intensify as the Italian dictator moved closer to his German counterpart.
88
 
Mussolini‟s adoption of anti-Semitic racial laws in July 1938 further strained relations 
between Pius XI and the Fascist state. 
It was in the midst of such political volatility, and diplomatic isolation, that the 
Vatican began to cultivate ever closer connections both to the American government and 
the American Catholic Church. Though the entire world had been shaken by the financial 
crash of 1929, American political structures remained remarkably resilient and stable, 
attributes admired and sought by the papacy. Alfred E. Smith‟s 1928 run for the 
presidency, while ultimately ending in failure, illustrated the extent to which Roman 
Catholics could penetrate American political life, even if nativist, anti-Catholic blocs 
remained. And the effective diplomacy of the NCWC on the Mexican crisis, as well as 
the administrative and fundraising acumen of the CNEWA, had revealed the potential, 
both political and financial, of the American bishops. As European political instability 
deepened, and as it became increasingly manifest that the United States had supplanted 
Britain and as the world‟s most stable and powerful democracy, Vatican attentions 
became increasingly focused on Washington and the American Church. 
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In the 1930‟s, a number of American Catholic leaders rose to prominence. The 
principal national figure among the American bishops was Archbishop Francis Spellman 
of New York, a close associate of Eugenio Pacelli (who would become Pope Pius XII in 
1939), and friend of Presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson.
89
 Spellman, who had studied 
for the priesthood in Rome, had served in 1925 as the first American attaché to the 
Vatican secretariat of state, where he became familiar with leading figures of the 
secretariat, including Pope Pius XI, Gasparri and Domenico Tardini, who would later 
advise Pius XII on political matters and serve as secretary of state to Pope John XXIII. In 
1927, Spellman‟s long and close friendship to Pacelli began during a visit to Germany, 
where the future pope was serving as apostolic nuncio. This relationship, which would 
strengthen over the 1930‟s and endure throughout Pacelli‟s pontificate, would guarantee 
Spellman, and by extension the American Church, an important voice in the formulation 
of Vatican policy both during and after the war. In 1939, the Pope would move Spellman 
from Boston (where he served as auxiliary bishop), to New York, where he was named 
archbishop of the nation‟s preeminent archdiocese. In the consistory of 1946, Pius XII 
would make Spellman a cardinal, cementing his position as the foremost leader in 
American Catholicism. 
Other important national figures included Chicago‟s Archbishop George 
Mundelein, a close associate of Roosevelt and key political ally, credited with delivering 
the Catholic vote to the Democrats in the 1933 and 1936 federal elections. Mundelein‟s 
early and unequivocal support of the New Deal firmed up Catholic support for Roosevelt 
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in the heavily Catholic mid-west, and his public praise of the Roosevelt administration`s 
action on Mexico further cemented Catholic approval. Between 1932 and the cardinal‟s 
death in 1939, Roosevelt could count on the political support of Mundelein who, by his 
very association with the president, had become the most visible figure in American 
Catholicism. The pair would meet fourteen times in this period, and they shared an active 
and frequent correspondence. That no other religious figure would share such a 
relationship with Roosevelt was emblematic of the rapidly growing prestige of American 
Catholicism.  
Archbishop Samuel Stritch, who succeeded Mundelein in 1939, and who was also 
raised to the Sacred College by Pius XII in 1946, also maintained a close relationship 
with Roosevelt throughout the 1930‟s, as did Boston‟s Cardinal William Henry 
O‟Connell. O‟Connell was succeeded in 1944 by Richard J. Cushing, who would 
advocate for the Vatican on the Palestine question after 1945, and who later achieved 
national renown as the churchman to deliver the invocation at John F. Kennedy‟s 1960 
inauguration.
90
 Other key figures included Detroit‟s Edward Francis Mooney, a former 
chairman of the NCWC, and archbishops John F. O‟Hara of Philadelphia, Michael J. 
Curley of Baltimore, Patrick O‟Boyle of Washington and Timothy McNicholas of 
Cincinnati, all of whom cultivated important political ties in the postwar years. Howard 
Carroll, who served as the General Secretary of the NCWC from 1944 to 1957, and Mgr. 
Thomas McMahon, who served as the acting head of the CNEWA after 1943, would 
emerge as similarly influential figures in the postwar American Catholic firmament, 
particularly on the question of Palestine. 
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 The growth of the American Catholic Church, and the expansion of its influence 
in the postwar period, did not escape the attention of the Vatican. From the early 1930‟s, 
officials in the Vatican secretariat had divined the growing importance of the American 
Church within the international Roman Catholic communion. Later in the decade, the 
British Minister at the Vatican, Francis D‟Arcy Osborne, reflected that “the steady 
increase of the Catholic populations of the New World, compared with the relative 
stability of that of the old, has during the last quarter of a century made the Vatican less 
dependent than formerly on Europe, and more anxious to adopt a democratic attitude in 
conformity with the spirit of America, to which the papacy may one day have to look for 
its main support, financial as well as spiritual”.91  
The foresighted Pope Pius XI, preparing Pacelli for the papal throne, had sent him 
to the United States in 1936 to acquaint him personally with the leading figures of the 
American Church.
92
 It was Spellman who co-ordinated Pacelli‟s 1936 visit, the first ever 
of a future pope to the United States.
93
 The visit, along with strengthening the bond 
between Rome and American Catholic leaders, also highlighted the pre-eminence of 
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Spellman in the American Church. Several members of the American hierarchy, 
including Mundelein, O‟Connell and Hayes, were vexed by Spellman‟s close control of 
Pacelli‟s visit, a situation undoubtedly facilitated by his friendship with Pacelli and his 
Roman contacts. Privately, John Burke expressed frustrations over Spellman‟s diffidence 
towards the NCWC during Pacelli‟s tour, and criticized the bishop‟s treatment of Amleto 
Cicognani, the apostolic delegate, who had been frustrated in his own efforts to manage 
Pacelli‟s agenda.94 If the tour signalled Spellman‟s rising status in the American Church, 
it also signalled the beginning of intense Vatican efforts to develop closer ties to the 
American government. Though the visit was classified as unofficial by the Holy See, the 
visit was intended to draw the nominal allies closer together. Pacelli‟s agenda was 
threefold: to consult with Catholic leaders and the American government on official 
Vatican-American diplomatic relations; to seek American co-operation in the Vatican‟s 
various anti-communist endeavours; and to muzzle Father Charles Coughlin, the anti-
Roosevelt „radio priest‟ who had become a dangerous nuisance both to Washington and 
Rome.
95
 The tour, which was covered extensively by the mainstream secular press, 
included meetings both with Catholic leaders and government officials. Through Joseph 
P. Kennedy, a prominent Catholic and a major contributor to Roosevelt‟s campaign chest, 
Spellman arranged a meeting between Pacelli and Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 5 
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November, where diplomatic relations, Coughlin, and closer Vatican-American co-
operation were discussed.
96
 
 Spellman was the key figure in the strengthening link between Rome and the 
American Church from the interwar period forward. He had worked with Pacelli in the 
Vatican Secretariat of State in the early 1930‟s, where the two became close friends and 
Spellman became Pacelli‟s protégé.97 After becoming auxiliary bishop of Boston in 1932, 
Spellman continued to cultivate his Roman contacts, and it was he who made 
arrangements for Pacelli‟s 1936 tour. Throughout the 1930‟s Spellman, in addition to his 
close relationship with Rome, also developed strong ties with Roosevelt. Spellman, along 
with Cardinal George Mundelein of Chicago, actively supported the New Deal, and both 
held spiritual authority and political sway in strongholds of Democratic Party 
membership.
98
 Spellman also cultivated a close political relationship with Joseph 
Kennedy, a fellow Bostonian, which opened additional avenues for the ambitious prelate. 
From 1933 to 1936, Spellman discussed the virtues of formal Vatican-American 
diplomatic ties with both Kennedy and James Roosevelt, the President‟s son, a message 
he would later take to the President himself during Pacelli‟s visit.  
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“The Mangiest, Scabbiest Cat Ever”: The American Catholic Political Lobby 
Matures 
 
The political activism of the American Church, honed during the Mexican crisis, 
continued to mature through the 1930‟s. Emboldened by an increasingly potent collective 
voice, American Catholics adopted distinct positions on several international crises of the 
decade, most notably on the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War. 
Significantly, these stances echoed the Vatican‟s quite closely, and stood in distinct 
contrast to the position of the federal government and mainstream Jewish and Protestant 
groups, highlighting the influence of papal Rome on the political mind, and advocacy, of 
American Catholics. Though the League of Nations had firmly denounced Italy‟s 
unprovoked attack on Abyssinia in October 1935, the Vatican issued only ambiguous 
reactions, reluctant to criticize Mussolini‟s policies too directly, and anxious to maintain 
an apolitical neutralism, particularly within the stormy context of European politics.
99
 
Though not unanimous, the response American Catholics to Italian aggression was 
similarly ambiguous.
100
 Many American Catholics continued to view Mussolini with a 
mixture of curiosity and admiration, regarding him as the defender of the Church and its 
values in Europe, and as a committed anti-communist, a theme that was treated 
obsessively in the American diocesan press. The vague reactions of American Catholic 
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leaders strained relations between Catholics on the one hand, and Protestants and Jews on 
the other, who had roundly criticized Italian actions as a clear breach of international law. 
Particularly conspicuous was the lack of Catholic endorsement for the various American 
aid agencies established for Ethiopia, many formed by mainstream Protestant and Jewish 
organizations, creating interdenominational frictions that would soon be heightened over 
the question of Palestine.
101
  
Though Roosevelt and Cordell Hull desired a stricter and more effective embargo 
policy on Italy, one that actually curtailed the Italian war effort, American Catholics, 
particularly Italian-Americans, opposed vehemently, citing the unjustness of an embargo 
policy that treated the belligerents unequally.
102
 The NCWC argued that a revised 
embargo policy compromised American neutrality, and would draw the United States 
dangerously closer to intervention, a position that the American Catholic press touted 
widely. The persistence of the Catholic lobby hindered Roosevelt‟s implementation of a 
stronger embargo, and weakened the president‟s suggestion of a „moral embargo‟ against 
the Fascist state. Much as in the case of Mexico, American Catholic positions on the 
Italo-Ethiopian War complicated American policymaking efforts. That Roosevelt 
                                                          
101
 Groups such as ‘American Aid for Ethiopia’ were quickly formed in response to the Italian invasion, 
which called for a stricter American embargo against Italy, and a firmer official censure of Fascist 
aggression. Its executive committee was comprised of members of the (Protestant) Federal Council of 
Churches, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and the African Welfare Committee of the Federal 
Council of Churches. Neither Catholic organizations nor individual Catholic leaders were included in the 
membership list of this organization, which was the largest and most prominent of the Ethiopian relief 
committees. See ‘Questions Concerning War and Peace’, January 1936, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 42, File 13. 
102
 The Neutrality Act, as it stood, banned the sale of finished war products to belligerents, but it did not 
deny them access to strategic materials, such as oil, cotton and copper, which could still be purchased at 
prewar levels. As it stood, Italian access to strategic materials boosted its war efforts against feudal 
Abyssinia, exposing American neutrality as an aid to Italy. For a succinct account of the Italian-American 
campaign against embargo revision, see Leo V. Kanawada, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Diplomacy and 
American Catholics, Italians and Jews (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1982): 75-92. 
71 
 
ultimately abandoned a more comprehensive embargo, despite support from Protestant 
and Jewish groups, was further evidence of the growing influence of American Catholics 
on Washington‟s policy considerations. 
The Spanish Civil War similarly served to highlight the increasing stridency of 
American Catholic activism on international questions, as well as the clear positional 
parallels between the Vatican and the American Church. Upon the outbreak of hostilities 
in Spain, the Roosevelt administration sought, above all else, to avoid entanglement in 
what was regarded as a European civil war, a policy that fit neatly into the isolationism of 
the New Deal. Over time, however, a steadfast isolationism became more difficult to 
maintain, particularly given the clear evidence of Nazi and Fascist assistance to General 
Francisco Franco‟s Nationalist forces, and in the face of growing atrocities on both sides. 
Though few Americans advocated direct intervention in the Spanish conflict, a 
wide range of liberal voices, which included many mainstream Protestant and Jewish 
groups, advocated for the lifting, or at least the revision of, the American embargo on 
arms shipments to Spain, a barrier which they claimed only aided Franco‟s Nationalists. 
A number of prominent Protestant and Jewish figures spoke out on the urgent need for 
embargo revision, including theologian Reinhold Neibuhr, Albert Einstein (then at 
Princeton University), and a cross-section of literary, entertainment and academic 
figures.
103
 The various proponents of embargo revision appeared to secure a victory in 
January 1938, when over sixty congressmen issued a statement expressing solidarity with 
the Spanish Cortez (Legislature) as a stirring example to the world in its fight to protect 
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democracy, a development which appeared to portend the lifting of Washington‟s 
embargo.
104
 
Liberal opposition to the Spanish embargo was counterbalanced by a majority of 
American Catholic leaders. Though few American Catholics advocated intervention, 
most were horrified at the atrocities perpetrated against Spanish religious by Republican 
Loyalists, and regarded Franco as a defender of religious freedom (even if many 
Catholics were dubious of his political legitimacy). Michael J. Ready, General Secretary 
of the NCWC, responded directly to the congressional statement of support for the 
Republicans with an open letter, carried widely in the Catholic press, and sent directly to 
the State Department, which expressed “shock and amazement” that democratically 
elected American congressmen could so cavalierly support an un-democratic, repressive 
and anti-clerical regime as the Spanish Republicans.
105
 Ready‟s letter followed the 
statement of the American bishops, issued following their annual meeting in November 
1937, expressing support and sympathy for their Spanish co-religionists, a statement 
bolstered by a wave of reportage in the Catholic press highlighting the rape of nuns, the 
shooting of bishops, and the burning of churches.
106
 In addition, a number of Catholic 
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organizations, at the suggestion of the NCWC, passed resolutions condemning the 
anticlericalism of the Barcelona government, forwarding them to key figures in 
Washington, including Roosevelt and Hull.
107
 In December 1938, the National Council of 
Catholic Men (NCCM) created the “Keep the Spanish Embargo Committee”, which 
constituted another flank in American Catholic efforts to shapes Washington‟s policy on 
Spain. 
The intensity of American Catholic political pressure on maintaining the Spanish 
embargo did not go unnoticed in Washington. In a May 1938 conversation with 
Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes noted that the President feared that the 
lifting of the embargo “might have meant the loss of every single Catholic vote next fall,” 
a predicament that made the Democrats justifiably wary.
108
 Though Ickes later quipped in 
his diary that Catholic political pressure was “the mangiest, scabbiest cat ever”, the 
administration was clearly cognizant of the need to strategically appease it.
109
 George Q. 
Flynn contends that although Catholic pressure did not sway the administration‟s 
decision on the Spanish embargo (and only reinforced it), the episode endowed the 
American Catholic Church with a reputation for political power it did not fully merit.
110
 
Nonetheless, the fight to maintain the embargo (and the apparent success of the Catholic 
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lobby), emboldened the NCWC‟s political lobby, and created the impression in non-
Catholic circles (and particularly among mainstream Protestant and Jewish groups), that 
Catholics held a special sway in Washington. In fifteen short years, the American 
Catholic Church, organized through the NCWC, had emerged as a cogent and unified 
voice in American public and political affairs, a powerful advocate of Vatican interests 
within the American body politic.  
As the political voice of the American Church grew more strident in the later 
1930s, so too did Spellman‟s profile also continued to rise. Upon the outbreak of war, he 
led American-Catholic support for the war effort, both in his vociferous support for 
American entry into the war, and in his capacity as the head of the American Catholic 
military chaplaincy.  As archbishop of New York, Spellman was also named military 
bishop of the United States, a position that took him to Rome several times during the 
war.
111
 Because of his close relationship with Pacelli, Spellman became a primary broker 
in the relationship between Washington and the Vatican during the war years. One of 
Spellman‟s key wartime duties had been to administer Vatican funds that had been 
shipped out of Europe and deposited into American banks for the duration of the war, 
evidence of the trust and esteem the Pope held for his point-man in the American Church.  
As the Cold War dawned, Spellman had proven his value to the Vatican as an effective 
financial manager, diplomat and administrator and was the only senior churchman, 
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contends historian Gerald Fogarty, whom the pope regarded as a personal and trusted 
friend.
112
 
 So highly esteemed was Spellman in Roman circles that there was speculation, as 
the war drew to a close, that the archbishop of New York would be named the Vatican‟s 
secretary of state, a position made vacant upon the death of Cardinal Luigi Maglione in 
August of 1944. The pope, cognizant of Spellman‟s influence with the American 
government and Catholic hierarchy, and aware of the potential power of both in the 
postwar world, offered him the position at the end of September. Spellman asked for time 
to defer his decision until the war‟s end, at which point he declined the offer, arguing that 
he would be of more use to Pius XII as archbishop of New York than as secretary of 
state.
113
 Though Spellman had been offered the second most prestigious position in the 
Vatican, a job Pacelli himself had held before becoming pope, he feared the constraints of 
working too closely with Pius XII. On several foreign questions, the pope had consulted 
more extensively with Spellman than with Maglione, and there was no guarantee he 
would not turn to someone else in the future.
114
 Upon reflection, Spellman concluded that 
as archbishop of New York, he could operate free of Vatican strictures, forcing Pius XII 
to rely on him as a political lynch-pin between Rome and Washington. His decision to 
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remain in the United States, given his acute political instincts, and given Rome‟s 
increasing desire to draw talented Americans into the Secretariat, spoke volumes on the 
growing prestige and influence of the postwar American Church in the international 
Roman Catholic firmament.  
 Vatican hopes for a direct envoy with the American government, which Spellman 
had advocated for some time, were realized in January of 1940, when Roosevelt named 
Myron Taylor, former chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, as his „personal 
representative‟ to the Holy See. Negotiations for such a representative had been ongoing 
since Pacelli‟s visit. Roosevelt had hoped that Mundelein would be his point-man for 
negotiations with Rome, but the Cardinal‟s death in October 1939 forced the president to 
turn to Spellman, with whom he shared a much less intimate association. Earlier in the 
same year, Spellman had been installed as the archbishop of New York following the 
death of Cardinal Hayes. The appointment itself was a sign of Spellman‟s favour in 
Vatican circles, and of the newly elected Pius XII‟s desire, as Europe slid into war, to 
draw closer to the American government. The mercurial rise of Spellman, who would 
maintain a close relationship both to Roosevelt and Pius XII, combined with the 
establishment of a direct presidential envoy to the pope, and the increasing political 
stridency of the NCWC, served to draw together the Vatican, the American Church and 
the American government through the war years and beyond. It was a strategic and 
ideological alliance that would be tested by several international developments, including 
the rapid postwar changes in Palestine. 
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The Vatican, American Catholics and Political Zionism, 1922-1939 
 Throughout the interwar period, Vatican attitudes on political Zionism remained 
unfavourable, becoming more hardened in the 1930‟s, as increased Jewish immigration to 
Palestine lent a renewed urgency to the question of Jewish statehood. Despite the strains 
that existed between the Vatican and American bishops in the early 1920‟s, American 
Catholic attitudes towards Zionism mirrored Rome‟s quite closely, evidence of an 
analogous transnational outlook that appeared to supersede other tensions. An 
examination of the American Catholic press over this period illuminates these parallels. 
Reflecting Vatican sentiment, American Catholic journals regarded the 1917 capture of 
Jerusalem by General Allenby a positive development, delivering the holy city from the 
clutches of Muslim rule into the hands of a Christian power. Scepticism of Zionism, 
however, remained a prominent theme, and was evinced almost immediately. Chicago‟s 
Catholic diocesan paper, the New World, expressed optimism in December 1917 that 
“whatever fate awaits the Holy Land, of this we have surety- never again will it depart 
from Christian control”, but in the same article it expressed fears that a Zionist-dominated 
Palestine would unleash repression against its Catholic population. Similar sentiments 
were echoed the following April by the American Catholic Quarterly Review, which 
noted that the „politico-religious‟ program of Zionism could spell disaster for the 
presence of Roman Catholicism in the territory.
115
 A host of other diocesan papers, 
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including the Boston Pilot, the Michigan Catholic, and the Los Angeles Tidings 
expressed comparable concerns.
116
 
These initial anxieties, however, appeared to have subsided by the early 1920‟s. 
Following the implementation of Churchill‟s „White Paper‟ of 1922, which amounted to a 
watering down of promises made in the Balfour Declaration, reactions in the American 
Catholic press toward political Zionism became discernibly muted.
117
 A joint resolution 
of Congress in September 1922, which affirmed that the United States favoured the 
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, did not appear to raise American 
Catholic ire.
118
 Vatican protests, both privately and to the League of Nations, appeared to 
have been effective in diluting the Balfour Declaration, as expectations of imminent 
Jewish statehood began to diminish. Even the Brooklyn Tablet, edited by the implicitly 
anti-Semitic Patrick F. Scanlan, which had adopted a vitriolic editorial stance against 
Zionism in previous years, made little mention of it after 1922.
119
 The remainder of the 
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decade, in fact, marked a benign period in Catholic-Jewish relations in the United States. 
The resurgence of nativism in this decade, particularly during Al Smith‟s run for the 
presidency in 1928, caused Catholic and Jews to find common cause in the face of 
Protestant bigotry. Since nativists often lumped Catholics and Jews together as 
potentially subversive and „un-American‟, the Catholic press stuck back by emphasizing 
that bigotry itself was „un-American‟. In doing so, Catholic journalists and essayists often 
defended Jews alongside Catholics, placing critiques of Zionism temporarily aside.  
Also mollifying American Catholic (and Vatican) opinion in the 1920‟s was the 
steady expansion of the Church and its institutions in Palestine in these years, combined 
with the decline of political tensions there after 1922. Under the protection of the British 
mandate, and in an atmosphere of political stability, the Roman Catholic Church 
underwent a rapid expansion in Palestine. The Jesuits opened a Jerusalem branch of the 
Pontifical Biblical Institute, and a number of churches, monasteries, schools and hospitals 
were erected in Haifa, Jaffa, Nazareth and Jerusalem.
120
 Institutions destroyed during the 
First World War were rebuilt, and twelve new Roman Catholic parishes were constructed 
to minister to Palestine‟s growing Roman Catholic population. America, the Jesuit 
journal founded in 1909 and edited by the firebrand Richard Tierney S.J., reflected this 
trend towards a muted response to Zionism. Under Tierney, who a later America editor 
described as a “man of strong personal views, detesting sham and doubletalk, and 
shirking from no controversy”, the influential journal took bold positions on a number of 
national and international affairs, including Mexican anticlericalism (for which Tierney 
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received a letter of thanks from Benedict XV), Irish nationalism and Palestine. In the 
early 1920‟s, however, it reflected Rome‟s general satisfaction with the situation in 
Palestine. America reported approvingly on the British Cardinal Bourne‟s visit to 
Palestine in 1924, where he observed that the Arab population had “learned to be 
patient”, and that he did not notice “the same unwise insistence on an untenable 
domination on the part of the Zionists” as he had in 1919.121 The temporary cessation of 
tensions in Palestine turned the attention of the majority of Catholic journals elsewhere in 
these years. The apparent waning of Zionist ambitions after 1922, combined with 
Catholic institutional expansion in Palestine, in fact, tempered American Catholic 
editorial opinion on the subject for nearly the remainder of the decade. 
There was also evidence that American Catholic money, which flowed to 
institutions in Palestine from the CNEWA via the Vatican‟s Oriental Congregation, was 
also contributing to the solidification of the Catholic presence in the territory. The 
NCWC‟s John Burke, who traveled to Palestine in April 1929 with Pietro Fumasoni-
Biondi, the apostolic delegate to Washington, praised the Franciscans in particular for 
their prolific institution-building activities in the Holy Land, and intimated that a Catholic 
presence in the territory was essential to the Vatican‟s continued stake there. He 
specifically cited the importance of American Catholics to this effort, whose “financial 
and political support help in securing and extending the right of Catholics to care for the 
Holy Places.”122 
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Events in Palestine in the later 1920‟s, however, served to retrench Catholic 
hostilities to Zionism. Riots erupted in the territory in 1929 that were the result of long-
mounting tensions. Despite British-Vatican cooperation in the region, which had 
facilitated the expansion of Roman Catholic institutions in Palestine, Arab-Jewish 
relations had continued to degrade. By 1928, leading Zionist groups had overcome 
hobbling political and ideological divisions, and the movement began to regain its former 
momentum.
123
 Palestinian-Arab leaders, recognizing the resurgent threat of Jewish 
Statehood, pressed British authorities on negotiations for a separate Arab state in 
Palestine, pointing to other successful Arab-national movements in the region.
124
 In a 
bitter atmosphere of growing mistrust, Muslim-Jewish tensions erupted over rights at the 
Wailing Wall. Though Muslims maintained control of the Wall, Jews were allowed to 
pray on the pavement beyond it, so long as they did not erect benches, chairs or other 
accommodations in the area. Days before the 1928 Jewish Day of Atonement (September 
28), Jews erected a screen at the Wall to divide male and female faithful. Muslim reaction 
led to an order to dismantle the screen, which British officials deemed an “infringement 
of the status quo ante.”125 British officers began to dismantle the screen during 
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Atonement Day services, to which Jews reacted angrily, and to which Muslim leaders 
mistook as British pro-Arab sympathy. The incident sparked both Jewish and Arab 
demonstrations, and placed the incompatibility of Jewish and Muslim ambitions in sharp 
context. 
The demonstrations piqued latent Arab-nationalist fervour. Over the next several 
months, in an effort to underscore Muslim jurisdiction over the Wall and its surrounding 
area, an extension was built over its northern portion, and a large muezzin was stationed 
on a nearby roof to call the faithful to prayer five times daily. In the summer of 1929, a 
passage was created from the Haram to the pavement, effectively making the area a 
Muslim thoroughfare.
126
 Jewish leaders claimed that these alterations constituted a more 
severe infringement of the „status quo ante‟ than had the prayer screen, to which Arab 
leaders responded with a host of accusations, including a purported Jewish assault on the 
Mosque of Omar itself. Tensions crested in August, when Arabs attacked Jewish districts 
in Hebron, Safad and several other places. In Hebron alone, 60 Jews were murdered, 
prompting a Zionist writer to observe that, “if it had not been for some friendly Arab 
families, not a single Jewish soul in Hebron would have remained alive.”127 British 
officials, overwhelmed by the impulsiveness and ferocity of the attacks, called in troops 
from Egypt for assistance. Though order was restored, the incident permanently poisoned 
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the well of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, and served to gird the Zionist movement 
for future challenges. 
While the Vatican did not issue a direct statement condemning the violence, its 
position could be gleaned from the reactions of the l’Osservatore Romano, the Holy 
See‟s “semi-official” journal which, for all intents and purposes, accurately represented 
papal views. It deplored the violence unleashed by Arab mobs, but noted that the Vatican 
had warned the British of rising tensions, and had recommended “certain changes in 
policy” in order to avert a bloody conflict.128 According to the Vatican, unrest in 
Palestine was clearly linked to economic injustice stemming from unchecked Jewish 
immigration. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Monsignor Luigi Barlassina, was quoted 
as saying that both Christians and Muslims opposed continued Jewish immigration to the 
Holy Land, citing it as a root cause of the recent unrest. (Barlassina, who advised Vatican 
policy on Palestine and staunchly defended both Christian and Arab rights, presented the 
Vatican‟s objections to the Balfour Declaration to the British government in 1921, and 
gave anti-Zionist speeches on scores of occasions. He was, perhaps, the most vocal 
Catholic anti-Zionist in Palestine, and he maintained an acrid relationship with both the 
Zionists and British officials, undoubtedly colouring Vatican responses as a result). 
The initial responses of the mainstream American Catholic press was not entirely 
unsympathetic to Jewish losses, a reflection, in part, of generally amicable Catholic-
Jewish relations in the 1920‟s. Journals such as America, Commonweal and the Pilot that 
had, throughout the decade, defended Catholics alongside Jews in the face of Protestant 
                                                          
128
 Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine, 17.  
84 
 
bigotry, were generally prompt in condemning Arab violence. Commonweal carried a full 
report on the massacre at Hebron, chiding Muslim leaders for inciting violence, and 
included a message of condolence from New York‟s Cardinal Hayes to American Jewish 
organizations.
129
 The journal further expressed an implicit sympathy with Zionist aims, 
urging that Jewish access be granted to worship at the Wailing Wall, given that Jew‟s 
rights were “anterior to the Moslem‟s in history; and speaking as Christians, we hold that 
his right is spiritually superior as well.”130 The Jesuit journal America expressed similar 
indignation at anti-Jewish violence.
131
 Boston‟s Pilot added to the chorus of Catholic 
sympathy for Jewish targets of Muslim violence. Its editor expressed his solidarity with 
Jewish victims: “To the unfortunate victims of the uprising in Jerusalem go the 
condolences and sympathy of their friends throughout the world. The popular mind 
associates the Jewish people with Jerusalem because of the tradition of the past, and the 
Old Testament Christian people applauded the Zionist movement.”132 
A majority of the American Catholic press, however, was condemnatory not only 
of Arab violence, but of political Zionism itself, which a number of Catholic 
correspondents regarded as a cause of the 1929 uprisings. The NCWC‟s correspondent in 
Palestine and associate of Barlassina, Dr. Alexander Mombelli, filed a series of reports on 
the Arab-Jewish riots of 1929 which were widely reprinted in the American diocesan 
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press.
133
 He traced the root of recent unrest to the Balfour Declaration, in his opinion a 
flawed agreement that gave oxygen to an ultimately untenable political goal: namely 
Jewish statehood in Palestine. Arab violence was carefully explained as an inevitable 
reaction to Jewish political and economic hegemony in the Holy Land, a situation 
exacerbated by steady Jewish immigration. In stressing the political, and not religious, 
origins of the riots, Mombelli attempted to diffuse the idea that the uprisings could be 
ascribed to „Moslem fanatacism‟, a notion widely expressed in the mainstream secular 
press. Zionism was described as a purely political program, divorced of any theological 
legitimacy and “foisted upon pious Jews” only to strengthen its chances of success.134 He 
further suggested that the agitations at the Wailing Wall had been sparked by Zionist 
groups, who had demonstrated there a day before the violence had erupted. His critiques 
of Zionism were surpassed only by his reports on the embattled position of the Catholic 
Church in Palestine, which he filed throughout the 1930‟s.135 
As was frequently mentioned in the Catholic press, Mombelli highlighted the 
„bolshevistic‟ nature of Jewish communes in Palestine, associating Zionism with an 
ideology long since condemned by the Vatican. He raised the issue of extreme divisions 
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within the movement itself, where moderates such as Weizmann and fundamentalists 
such as Ze‟ev Jabotinsky vied for control.136 As in the mainstream Protestant press, his 
reports emphasized a lack of support from most Jews for Zionism, painting the movement 
as the ill-conceived brainchild of a small group of quixotic agitators.
137
 He portrayed the 
violence of 1929 as a necessary check on Zionist ambitions, and concluded that its 
demise would only benefit the Holy Land. As he observed: “Zionism has had a very 
severe trial- its colonies devastated, its buildings robbed, its initiatives paralyzed. When it 
is considered that it was already in difficulties, the case is all the worse. If the Arabs in 
future should rise and be supported by their co-religionists of Transjordania, Syria, Iraq 
and the Arabian peninsula, what might be the result?”138 
The anti-Zionist and implicitly pro-Arab reportage of Mombelli, which was 
carried by a number of high-circulation diocesan weeklies, did not escape the attention of 
Jewish Americans. The tensions that had previously played out between Zionist leaders 
and the Vatican now appeared to pit Catholics against Jews in the United States. Jewish 
leaders expressed concern with Catholic coverage of events which, contrary to the 
mainstream secular press, appeared to fault Zionism for political tensions in Palestine. 
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Morris Lazaron, an influential Baltimore rabbi who would play a significant role in 
interfaith initiatives in the 1930‟s through the National Conference of Christians and Jews 
(NCCJ), expressed reservations at the implicit biases in Catholic coverage. Though a 
leading voice in the American non-Zionist movement, he took exception to what he 
regarded as an anti-Semitic propensity in the diocesan press, a position he expressed in 
letters to Burke and the National Catholic News Service (NCNS).
139
 In a response to 
Lazaron, Burke conceded that his correspondent did advocate an anti-Zionist position, but 
that he did not “show an anti-Jewish spirit”, and that he did highlight Arab atrocities. “He 
does show bias”, Burke admitted, “against the extreme form of Zionism, and he does play 
up the Arab side and the Arab defence. Yet at the same time, he shows the Arabs in a bad 
light in two respects- in the violence they commit and in their non-conciliatory spirit.”140 
In closing, Burke expressed a view that was to define the position of mainstream 
American Catholicism for the remainder of the 1930‟s: a denunciation of anti-Semitism 
and Jewish persecution, combined with a forthright opposition to the tenets of political 
Zionism. “The impression I have reading his weekly correspondence is that he is not at 
all anti-Jewish, but that he is certainly in favour of a lessening of the Zionist status...Only 
when the material is grossly wrong do we interfere, and in this case we hardly think that 
the case merits intervention.”141 
American Catholic disdain for Zionism, coupled with a claimed affinity for Jews 
and an abhorrence of religious persecution in general, closely mirrored the Vatican‟s 
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position in the 1930‟s, and it was reflected broadly in the American Catholic press. The 
Balfour Declaration, which had received little analysis or comment in the diocesan press 
in 1917, was now regarded as the source of political and social instability in Palestine. 
The riots promulgated by Muslims were tied to legitimate grievances stemming from 
Jewish political and economic dominance in Palestine, and not in eruptions of religious 
violence. America, which adopted an editorial line increasingly sympathetic to Arab 
concerns, emphasized the marginalization of Arabs by Jews in Palestine, the latter having 
“every advantage- capital, science and organization.”142 Despite this position of 
advantage, Zionists were portrayed as a ravenous group bent on further dominance. As 
the New World (Chicago) reported, Zionists demanded “a Jewish police force, a Jewish 
defence force, and a Jewish administration.”143 In discounting charges of „Moslem 
fanaticism‟ in the riots of 1929, editor Patrick Scanlan of the Brooklyn Tablet reminded 
readers that “there was once a religious warfare in the Holy Land. The papers said 
nothing about it. It was when Christ was crucified,” a clear allusion to Jewish complicity 
in the crucifixion and an example of the thinly-veiled anti-Semitism that characterized the 
paper until at least the early 1950‟s.144 
The British Commission charged with investigating the 1929 riots reached a 
conclusion not disagreeable to the Catholic position. Appointed by Lord Passfield 
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(Sidney Webb) and headed by Sir Walter Shaw, the Commission arrived in Palestine in 
late October 1929 to observe and report on the political and social condition of the British 
Mandate. The Passfield „White Paper‟ essentially amounted to a check on the national 
ambitions of both Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews. As both movements appeared to be 
gaining momentum and international support (with „American Zionism‟ gaining strength, 
and regional support for Arab Palestinians coalescing), British surveyors feared losing 
control of the territory to either group. Jewish immigration, which had caused the Jewish 
population of Palestine to double in ten years (from 84,000 in 1920 to 175,000 in 1930), 
was cited as a central cause of Arab discontent, and limits on Jewish immigration to 
Palestine was suggested.
145
 Maintenance of the status-quo became central to the Shaw 
Commission‟s report. The Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald adopted Shaw‟s 
suggestion that the Balfour Declaration really imposed on Britain two separate but equal 
obligations to both Jews and Arabs. In announcing Britain‟s official policy on the 
Palestine Mandate, MacDonald explained that, “A double undertaking is involved, to 
Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the 
other; and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty‟s Government to give effect, in equal 
measure, to both parts of the Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the 
population of Palestine.”146 
The Vatican, which continued to oppose Jewish statehood in Palestine, was 
generally approving of the British resolution, which appeared to hobble Zionist national 
                                                          
145
 These limits were never strictly enforced by British officials, and they became effectively impossible to 
enforce after 1933, when Hitler’s rise in Germany created a steady stream of Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine. 
146
 Sicker, The Middle East in the Twentieth Century, 47. 
90 
 
ambitions. The Vatican similarly feared Muslim control of the territory, which was 
regarded as an equally dangerous threat to Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land. 
Both Britain and the Vatican feared Soviet infiltration, which the Passfield „White Paper‟, 
by maintaining some semblance of order, appeared to have staved off. For the time being, 
the synchronous goals of the Vatican and Britain, namely to prevent the hegemony of 
either Arab or Jew in Palestine, and to ward off Soviet infiltration, appeared to be secure. 
The Vatican‟s public stance on Palestine became increasingly cautious in the late 1920‟s 
and early 1930‟s. The Passfield „White Paper‟, as did Churchill‟s „White Paper‟ of 1922, 
appeared to have created a temporary calm in the Holy Land. The Vatican secretariat 
continued to air its concerns to Britain through diplomatic channels, but its public 
positions became focused on bolshevism and the promotion of international religious 
freedom (as in Mexico, Spain and Russia).  
The American Catholic press similarly expressed satisfaction with the restrictions 
of the „White Paper‟, which placed a check on a Zionist solution that many Catholic 
editors considered untenable. The Commonweal, a liberal and lay Catholic journal, 
founded in 1924 and reputed for its principled editorials and liberal slant, issued perhaps 
the most balanced Catholic reaction to the Passfield „White Paper‟, but one which still 
regarded a Jewish state in Palestine as ultimately untenable: 
We have expressed before this our sense of the tragic impasse in Palestine. The   
peculiar need of the Jews for a geographical home, the peculiar historic and 
spiritual  appropriateness of locating that home in Palestine, are beyond question. 
Beyond   question too, are the facts of the solemn invitation and guarantee 
extended to the   Jewish race in the Balfour document, and that race‟s 
overwhelming response in   dollars and men. On the other hand, the resentment of 
the Palestinian Arabs at   what they feel to be an alien invasion, is as little to be 
conjured away; and when   we consider the homogeneity of the whole Moslem 
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body, and the 75,000,000   Indian Mohammedans who at any moment may take 
up actively the cause of  their Arab co-religionists, we can understand Britain‟s 
present minimizing of  their undertaking.
147
  
 
Other American Catholic journals, particularly the diocesan papers which 
received dispatches from the NCWC News Service, were less judicious in their 
evaluations. Mombelli, who remained in Palestine as the NCWC‟s correspondent, placed 
the blame for the 1929 riots squarely on the Zionists, and considered the roots of discord 
in the Holy Land to be political, and not racial or religious, a tack that allowed Roman 
Catholic observers to critique Zionism while avoiding the smear of anti-Semitism. The 
unrest of 1929, he maintained, was the inevitable end-result of Zionist belligerence. “This 
roseate idea that a solid and admirable new homeland for the scattered Jewish people, 
with the current faith of Moses as its centre, has been rearing itself here and has become 
far too widespread,” he wrote in October 1929. “Regrettable as these recent events have 
been, it was time that something came about to bring the truth of the matter to the 
fore.”148 In early 1930, Mombelli quoted Robert Gordon-Canning, the noted British 
fascist, anti-Semite and supporter of Arab nationalism who visited the territory in 1929 
and concurred that “the fundamental unrest in Palestine and the hatred of the Jew by the 
Arab is political, and neither racial nor religious.”149 In stressing that the movement was 
essentially political, based on a cynical realpolitik, Mombelli emphasized its 
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incompatibility with orthodox Judaism, and indeed its links to bolshevism and 
communism, charges echoed by a number of American bishops and high-ranking figures 
in the Vatican secretariat. In linking Zionism and bolshevism, he assured readers that 
Zionists had every intention of “making Palestine a battlefield.”150 
The portrayal of political Zionism as a dangerous, ill-founded and belligerent 
movement, cynical in its methods, based in power politics, and divorced from orthodox 
Judaism in spirit and action, formed the essence of American Catholic characterizations 
of it for the remainder of the 1930s. Steady Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the 
periodic flare-ups of Arab-Jewish tensions over the decade, only entrenched the anti-
Zionist premonitions of the Catholic press.
151
 Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany, 
however, gave a new urgency to the question of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as the 
decade wound to a close. Nazi brutality also steeled the Zionist lobby in the United States 
which, by the eve of war, was strenuously advocating its positions in Washington. As 
American Catholic and Vatican positions on Zionism continued to coalesce, and as 
American Catholics more confidently advocated their views on a number of international 
questions, so too had the American proponents of Zionism (which included a number of 
Protestant leaders) become more strident. The war, and its immediate aftermath, would 
serve to place these opposite camps in sharp relief. 
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Chapter 2 
 Toeing the Roman Line: American Catholics, the Holocaust and the 
Palestine Question 
 
 
As the clouds of war continued to gather over Europe, ties between the Vatican, 
Washington and the American Church continued to coalesce. The appointment of Myron 
C. Taylor as Roosevelt‟s „personal representative‟ to the Vatican in December 1939 
highlighted the President‟s desire to establish a direct link to the Pope, despite stiff 
Jewish and Protestant disproval of the mission. Roosevelt‟s ties with American Catholic 
leaders were also strong on the eve of war, and he would count on the support of the 
bishops to transform a staunch Catholic isolationism into support for the war effort by 
1941. Cardinal Spellman‟s close relationship with Pacelli (who had been elected Pope 
Pius XII in March 1939) heralded an ever closer working relationship between the 
Vatican and the leading figure in the American Church. The informal, tripartite „strategic 
alliance‟ appeared to have congealed. 
On the question of Zionism, however, a deepening cleft emerged between the 
Vatican and American Catholics on one side, and Washington and American Zionist 
groups on the other. The Holocaust, despite providing the most compelling rationale yet 
for the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine, did not alter either the Vatican‟s or the 
American bishops‟ opposition to the Zionist program, a stance which remained firmly 
rooted in historical and theological notions. American Catholic expressions of sympathy 
for persecuted Jews were widespread and genuine, reaching beyond the retrained and 
abstract statements issued by the wartime Vatican. On the substantive issue of a Jewish 
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national home in Palestine, however, the American bishops remained firmly in line with 
Rome. Simply put, the tragedy of the Holocaust did not break up the transnational Roman 
Catholic consensus on Zionism, despite the increasingly compelling logic for the creation 
of a Jewish national home.  
The Wartime „Strategic Embrace‟: American Catholics, the Vatican and 
Washington 
 
 The war years witnessed a progressive consolidation of the interrelationship 
between the Vatican, Washington and the American bishops, an informal alliance which 
the conflict itself had made increasingly vital. These relationships, of course, had been 
warming since the early 1930‟s. The Vatican had long been cognizant of the increasing 
importance of the United States in international affairs, acknowledged by Pacelli‟s 
American „tour‟ of 1936, and was anxious to build on its collegial and constructive ties to 
both American Catholics and their government. By the late 1930‟s, Roosevelt had spent 
nearly a decade cultivating his ties to American Catholic leaders, as his close ties to 
Mundelein, Stritch, Mooney and Spellman attested.  Catholics had been instrumental in 
delivering Roosevelt electoral victories in 1932 and 1936, and the President remained 
committed to maintaining amiable relations with the Church, particularly as the European 
situation darkened. His appointment of Myron C. Taylor, a prominent New York 
industrialist, as his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See in December 1939, 
highlighted the President‟s genuine desire for closer ties with papal Rome. Roosevelt‟s 
appointment of Taylor was a tacit sign of the significance the President placed on a 
diplomatic channel directly to the Pope. The idea of a representative had the additional 
support of Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and Sumner Welles, his undersecretary, 
96 
 
and was negotiated through Cicognani and Spellman.
1
 Spellman‟s central role in the 
negotiations, in fact, signalled his increasingly important function as a conduit between 
the Vatican and the President, enhanced by his accession to Archbishop of New York in 
May 1939. Hull and Welles considered the Vatican an important wartime „listening post‟, 
a repository of diplomatic intelligence that could only enhance American efforts. The 
Vatican, on its part, recognized the growing role of the United States in global affairs, 
and was eager to establish more regular channels with Washington, particularly in the 
midst of a rapidly deteriorating European situation. The American Church, an institution 
and a constituency both American and Catholic, was poised to become the crucial 
intermediary in the wartime Washington-Vatican axis. 
The American Catholic bishops, on their part, largely abandoned the staunch 
isolationism of the 1930‟s to wholly endorse the American war effort. Though 
isolationism had defined mainstream American Catholic positions on the war debate in 
the later 1930s, and while pockets of Italian-American Catholics remained sympathetic to 
Mussolini and the Fascists, the bishops adopted the position that the struggle against Nazi 
Germany was indeed a fight for the survival of Christian civilization. In December 1941, 
two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, Mooney, acting as the chairman of the 
administrative board of the NCWC, assured Roosevelt that the United States could count 
on the unconditional support of the American Catholic Church.
2
 In fully equating 
Catholicism with unreserved patriotism, Mooney informed the President that “the historic 
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position of the Catholic Church in the United States gives us a tradition of devoted 
attachment to the ideals and institutions of government we are now called upon to 
defend.” He assured Roosevelt that the bishops, “spiritual leaders of more than twenty 
million Americans,” were “keenly conscious of [their] responsibilities in the hour of the 
nation‟s testing.”3 In concluding, Mooney reiterated resolute Catholic support, and 
intimated the importance of the struggle for the survival of Christian civilization. “We 
give you, Mr. President, the pledge of our whole-hearted support in the difficult days that 
lie ahead. We place at your disposal in that service our institutions and their consecrated 
personnel. We will lead our priests and our people in constant prayer that God may bear 
you up under the heavy burdens that weigh upon you...that He will strengthen us all to 
win a victory that will be a blessing not for our nation alone but for the whole world.”  
In short order, support for the war effort was widely trumpeted in the Catholic 
press, which characterized the struggle as a stark confrontation between Christian 
civilization and barbarism.
4
 In January 1942 the Vatican, through Cicognani, virtually 
demanded that the American episcopate present a unified public stand of support for the 
statement, despite the lingering of isolationist sentiments among some bishops.
5
 It was a 
corporate action that the Vatican would soon again expect on the question of Palestine. 
The statement, which was released to the press, was also reported on widely in 
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mainstream papers, including the New York Times, which reprinted the letter in its 
entirety on Christmas Day.
6
 In his response to the NCWC, Roosevelt thanked the bishops 
for their pledge of support, and assured that an allied victory would be a victory for 
Christian civilization. “We shall win this war and in victory we seek not vengeance,” he 
intoned, “but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall 
rule the hearts of men and of nations.”7 As the United States entered the war, Roosevelt 
could certainly count on Catholic enlistment, which would surpass even the high levels of 
the First World War. 
Events of the war itself drew the parties ever closer. Soon after the American 
entry into the conflict, the NCWC again assured Roosevelt of the unswerving loyalty of 
American Catholics to the war effort. In a memorandum to the President, Mooney, 
speaking on behalf of the NCWC, presaged a fruitful postwar cooperation between the 
Vatican and the United States, “when anti-Christian philosophies which have taken the 
sword will perish by the sword,” and he outlined the unanimity of papal pronouncements 
and American objectives.
8
 The nation was united in the war effort, he continued, and 
“among the architects of this unity are the foremost Catholic leaders in our country.”9 It 
was a statement of fealty to which the Vatican would demand full adherence to from the 
American episcopate. The American bishops‟ annual statement for 1942, „Victory and 
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Peace‟, affirmed the sentiments of Mooney‟s letter.10 Roosevelt, on his part, sought to 
assure the Vatican that he shared papal visions of a postwar order. In September 1942, he 
prepared a lengthy and confidential memorandum for Pope Pius XII, to be delivered 
personally by Taylor, in which he praised the moral leadership of the Roman Catholic 
Church, particularly in denouncing Nazi racialism, and pledged to fight the Axis to the 
bitter end.
11
 He further praised the support of the American Catholic bishops, who had 
engaged “the lives, the treasure and the sacred honour of American Catholics in the 
defence of their freedom against aggression.” He further emphasized the enduring unity 
of purpose between Washington and papal Rome. “We want nothing better,” he 
concluded, “than a continuation of those parallel efforts made by the Pope and the 
President before the war became general.”12 
The war also highlighted the growing role of the American episcopate as an 
intermediary between Washington and the Vatican, despite the existence of an American 
envoy to the pope. The allied bombings of Rome vividly underscored the diplomacy of 
the American bishops, particularly Spellman, Mooney and Stritch, on behalf of the 
Vatican. Allied strategic bombing of Rome throughout the spring, summer and autumn of 
1943, designed to loosen the German grip on the Eternal City, strained relations between 
the Vatican and Washington. Publically, the bishops said little about the bombings, eager 
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to maintain a unified front in supporting the war effort, and reticent to incur the hostility 
of non-Catholic groups. Privately, however, the bishops strenuously commuted to 
Roosevelt the Pope‟s desire to spare Rome further bombings. In September, the NCWC 
issued a letter to Roosevelt, in the name of the entire American episcopate, reminding the 
President of his responsibility to protect Rome from further damage.
13
 Spellman, on his 
part, met repeatedly with Roosevelt to negotiate a cessation. During a meeting with the 
president in September 1943, Spellman presented a statement, also signed by Mooney 
and Stritch, which recommended that Rome be declared an „Open City‟, and immediately 
be spared allied bombs.
14
 The trio didn‟t hesitate to draw parallels between their demands 
and American domestic politics, alluding to the political power “of more than twenty 
million American Catholics, [who hoped] that their government will not have to share 
further responsibility for even more disastrous developments that threaten the Holy See 
under the conditions.” The statement further warned against ignoring the international 
political influence of the Roman Catholic Church, continuing that “military measures 
which offend the religious sense of so many citizens in so many nations may have 
consequences fatally prejudicial to the interests we all have at heart in the making of the 
peace and to the national and international collaboration necessary to that blessed end.”15 
Roosevelt, on his part, pledged to his guests the creation of a free zone of twenty miles 
around the city, and assured them that the allied (and American) cause was in full unison 
with the Holy See‟s. 
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On 11 November, just weeks after the meeting with Roosevelt, the American 
bishops convened in Washington for their annual meeting. While the annual statement 
issued for 1943, „The Essentials of a Good Peace‟, expounded on the necessary 
conditions of a Christian postwar order, the meeting was also significant for the adoption 
of a resolution where the bishops pledged their “filial devotion to the Holy See.”16 In it, 
they vowed to raise public awareness through the Catholic press, and keep Washington 
apprised of any threats to the Vatican City or other church interests. Though the 
bombings of Rome were not mentioned explicitly, they were clearly implied. The 
resolution was a call to action for the American bishops, echoing the pope‟s July request, 
on visiting a shelled Roman neighbourhood, that the American Church “demonstrate its 
dissatisfaction in such great grief.” Though the bishops never publically criticized the 
allied bombings of Rome, the American Catholic press expressed evident dissatisfaction, 
clearly revealing the position of the American Church. 
While the war, then, drew the Pope, the President and the American bishops 
closer together, it also raised hopes that the bishops might more effectively press the 
Vatican‟s demands on Washington. The bishops, on their part, had answered the nation‟s 
call to duty, and their protests on the bombing of Rome represented their first attempt, 
since the American entry into the war, to shape Washington‟s policy on an issue germane 
to the Vatican. It was a lobby that would be mobilized again on a number of postwar 
questions, including Palestine.  
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Into the Abyss: The Pope and The Shoah  
The Second World War and the Holocaust proved to be cataclysms that shaped 
subsequent European and international affairs in profound and irrevocable ways. The 
conflict, besides proving to be the crucible of a new and dangerous ideological divide, 
produced atrocities that that made the logic of a Jewish homeland more compelling. 
Britain, the mandatory power, had been reticent to support Zionist ambitions for much of 
the 1930‟s, and the British „White Paper‟ of 1939 appeared to have placed renewed 
obstacles in the path of such a goal.
17
 The horrors of the Holocaust, however, and the 
growing sense of the depth of the Jewish refugee crisis created a sense of urgency on the 
Zionist Question from 1943 onwards. The tragedy of European Jewry underscored the 
moral, political and historical legitimacy of a Jewish state in Palestine. Much scholarly 
ink has been spilled on the question of the Vatican‟s efforts, or lack thereof, to assist 
European Jews during the darkest days of their history.
18
 Significant is that fact that a 
growing awareness of the tragedy affecting European Jewry after 1942 did not alter the 
Vatican‟s fundamental opposition to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a 
position it had presented in its 1922 „aide memoire‟ to the League of Nations, and which 
remained unchanged through the war. 
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 The Vatican did consider the Holocaust a tragedy for humankind, and numerous 
papal attempts to assist Italian and European Jews were documented.
19
 Despite the 
ambiguity of official pronouncements, for which the wartime Vatican has been justifiably 
criticized, examples of papal assistance to European Jews during the war abound. A brief 
examination of Vatican efforts does place its policy on political Zionism into wider 
context. In Italy, the Vatican had protested Fascist anti-Semitic laws since their inception 
in 1937, a reflection of Pius XI‟s deep enmity for racialist ideologies. In 1939, when 
these decrees excluded Jews from a number of professions, including medicine, law, 
teaching and journalism, Cardinal Maglione, the Vatican Secretary of State, openly 
criticized the “so-called racial laws”, and stressed in a note to the Mussolini government 
that the laws created a “good deal of suffering, desolation and ruin”.20 The Vatican 
maintained official protests against Italian racial laws for the duration of the war. Pinchas 
Lapide, a postwar Israeli diplomat and prominent scholar of the wartime papacy, 
contended that racial laws were never fully implemented in Italy due in part to the 
ceaseless interventions of the papal nuncio to Italy, Francesco Borgongini-Duca, on 
behalf of Italian Jews.
21
 Vatican diplomats in Nazi-occupied territories such as France, 
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Slovakia, Croatia and Greece similarly protested to local official against anti-Semitic 
decrees, and with some success, particularly in Catholic states.
22
  
 Efforts to assist European Jews extended beyond official protests. Between 1939 
and 1945, more than six thousand Italian Jews obtained passports, ship tickets and travel 
money from the Rome-based St. Raphael‟s Association, an organization directly funded 
by the Vatican. Countless others were sheltered in monasteries, churches, convents and 
private homes, all with the explicit knowledge of the Pope, and consistent with his 
opposition to Nazi and Fascist racialist policies.
23
 The Vatican Relief Commission, at a 
cost of nearly one million dollars, supplied food, clothing, and medicine to untold 
thousands of refugees, prisoners and partisans during the winter of 1943-44, including at 
least 6000 Jews in Rome alone. As confidence in papal efforts to assist persecuted 
minorities increased, funds flowed to the Vatican from various international sources. In 
January 1940, the Chicago-based „United Jewish Appeal for Refugees‟ forwarded 
125,000 dollars as a contribution to Vatican rescue efforts. Throughout the war, the 
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Vatican distributed American federal funds through its various aid organizations in Rome 
and throughout Italy, for the benefit of Jews and non Jews alike.
24
 
 The Vatican also sought to facilitate the emigration of Italian Jews to safer 
wartime havens. One of the more famous of these initiatives was the provision of more 
than a thousand Brazilian immigration visas to Italian Jews, many of them recent 
converts to Catholicism, to provide safe passage from Rome to Rio de Janeiro, a plan 
which saw more than a thousand visas issued.
25
 The Vatican also provided financial 
support to DELASEM (Delegazione per L’Assistenza degli Emigranti Ebrei), a Jewish 
resistance organization that operated in Italy throughout the war, and that facilitated the 
emigration of nearly 9000 Jews from Italy, primarily to neutral states such as Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland.
26
 The initiative, though undoubtedly beneficial to Jews fleeing Nazi 
terror, fit neatly into the Vatican‟s longstanding position on Zionism. It recognized the 
legitimate plight of persecuted Jewry, and it sought to offer material and logistical aid 
where it could, but it implicitly suggested a destination other than Palestine, consistent 
with the view that the Terra Santa itself was sacred to Roman Catholics, and could not be 
jeopardized by the fulfillment of the Zionist program. 
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Vatican efforts were acknowledged by a number of prominent Jewish and Zionist 
leaders. In a 1943 letter to Amleto Cicognani, the apostolic delegate in Washington, 
Chaim Weizmann expressed gratitude to the Church for its assistance to European Jews. 
“I was happy to hear from Secretary [Henry] Morgenthau,” he said, “that the Holy See is 
lending its powerful help wherever it can, to mitigate the fate of my persecuted co-
religionists, and once more I would like to give expression to my deep feeling of 
gratitude in which I am sure every humanitarian would share.”27 In the immediate 
postwar years, praise for Pius XII from Jewish leaders was largely effusive. Dr. Raphael 
Cantoni, head of the Italian Jewry‟s Wartime Assistance Committee, observed of Roman 
Catholic efforts: “The Church and the papacy have saved Jews as much and in as far as 
they could save Christians...Six million of my co-religionists have been murdered by the 
Nazis, but there could have been many more victims, had it not been for the efficacious 
intervention of Pius XII.”28 In a private audience granted in the fall of 1945, a group of 
prominent Jewish leaders, including Italian Rabbi Elezier Jeruscialmi, thanked the Pope 
for his efforts in sparing their co-religionists the worst of Nazi abuses.
29
 Moshe Sharett, 
the future Israeli foreign minister and prime minister, echoed these sentiments following 
an audience with Pius XII in April 1945: “I told him [the Pope] that my first duty was to 
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thank him, and through him, the Catholic Church, on behalf of the Jewish public for all 
they had done in the various countries to rescue Jews, to save children, and Jews in 
general. We are deeply grateful to the Catholic Church for what she did in those countries 
to help save our brothers.”30  
 Throughout the war, a distinct bifurcation endured in the Vatican‟s response to 
persecution of Europe‟s Jews, characterized by assistance to Jews, where possible, one 
the one hand, and an opposition the goals of political Zionism on the other. Simply put, 
the tragedy of the Holocaust and the refugee crisis that it created did not translate into 
Vatican support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Assistance to European 
Jews was regarded as a Christian duty, an obligation to lend assistance to a suffering 
fellow man. Monsignor Domenico Tardini, the Vatican‟s undersecretary of state, 
expressed as much in the spring of 1943, when he observed that “the Jewish question is a 
question of humanity. The persecutions to which the Jews in Germany and the occupied 
or conquered countries are subjected are an offence against justice, charity, 
humanity...Therefore, the Catholic Church has full reason to intervene, whether in the 
name of divine law or natural law.”31 Support for a Jewish homeland, however, despite 
the catalyst that the Holocaust had created toward that very end, was unfailingly opposed 
by Pius XII‟s Vatican, based on the ancestral Roman Catholic tenet that the Terra Santa 
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was sacred to the faith, and must never fall under the political jurisdiction of a sovereign 
power.  
 In the spring and summer of 1943, as the world became more fully apprised of the 
tragedy of the Holocaust, Cardinal Luigi Maglione, Pope Pius XII‟s Secretary of State, 
restated the Vatican‟s opposition to Zionism in stark terms. In a March letter to William 
Godfrey, apostolic delegate to London, he expressed disappointment that Britain, which 
had recently facilitated the immigration of Jews from all corners of Europe to Palestine, 
had “altered its course”, and appeared to be contravening the limits on immigration 
outlined in the 1939 „White Paper‟.32 It was clear that Maglione equated Jewish 
immigration to Palestine with the creation of a Jewish state there. “The Holy See has 
never approved the project of making Palestine a home for the Jews,” he continued. 
“Palestine has always been more sacred to the Catholic than the Jews.”33 Maglione‟s 
notes from April revealed similar sentiments. He reflected on the “particular historical 
rights” held by Catholics on the Holy Places, which extended “with deep piety and 
devotion to Palestine itself, made sacred by the presence and memory of the divine 
redeemer”, alluding that the whole territory was sacred to the Church.34 As such, he 
concluded that “Catholics would be injured in their religious sentiment and rightly fear 
for their rights if Palestine would belong exclusively to the Hebrews,” echoing sentiments 
that could be traced back to the writings of Origen, Tertullian and Augustine.  
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 In a May letter to Cicognani, the apostolic delegate to Washington, he re-iterated 
the Vatican‟s 1922 „aide memoire‟ to the League of Nations, which continued to define 
the Vatican‟s position on Palestine.35 The Holy See, he expressed, could not accept the 
creation of a Jewish state in a territory that held such deep historical, theological and 
spiritual significance for the world‟s Roman Catholics. It was a territory, he reminded 
Cicognani, which constituted the very cradle of Christianity. Though he admitted that “at 
a time, the Jews did have a home in Palestine”, he questioned “how this historical criteria 
could be adopted to restore a people to a territory they occupied more than nineteen 
centuries ago?”36 He suggested that another home could be found for the Jews outside of 
Palestine. Pushing forward the Zionist program, he warned, would be dangerous. “It 
would create serious new international problems, and would lead to a justifiable lament 
from the Holy See, which has always provided charity and assistance to non-aryans.” 
Maglione‟s statements perfectly reflected the duality of Roman Catholic attitudes towards 
the Jewish plight, which encompassed a professed Christian duty to assist fellow men in 
need, with a resolute rejection of the solution proposed by Zionism. It was a duality 
almost perfectly mirrored by the institutional response of the American Catholic Church.  
American Catholics, the Holocaust and Zionism 
 From the time of the Kristallnacht forward, expressions of solidarity with 
European Jews, and denunciations of Nazi brutality, were largely forthcoming from the 
various organs of the American Catholic Church. This was despite the fact that the 
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Church was still working to effectively constrain the anti-Semitic „radio priest‟, Father 
Charles Coughlin, whose popularity on the airwaves had contributed to tepid Catholic-
Jewish relations in the 1930‟s. Maria Mazzenga has argued that a crassly anti-Semitic 
broadcast of Coughlin‟s, delivered in the immediate wake of the Kristallnacht, 
galvanized his opponents in the American Church to present a more definitive stance of 
support for European Jews.
37
 The brutality of the Kristallnacht, which aroused 
sympathies across the American political and religious spectrum, combined with 
Coughlin‟s crass response to it, did appear to spur the American Church to speak out 
more openly against Nazi crimes. 
 In the immediate wake of the Kristallnacht, the Knights of Columbus published 
an open letter to Roosevelt, expressing the organization‟s “deepest sympathy for the 
distressed Jews of Europe”, and urging the American government to use its diplomatic 
channels and political clout to help secure the refuge of Jews to Palestine and other safe 
havens.
38
 John A. Ryan, the foremost progressive American Catholic thinker of the 
prewar era, wasted little time in denouncing Nazism following the Kristallnacht.
39
 In a 
July 1938 address to the annual convention of Duluth‟s B‟nai B‟rith, Ryan denounced 
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Nazi persecution of the Jews as “contrary to the moral law of nature,” and deemed Nazi 
racial theories as “utterly without scientific basis.”40 He continued that “Hitler‟s theory 
and practice with regard to the Jews contradicts, as he well knows, the very doctrines of 
Christianity.” Ryan assured his audience that “authorized teachers and expounders of 
Catholic doctrine do not indulge in anti-Semitism,” and he re-iterated the “outspoken 
espousal of the Jewish cause” by Catholic editors and writers in the United States.41 Later 
in 1938, he wrote that Nazism, which was “excessively nationalistic, adheres to a theory 
of racial superiority and racial purity which are without foundation in fact, and which 
have been used as a pretext for an enormous amount of injustice and uncharity towards 
the Jewish race.”42 In 1939, Ryan told the audience of a Jewish civic forum in New York 
that anti-Semitism was “contrary to Christianity and violates the basic principles of 
American democracy. Followers of Christ cannot believe He would hate the race from 
which He sprang or any other people.” 
 Ryan did not stand alone in expressing such sentiments in the immediate wake of 
the Kristallnacht. American Catholic solidarity with, and sympathy for, German Jewry 
was expressed emphatically and passionately in a thirty minute radio address, broadcast 
from the Catholic University of America, and carried by NBC to a nationwide audience. 
Organized by Maurice Sheehy, professor of religion at Catholic University, and airing in 
November 1938, just 2 weeks after the Kristallnacht, the address featured a number of 
prominent American Catholic leaders, including Sheehy, Bishops John Mitty of San 
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Francisco, John Gannon of Erie, and Peter Ireton of Richmond, former Democratic 
presidential candidate Al Smith, and Catholic University rector Monsignor Joseph 
Corrigan.
43
 Sheehy‟s opening remarks were indicative of the tone of the broadcast. “The 
world is witnessing a great tragedy in Europe today,” he intoned, “and after sober, calm 
reflection, various groups and leaders of the Catholic Church have sought permission to 
raise their voices, not in mad hysteria, but in firm indignation against the atrocities visited 
upon the Jews in Germany. The Catholic loves his Jewish brother because, as Pope Pius 
XI had pointed out, we are all spiritual Semites.”44 The address amounted to a resolute 
condemnation of Nazi aggression, and implicitly served to counter the recent anti-Semitic 
musings of Coughlin. In effect, the address proposed an alternative to Coughlin‟s 
defensive Catholicism, beckoning American Catholics to champion religious freedom 
and democratic ideals, and to pray for his persecuted Jewish „brothers‟. It was this 
enlightened strain of American Catholicism which informed Catholic responses to Jewish 
persecution through the war. 
 In large part, Catholic periodicals and diocesan newspapers in the United States 
reflected the position of Rome; namely that the persecution of European Jews was a 
tragedy for all humankind, but that it did not necessitate, or obviate, the creation of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine. Declarations of solidarity with persecuted Jews, therefore, 
featured prominently in a wide range of Catholic journals from the Kristallnacht forward, 
reflective of genuine American Catholic sympathies for the Jewish plight. The widely 
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circulated Commonweal, edited by Edward S. Skillin, was at the forefront of Catholic 
sympathy and solidarity with European Jewry. Under Skillin‟s direction (which lasted to 
1967), the journal became a leading voice of liberal Catholicism in the United States, 
publishing a range of seminal essays by figures, both Catholic and non-Catholic, such as 
Hanna Arendt, Luigi Sturzo, G.K. Chesterton, Evelyn Waugh, Hilaire Belloc and others. 
He was unafraid to challenge preponderant views in the American Church. In 1938, 
Skillin penned an editorial deploring the widespread tendency of American Catholics to 
conflate Franco‟s anti-communism with the cause of the faith, a position which placed 
him at odds with a number of leading figures in the American Church.
45
  
On the question of Jewish persecution, the Commonweal was unequivocal. The 
journal heavily criticized Charles Lindbergh‟s anti-Semitic „Iowa Speech‟ of 1941, in 
which the former aviator and ardent isolationist identified Jews as the “principal agitators 
for war”.46 Jewish control of publishing and media, contended Lindbergh, drew the 
United States closer to a conflict it should properly avoid. A Commonweal editorial 
strongly disproved Lindbergh‟s speech, questioning his faulty logic in linking Jews to 
either media control or to pro-war agitation. Lindbergh‟s crude positions and barely 
concealed anti-Semitism, it continued, threatened to discredit the legitimate isolationist 
positions held by so many American Catholic leaders. The fate that had befallen 
European Jews, it argued, was a scourge that could only spread if not opposed by all faith 
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groups, including Roman Catholics. “Anti-Semitism is an element and a symptom”, it 
concluded, “of the calamity from which all groups and classes of America should want to 
save as much of the world as possible.”47 
 Through 1942 an 1943, as the world became gradually apprised of the full extent 
of Nazi plans for Jewish genocide, the American Catholic press continued to denounce 
anti-Semitism and Nazi crimes in the strongest terms. In those years, Commonweal ran a 
series of articles by the exiled French-Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain that 
attempted to discredit Nazi racialist theories, and their resultant policies, on 
philosophical, moral and scientific grounds.
48
 Maritain eloquently imparted to his readers 
the notion that anti-Semitism had historically been, and remained, repugnant to any 
genuine interpretation of Christian history, and was the result of human weakness and 
distorted biblical and theological interpretations. German racial laws, according to 
Maritain, represented a complete and total abandonment of any genuine Christian 
morality, and stood in opposition to God‟s natural law, which Pius XI had recently 
emphasized in the anti-Nazi encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge. As to whether or not 
Catholics should embrace the American entry into the war to fight the totalitarian 
persecutions, Maritain was unequivocal. “The only conclusion possible,” he observed in 
1943, “is an unutterable horror of the mind and heart in the face of the human degradation 
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of which racist crimes are the expression, and a resolution to fight this degradation to the 
death.”49 
 The Catholic weekly America, published by the Jesuits since 1909 and considered 
as moderate and judicious in its editorial line, presented similar denunciations of Nazi 
crimes and offered messages of Catholic solidarity with the persecuted Jews of Europe. 
Like the Commonweal, it was edited in this period by another leading Catholic liberal, 
John LaFarge S.J., who would gain later acclaim as a champion of racial equality, 
establishing the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice in 1960. America‟s 
relatively wide circulation and weekly magazine format, combined with its reputation for 
attracting noted non-Catholic contributors, made it an influential journal in both Catholic 
and wider circles.
50
 As with Commonweal, America drew consistent attention to Jewish 
persecutions, particularly from the summer of 1942 forward, as news of Nazi atrocities 
became more widely understood in the West. A 1942 article, by the Jewish-American 
field reporter Maurice Feldman, detailed the entrenchment of Nazi torment of German 
and central European Jews, outlining the dire situations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania 
and Croatia. In concluding, Feldman presaged the „Final Solution‟ in observing that 
“there is no doubt that the Nazis have plans not only for the destruction of the Jews in 
Europe, but throughout the whole world.”51 
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 By the spring of 1943, America drew attention to, and denounced, Nazi pogroms 
in the most explicit manner. In June, it reprinted from Commonweal parts of Maritain‟s 
passionate and erudite refutation of Nazi racist laws, assuring that his ideas received wide 
exposure in the Catholic press.
52
 In solidarity with Maritain‟s positions, America warned 
its readers that any equivocation in Catholic attitudes to the Jewish plight amounted to a 
grave error. “It is not a question of this or that human being,” the editorial intoned, “it is a 
question of all human beings and methods of destruction which exceed the nightmares of 
the most diabolical imagination.”53 It opined that Jewish sufferings could not be 
dismissed as mere “atrocity stories”, but a plan for racial genocide carried out to “an 
inexorable and well defined plan.” Through 1943 and 1944, America‟s editorials 
reminded readers that the tragedy unfolding for Jews, which stemmed from wrong-
headed anti-Semitic vitriol, could befall Catholics as well. The atrocities, it stated, were 
“but a step” from Catholics if they condoned the spread of this “moral poison in the 
world, rooted in hatred of God and Christ Himself, which spreads like a forest fire and 
soon cares little what victim its violence destroys.”54 Similar sentiments were voiced by 
Louisiana‟s Father Elliot Ross, who told the New Orleans Catholic Action of the South 
that there were “Catholics who do not realize that if anti-Semitism comes [to the United 
States], anti-Catholicism will not be far behind. If anti-Semitism ever becomes 
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formidable among us, every probability points to the prejudice breaking bounds and 
including Catholics as well as Jews.”55 
 Though America and Commonweal represented the leading edge in the 
denunciation of Nazi racialism and solidarity with European Jewry, similar expressions 
could be found across the American Catholic press. The large-circulation Catholic World, 
published by the Paulist fathers, offered a severe and lengthy critique of anti-Semitism in 
an October 1939 essay, calling it “unjust, brutal, and opposed to the teachings of 
Christ.”56 Large circulation papers such as the Michigan Catholic, the Catholic Mind, the 
Boston Pilot and the Catholic Worker offered similar sentiments.
57
 Virtually no paper 
stood „silent‟ on the issue. Even the Brooklyn Tablet, which had offered support to the 
anti-Semitic Father Charles Coughlin throughout the 1930‟s, presented denunciations of 
Nazi racialism.
58
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 Expressions of wartime solidarity were not limited to the American Catholic 
press. Catholic leaders such as Ryan, Mitty, Gannon and Sheehy, building on their efforts 
following the Kristallnacht, continued to decry Nazi brutality throughout the war. 
Official pronouncements and statements from the various Christian denominations, 
including Roman Catholics, against the policy of anti-Semitism were compiled in 1943 
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), and were published and 
widely distributed in a pamphlet entitled Christians Protest Persecutions.
59
 In an address 
to Detroit civic forum in June 1944, Archbishop Edward Mooney hailed the heroism of 
the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, and denounced Nazi brutality in clear terms. 
Mooney further expressed revulsion at the plight of Jews through the centuries, and 
outlined the need for Catholics to “give full play to our instinctive revulsion and horror 
against this latest instance of mass cruelty in the story of the Warsaw Ghetto, to prepare 
ourselves for the impending task of putting together the shattered pieces of a war-torn 
world.”60 In pointing up the anti-Christian as well as anti-Semitic elements of Nazism, he 
concluded “May we not hope that in the fires of a common tribulation new bonds of 
human solidarity and mutual goodwill are being forged between Catholics and Jews?” In 
the same speech, Mooney stressed the incompatibility of anti-Semitism and Christian 
faith. “Catholic teaching formally and explicitly condemns ant-Semitism,” he intoned. 
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“Catholic teaching directly emphasizes the dignity of the human person of which anti-
Semitism outrages. Catholic teaching exalts the historic religious role of the Jewish 
people, and glories in the heritage from Judaism which is an essential element in 
Christianity.” He then paraphrased Pope Pius XI, who in a decree of 1928 had stated that 
“anti-Semitism is not compatible with the sublime reality of the faith. It is a movement in 
which Catholics cannot participate. We are all spiritually Semites.”61 Mooney‟s 
sentiments, however, also implicitly alluded to Roman Catholic positions on Zionism, 
even when pleading for closer Catholic-Jewish cooperation. “In the heroism of Christians 
who have so often risked and not so infrequently given their lives to rescue their even 
more unfortunate Jewish brothers, may we not find an augury that when the agony is over 
Jews and Christians will work together to write a brighter page of history in liberated 
Europe, and particularly in Poland which has, at least, the historic glory of offering Jews 
a haven of refuge when they were driven out of other countries?”62 
Fulton Sheen, the future archbishop and „television priest‟, and leading voice of 
Catholic America both before and after the war, also tackled the issue of Nazi anti-
Semitism on his weekly radio program, The Catholic Hour, which had attracted an 
audience topping one million by the early 1940‟s.63 In a broadcast delivered on 10 
January 1943, Sheen reflected on Pius XII‟s Christmas allocution of 1942, in which the 
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pontiff had bemoaned the totalitarian and militaristic ideologies which were destroying 
Europe both physically and spiritually.
64
 Sheen‟s address, however, denounced Jewish 
persecutions more directly than Rome had. He impugned Nazi racialism as a policy based 
wholly on the warped ideology of a despotic madman, with no grounding in scientific 
fact. In this vein, he deplored the persecution of European Jews in the most explicit 
terms. To Sheen, Nazism, like communism, denied the basic equality of all humans, a 
pillar of Nazism that had led to Jewish persecution. “The disdain of the human person,” 
he observed, “is the first dogma of all totalitarian systems. It explains why the individual 
Jew has no value or rights under Nazism: Because he is not a member of the 
revolutionary race. The persecution of Jews arises, therefore, not because, as Hitler first 
claimed, they were too wealthy, but simply because they were not Nordic.”65 Like 
Maritain, Sheen linked Nazi disdain for Judaism and Christianity. Speaking at a 
November 1942 meeting of the NCCJ, he announced that the world had entered into a 
new historical phase, “in which there will be no persecution of Jews without persecution 
of Christians.”66 In light of this view, he implored American Catholics to abandon 
lingering isolationist sympathies and support the war effort. “What we were once 
intolerant to as a wicked idea,” he urged, “we must now be intolerant to as a deed.” 
Interestingly, Sheen appeared to be doing what many of the Pope‟s critics were 
demanding- namely to issue specific, explicit denunciations of Nazi crimes rather than 
the vague allusions and abstractions of the encyclicals. Sheen‟s sentiments, in fact, were 
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reflective of the dual nature of the American Church. His words reflected, on the one 
hand, the pronouncements of Rome, as expressed through the encyclicals, but they also 
spoke to the American reality of confronting the Nazi threat, and to the need to rally 
American Catholics to the war effort. It was the melding of two loyalties, as it were, at 
once both Roman Catholic and American. 
 The American Catholic episcopate similarly expressed revulsion at the fate of 
European Jewry. At a 1940 meeting of the National Conference for Christians and Jews 
(NCCJ), Bishop Robert Lucey of Amarillo, Texas declared that “We, as Christians, as 
citizens, as human beings, must cry out against the horror of this Nazi [debauchery] 
against Jews.” In warning his listeners against the false comfort of isolationism, and in 
rallying his audience to the defence of “Western civilization”, he intoned that “what is 
happening to the people of Europe is our business.”67 The American bishop‟s annual 
statement for 1941, issued through the Washington-based NCWC and titled „The Crisis 
of Christianity‟, addressed the evils of “totalitarian systems”, singled out Nazism and 
Communism as ideological forces which threatened both Christianity and indeed Western 
civilization, and implicitly urged American Catholic to support the larger effort to defeat 
these “systems.” The statement also referred specifically to the suffering of Europe‟s 
Jews, stating that “Our sympathy goes out again to the peoples of those countries who 
have been crushed under the heel of the invader, and indeed, to all upon whom war has 
imposed so heavy a burden of suffering and sacrifice. We cannot too strongly condemn 
the inhuman treatment to which the Jewish people have been subjected to in many 
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countries.”68 The bishops annual statement for 1942, entitled „Victory and Peace‟, 
addressed a range of themes. It endorsed the war effort emphatically, signalling a 
definitive end of the hierarchy‟s lingering debate on isolationism. It urged an allied 
victory under American stewardship as the only outcome that could guarantee an 
enduring peace, in which Christian principles would guide and inform the international 
order. The statement also deplored Nazi brutality, and specifically addressed the question 
of European Jews. 
...We feel a deep sense of revulsion against the cruel indignities heaped upon the 
Jews in   conquered countries and upon defenceless peoples not of our faith. We 
join with our brother  bishops in subjugated France in a statement attributed to 
them: “Deeply moved by the mass   arrests and maltreatment of the Jews, we 
cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of  humanity and Christian 
principles our voice is raised in favour of imprescriptible rights of  human 
nature.” We raise our voice in protest against despotic tyrants who have lost all  
sense of humanity by condemning thousands of innocent victims in concentration 
camps,   and by permitting unnumbered persons to die of starvation.
69
 
 
Signing these statements was a cross-section of the nation‟s most prominent 
churchmen, including Archbishops Francis Spellman of New York, Samuel Stritch of 
Chicago, Edward Mooney of Detroit, John Mitty of San Francisco and John McNicholas 
of Cincinnati.
70
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 American Catholic positions on political Zionism, however, remained unchanged 
through the war, and adhered closely to Rome‟s longstanding position. If American 
Catholic expressions of sympathy for the Jewish plight were expressed in terms starker 
than those emanating from Rome, there was no substantive deviation on the question of a 
return of the Jews to Palestine. The Zionist goal of a Jewish home in Palestine was an 
aspiration that Roman Catholic leaders, both at the Vatican and in the United States, 
continued to oppose on historical and theological grounds, despite the tragedy of the 
Holocaust. On the whole, however, opposition to the Zionist program was a policy 
discreetly espoused by the American Catholic leaders during the war, reflective of 
Rome‟s public stance on the issue. An analysis of the wartime Osservatore Romano 
reveals little on the question of a national home for European Jews, despite the fact that 
the Holocaust severely underscored the growing importance of that very question. 
Vatican ambivalence can be traced to its preoccupation during most of the war: namely to 
maintain an apolitical neutrality designed to ensure the survival of the institutional 
Church through the conflict‟s darkest days. Given the highly fluid and rapidly evolving 
progression of the war, particularly to 1943, Vatican policymakers preferred to keep 
discreet any public stance on the future of Palestine. Privately, however, Pius XII and his 
Secretary of State, Cardinal Luigi Maglione, continued to express severe reservations 
about the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, fearing a loss of control over Christian 
sites in the Holy Land, and concerned with the possibility of a Jewish „beachhead‟ for 
communist influence and infiltration in the Near East.
71
 These sentiments were shared by 
a number of the Vatican‟s most powerful Cardinals and diplomats, including Angelo 
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Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII, who as nuncio to Istanbul was noted for his efforts 
to save Jewish lives, but was unreceptive to the solutions posed by political Zionism.
72
 In 
a September 1943 letter to Maglione, Roncalli expressed discomfort about the degree to 
which Vatican aid to Jews would be later considered an endorsement of their “messianic 
dream”, adding that the “reconstruction of the Kingdom of Judah and the Israelites would 
not create a utopia.”73 
 A similar circumspection was exercised by the leading American Catholic figures. 
When the various organs of the American Church did weigh in on the question of 
Zionism, however, its support was not forthcoming. A survey of a cross-section of the 
American Catholic press reveals a remarkable unanimity on the question of Palestine. As 
the war approached, and as tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine became more 
acute in 1938 and 1939, America examined the competing claims of Jew and Arab in 
Palestine, favouring neither for absolute political jurisdiction of the territory.
74
 James E. 
Coleran, a Jesuit scholar and author of these articles, compared the claims of Jews and 
Arabs, and sympathized with Britain in the precarious role she occupied as the 
Mandatory Power. While denying Arab claims to complete control of Palestine, Coleran 
did highlight the fact that Arab claims were based on a 1500 year occupation of the 
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territory, and opined that if the Jews were to have any kind of national home in Palestine, 
it should have to be in consultation with, and with the consent of, Palestinian Arabs.
75
 
Given the rate at which Jews were successful in supplanting Arabs in Palestine, both in 
numbers and in economic and political control, Coleran observed, he doubted that any 
such co-operation could exist in a new state. 
 While he agreed that both Jew and Arab could rightfully appeal to the Wilsonian 
principle of national self-determination, he questioned whether Palestine could be 
considered the legitimate homeland of the global Jewish diaspora. In reflecting on Zionist 
ambitions, he observed: 
...Even after the Romans finally destroyed their nation they never ceased to look 
upon  Palestine as their land, and for the past centuries since that destruction 
countless Jews  have longed to return, and many have actually filtered back to live 
and die in the „Land  of Israel.‟ Some seem to think that these facts constitute a 
sort of title to the land. However,  if the fact that a people desire to regain their 
land, and a few do return to it, constitutes  a just title to the land, what havoc 
might be wrought of the boundaries of more than one  nation today, not excluding 
the United States!
76
 
Coleran did not deny the need for a Jewish national home, particularly in the 
context of escalating Nazi brutality, but he did suggest, as did the Vatican both during 
and after the war, that a Jewish state be established somewhere other than Palestine. 
“Some part of this large earth,” he opined, “should be given to them as their own. Some 
colony should be given to them where they would be their own masters, and never again 
to fear that the people among them, where they live, would someday rise against them 
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and send them bleeding and impoverished to seek the calculating charity of strange 
lands.”77 He questioned, however, whether Palestine possessed the “absorptive capacity” 
for such an endeavour. “All must admit,” he observed, “that Palestine cannot hope to 
provide for all of these. The more prosperous nations are all hesitating about throwing 
wide their doors to these unfortunates. Why insist that a poor Palestine do it?”78 Coleran‟s 
notions on Palestine‟s “absorptive capacity” stood close to the Vatican‟s own position on 
the future of the Terra Santa, and were emblematic of the growing convergence between 
Roman and American Catholic views on the future of Palestine.  
In a later article, on the eve of war, Coleran mused critically on the increasing 
“force and vehemence of international Jewry,” observing that “the union of sentiment, the 
similarity of method, the use of propaganda, the moral pressure of Jews in every nation, 
particularly in the British Commonwealth and the United States, all manifest that Jewry is 
an international power, that it is aggressive and may be ruthless, and that it is determined 
to champion its interests against any and all who would question its aims.”79 The article 
was a reflection of the concern, in segments of the American Catholic hierarchy, of the 
growing stridency, profile and effectiveness of American Zionist lobby, particularly the 
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA).
80
 In praising the even-handed neutrality of the 
British „White Paper‟ of 1939, which Zionists regarded as a hindrance to their ambitions, 
Coleran warned of the possible outcomes of unchecked Zionist zeal, and implicitly 
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suggested that Washington act to brake Zionist demands in the interests of peace and 
security. “The problem of Palestine may provoke a new orientation of ideas in regard to 
the place of the Jewish race in world affairs. In the United States, likewise, there is in 
process a new Jewish consciousness, characterized by militancy and acumen. This, also, 
requires a new American evaluation and orientation.”81  
The Brooklyn Tablet weighed in similarly on the „Palestine Question.‟ In a 
number of articles published on the eve of the war, the paper presented a decidedly 
Arabist perspective on the struggle for Palestine. It characterized Arab nationalism as 
primarily defensive in character, in contrast to the hegemonic ambitions of Zionism, and 
was supported by the majority of the Palestinian population, in contrast to the minority 
position of the Zionists.
82
 As did America, the Brooklyn Tablet opined that “little 
Palestine” had reached its “absorptive capacity”, and that further Jewish immigration to 
the territory would only serve to deepen political tensions there. The Arab struggle was 
likened to “the American struggle against British imperialism and the fight of George 
Washington and his men against that same imperial power. They, too, wished to secure 
themselves life, liberty and happiness.”83 The Brooklyn Tablet‟s articles emphasized the 
fact that Palestinian Christians also opposed Zionist designs for the territory, echoing 
Vatican concerns that Christian rights were being trampled by Zionist aggression in the 
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Terra Santa. On this theme, the paper quoted Dr. George Ibrahim Kheirallah, a noted 
Iranian academic and Secretary General of the Arab National League, who observed that 
“One hundred thousand Christian Arabs stand should to shoulder with their Muslim 
brothers- patriarchs, Bishops, priests, and ministers, all standing as one nation threatened 
by this ruthless treatment. Our forefathers once before generously fertilized the sacred 
soil of Palestine with their blood. May we be spared the necessity of doing it again.”84 
Such allusions to a new crusade for the Holy Land would appear often in the Catholic 
press from the beginning of the war onward.  
As the oppression of European Jewry turned to violence and murder in the early 
years of the war, Zionist leaders began to regard the emergency faced by their co-
religionists as their last best chance to push for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
The American entry into the war, furthermore, and the strength and vibrancy of American 
Zionist organizations, the ZOA foremost among them, created a shift in the focal point of 
Zionist lobbying from London to Washington during the war years. Zionists had been 
bitterly disappointed by the British „White Paper‟ of 1939, and British reluctance to 
support a proposed Jewish army marked a sea-change in relations between London and 
leading Zionist groups. The American-Palestine Committee, which had been created in 
1932 to foment high-level support for a Jewish state among non-Jewish leaders and 
politicians, claimed 15,000 members by 1941, among them nearly two thirds of the 
United States Senate, and many members of the House of Representatives. Though 
Britain remained the Mandatory Power, the United States increasingly became the centre 
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of the Zionist lobby, its leaders cognizant that the American government would likely 
dictate the terms of an allied victory, and buoyed by the growing support of a large 
Jewish-American community.  The gathering of the leading Zionist organizations at New 
York‟s Biltmore Hotel in May 1942, attended by Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-
Gurion, signalled a definitive shift that would see Washington as the new centre of the 
international Zionist campaign. The platform of the „Biltmore Conference‟ not only 
advocated for unlimited Jewish emigration to Palestine, but also forcefully endorsed the 
creation of a sovereign Jewish state. Biltmore delegates saw this as not only a solution to 
the immediate problem of Nazi persecutions, but as a permanent solution to Jewish 
dislocation since the time of the Roman Empire.
85
 
The rising tide of sympathy for Zionism in the United States did not escape the 
attention of the Vatican. In May 1943, Cardinal Maglione instructed Amleto Cicognani, 
the apostolic delegate in Washington, to keep the Holy See apprised of any developments 
in the Zionist lobby, and to outline any shifts in public opinion toward or against the idea 
of a Jewish state in Palestine.
86
 To this end, Cicognani filed several reports to Rome on 
the emergence of new and robust Zionist associations in 1943 and 1944, including the 
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„Hebrew Committee of National Liberation‟, which included among its leadership the 
revisionist Zionist Eri Jabotinsky, and Peter Bergson, a prominent Zionist who had 
escaped Nazi-occupied Poland in 1939, and who tirelessly lobbied the American 
government for assistance to persecuted Jewry.
87
 Other groups identified by Cicognani, 
with the assistance of the NCWC, included the „American Friends of a Jewish Palestine‟ 
and the „American League for a Free Palestine‟. In his reports Cicognani noted, with only 
half-hearted relief, that mainstream Zionist organizations such as the ZOA and the 
American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) considered these new groups overtly 
aggressive and potentially disruptive, and sought to exclude them from serious 
negotiations on the future of Palestine.
88
  
He further urged Cicognani to remind the American bishops of the dangers of 
political Zionism, and to delineate these concerns, where possible, through the American 
diocesan press, particularly as sympathy for Zionism continued to expand in the United 
States. Early in 1944, the Cardinal Secretary of State echoed these sentiments to 
Cicognani, urging him to “appeal to the sentiments of the Government and public opinion 
of America for the full freedom of people, and mention also the prestige which the U.S. 
might achieve from their involvement in such a just cause as supporting the Christian 
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communities in the Middle East and civilization.”89 In June 1943, Maglione forwarded 
the Vatican‟s 1922 Aide memoire on Palestine to Michael Ready, the General Secretary 
of the NCWC.
90
 The memo, which delineated the Vatican‟s opposition to a Jewish 
Palestine on theological, historical and political grounds, was evidence that the Holocaust 
had barely altered the Vatican‟s formal position of Zionism, and was intended to act as a 
template for American Catholic responses to the „Palestine Question.‟ In May 1944, 
Cicognani forwarded to Ready another memo on the Vatican‟s position, stating that 
“since the question is one of much discussion at the present time, it may be well for the 
point of view of the Holy See to be brought to the attention of the Most Reverend 
Bishops.”91  
On the same date, Cicognani forwarded a copy of the memo directly to Joseph 
Rummel, the German-born Archbishop of New Orleans, who had been appointed by the 
Vatican as the Chairman of the Catholic Committee for Refugees in 1941.
92
 Rummel‟s 
case, in fact, reveals the extent to which the Vatican expected the American bishops to 
speak with one voice on the question of Palestine and on Zionism generally. The 
apostolic delegate rebuked Rummel for publicly expressing distaste with the limits placed 
on Jewish immigration to Palestine in the British „White Paper‟ in an open letter to Rabbi 
Emil Leipziger. Rummel‟s sentiments were reported on in the local diocesan press. “If 
the Jews needed protection in 1917 and the solace of a homeland in 1922”, wrote the 
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Archbishop in February 1944, “they stand in greater need of help after all the sufferings 
endured in Europe, and Winston Churchill now has the opportunity to unmake what, in 
1939, he criticized so vehemently in parliament as the violation of a pledge.”93 Cicognani 
expressed to Rummel that he could “understand the humanitarian motives which induced 
[you] to make the statement referred to. I believe it will be useful for [your] future 
guidance to know the attitude of the Holy See, and to consider certain Catholic and 
Christian aspects of the problem which are commonly neglected in the public agitation 
being carried on in the United States for a Jewish Home Land.”94 The apostolic delegate 
added that he hoped Rummel, in his influential capacity as Archbishop, would “be in a 
position to utilize this statement of policy on many occasions.”95 
The „statement of policy‟ forwarded to Rummel, which was identical to that sent 
to the NCWC, amounted to a summary of the Holy See‟s longstanding „Palestine policy‟, 
positions barely changed since the end of World War One. The statement outlined the 
Holy See‟s recent efforts to spare European Jewry the worst of Nazi wrath, but stated that 
Jewish suffering did not preclude the Vatican‟s longstanding opposition to a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine, as expressed by Pope Benedict XV at a 1919 Consistory of 
Cardinals, and re-iterated by Pope Pius XI in his 1922 Aide memoire to the League of 
Nations. On the „Holy Places‟, the memo emphasized the importance of Catholic control, 
stating that generations of Popes had “made every effort to keep them from falling into 
the hands of infidels, and because their possession had now become secure, all 
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precautions must be taken to see that it be protected and strengthened.”96 On Palestine 
itself, it stated that “Catholics the world over are piously devoted to this country, 
hallowed as it was by the earthly presence of the Redeemer, and esteemed as it is the 
cradle of Christianity. If the greater part of Palestine is given to the Jewish people, this 
would be a severe blow to the religious attachment of Catholics to this land. To have the 
Jewish people in the majority would be to interfere with the peaceful exercise of these 
rights in the Holy Land already vested in Catholics.” It further suggested that Jewish 
occupation of Palestine two millennia previous did not legitimize a modern claim to the 
territory, and it echoed a familiar Vatican refrain that while Jews would certainly require 
a postwar home, that Palestine was not ideal. “If a „Hebrew Home‟ is desired,” in 
concluded, “it would not be too difficult to find a more fitting territory than Palestine. 
With an increase in the Jewish population there, grave, new international problems might 
arise. Catholics the world over might be aroused. The Holy See might then be hindered in 
its care of the Holy Places, and it might be kept from giving charitable assistance in the 
measure which it would wish.” On 9 June, Ready forwarded copies of the memo to the 
entire American episcopate.
97
 Rummel made no public utterances on the question of 
Jewish refugees and Palestine after February 1944, despite his central role as Chairman of 
the Catholic Committee for Refugees. 
In the wake of Rummel‟s censure, some bishops took the initiative to make 
certain that diocesan priests were fully cognizant of the Vatican‟s policy. On 24 July, 
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Thomas McLaughlin, bishop of Paterson (New Jersey), forwarded his priests a memo 
outlining the Church‟s historic, and unaltered, position on the “Jewish Homeland Idea.”98 
He instructed clergy to discourage parishioners from “participating in the current 
agitation on the British White Paper to the end that Britain may relax her immigration 
laws to Palestine,” stating that as the issue “was economic and political rather than 
strictly religious...the Church and its organs and representatives should not as such take 
sides or make commitments on this matter.” The letter was far from a neutral statement, 
however, clearly delineating the Vatican‟s historic position on the Holy Land. In addition 
to reiterating the points in the NCWC‟s „Rummel memo‟ of 9 June, McLaughlin added 
that “There is every reason to fear that were the Jewish people in the majority in that 
region, there would be interference with the peaceful exercise of the present recognized 
rights vested in Catholic in the territory. A noteworthy increase in the permanent Jewish 
population there gives fear lest grave new international problems might arise. Catholics 
all over the world might be aroused with the result that the Holy See might have 
difficulty in caring for the places in the Holy Land.”99 In paraphrasing the Cardinal 
Gasparri‟s 1922 aide memoire, which remained the backbone of Vatican policy on 
Palestine, it continued that “there is no principle in history or justice to establish the 
necessity of the return of a people to a country which they left nineteen centuries ago. 
There are other places on this earth where a „Hebrew Home‟ could be set up without 
causing international repercussions and difficulties.” In concluding, McLaughlin warned 
his priests to remain cognizant of the papal line, while avoiding entanglements that a 
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defined public stance might produce. “In a word, we are to defend Catholic interests and 
not lend ourselves to propaganda for a cause (lifting British immigration quotas) which 
has no bearing upon our life here, but contains the seeds of difficulties for the authorities 
of the Church in maintaining recognized rights.”100 
Though Catholic leaders were wary of trumpeting an opposition to Zionism too 
loudly, they were also concerned about the rising tide of support for it in the United 
States, particularly among non-Jewish groups and in Congress. The Vatican, too, was 
aware of the gravity of losing the battle for public opinion to the Zionists in these years, 
and was keen to enlist the support of the American Catholic press on the issue, prompting 
an August 1943 request from Cardinal Maglione that Catholics journals more clearly 
delineate Rome‟s concerns on the Zionist program.101 American Catholic journals that 
did comment on the „Palestine Question‟ from the summer of 1943 forward did not 
disappoint him. The Catholic press cast a dubious shadow over the Zionist idea, and 
continuously drew a line between the denunciation of anti-Semitism, and support for a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine. The tragedy of the Holocaust, and the daunting refugee 
crisis that it spawned, did not alter mainstream American Catholic positions on political 
Zionism, which continued to be regarded as a dangerous experiment, and one which, in 
combination with an emergent Arab national movement, threatened the position of 
Roman Catholics in the Holy Land. America continued its assault on Zionism long after 
the news of Nazi „death camps‟ had become common knowledge. In an October 1944 
editorial, it advised that, despite the fact that European Jewry had suffered 
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disproportionately during the war, the United States should be wary of supporting 
“zealous Zionists.”102 The unchecked inflow of Jewish refugees, it warned, was a solution 
“fraught with dangers that should be recognized now.” It cautioned Washington leaders 
that had warmed to Zionism of the dangers of intervening in a dispute between Jews and 
Arabs, and cited the example of Britain, whose “fingers had been burnt by competing 
commitments.” In concluding, it suggested that while a home would need to be found for 
Europe‟s displaced Jews, securing that home in Palestine would raise more problems than 
it would solve.
103
 
In a series of editorials in the fall and winter of 1945, America further elaborated 
on its opposition to Zionist demands. It decried the increasingly violent tactics employed 
by Zionists by the end of the war, and scolded the movement for its “violent 
disagreement” with British foreign policy, referring specifically to the Anglo-American 
Report of 1945, which many Zionists found as unpalatable as the 1939 „White Paper.‟104 
America advocated an international settlement for the territory, and opined that, in 
resorting to violence, it “appeared that the Zionist nationalists no longer fight the battle 
primarily to seek a refuge for persecuted brethren, but rather to further nationalist 
ambitions.” While the journal didn‟t fault Jews for seeking a place of refuge following 
the war, it argued that the Jewish dilemma was a humanitarian question, not a political 
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one, highlighting that “unity among [Jews] is based on religion rather than nationality.” 
On that score, it advised against “a nationalistic treatment of a humanitarian problem.”105 
It advised that the „Palestine Question‟ be turned over to an international body, such as 
the UN, a position the journal claimed it shared with a majority of Jews who, it 
suggested, found the claims of Zionists “embarrassing and politically dangerous.” In 
concluding, it suggested a number of alternatives to the Zionist program, including the 
reinstatement of Jews as free citizens of their homelands, increased immigration quotas 
by Britain and the United States, and slight modifications to the 1939 „White Paper‟ to 
allow more Jews to seek refuge in Palestine.
106
 
A number of other Catholic journals also advised referring the „Palestine 
Question‟ to an international body such as the UN, warning that leaving Jew and Arab to 
their own devices would only lead to conflict and bloodshed. In a series of articles in the 
Boston Pilot and the Michigan Catholic, Monsignor Michael Assemani, the 
representative of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to Washington, raised these and other 
issues.
107
 Assemani‟s articles emphasized that while Jews and Arabs had legitimate 
historical and sentimental claims to the Holy Land, so too did Christians, and he implored 
that their rights could not be undermined by the larger Jewish-Arab struggle. The Holy 
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Land was sacred to Christians, he asserted, because “Jesus was born in Bethlehem, 
walked the dirt roads to Nazareth, through Samaria and to Jerusalem. It is the land which 
witnessed His miracles, the country in whose language He preached. It was on Mt. 
Calvary that He was crucified. Palestine is the cradle of Christianity.”108 In concluding, 
Assemani hinted that Catholics would be prepared to take a firm stand in defending the 
neutrality of Christian holy sites in Palestine. “From the 12th century onward,” he intoned, 
“Christians have fought and died to regain control of the holy sites in Palestine. And 
while the crusades of the armed Knights who went out to fight the non-believers now 
belong to history, the Christian world is no less keenly interested in the preservation of its 
holy places in Palestine.”109 His appeal to Christian historical and spiritual ties to the 
Holy Land were echoed by the Vatican in the early postwar years, and were intended to 
elicit an emotional response in American Catholic attitudes towards the struggle for 
Palestine. By re-emphasizing Christianity‟s own ancestral stake in the territory, the 
diocesan press helped to shape Catholic opinion for later Vatican claims for the 
internationalization of the Holy Places, a focal point of postwar Catholic efforts.  
An April 1945 press release by Anthony Bruya, an American Franciscan who 
served as the Palestine correspondent for the NCWC‟s news service, emphasized the 
notion that no suitable solution for the territory could be found that did not address 
Jewish, Muslim and Christian concerns in the Holy Land. In addressing the theme of 
Palestine‟s „absorptive capacity‟, and implicitly questioning Jewish primacy in the 
territory, he observed that “talk about providing a home for the persecuted millions of 
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Europe is all very good and edifying, but is 10,000 square mile Palestine able to remedy, 
or even to alleviate, the plight of those unhappy peoples- by no means limited to those of 
the Jewish race, but knowing neither racial nor religious lines?”110 Bruya further 
criticized a proposed Anglo-American partition plan for Palestine, inspired by a solution 
presented by the influential London Economist, which would have ceded the Zionists a 
large portion of Palestine, including important Christian centres, save only Jenin and 
Nablus.
111
 Though the plan was never made official nor implemented, Bruya‟s dispatches 
were reprinted in the American diocesan press under headlines such as „Christian Rights 
Overlooked‟ and „Christianity Ignored in Verbal Battles Over Arab, Jewish Control of the 
Holy Land‟.112 In concluding, Bruya re-emphasized the notion that no solution was 
acceptable that did not preserve Christian control of the Holy Sites in Palestine. “Any 
attempted solution of the „Palestine Question,‟” he declared, “which does not provide a 
definitive and practical safeguard for the Christian position here, and hence for the 
peculiarly Catholic rights which are as old as Christianity itself, will be no solution at all. 
Such a make-shift will merely postpone the day when a real solution will have to be faced 
by all concerned.”113 
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As the war drew to a close, and as the Palestine question was about to enter a 
decisive new phase, American Catholic opposition to Zionism had become firmly 
entrenched, despite the full airing of the tragedy of the Holocaust by 1945. It was a 
position, moreover, that drew direct inspiration from the Vatican itself. The political 
lobby of the American bishops on Mexico, Spain, Ethiopia and, most recently, the allied 
bombing of Rome, was set to press its case on the question of Palestine. American 
Catholic anti-Zionist rhetoric was about to be applied as concrete political pressure. It 
would contend, however, with an increasingly powerful American Zionist lobby, which 
similarly sought to shape Washington‟s policy on the fate of the Holy Land. 
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Chapter 3 
“Impatient Zionism” and the Transnational Catholic Crusade for the Holy 
Land 
 
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the most crucial 
historical phase of the two thousand year struggle for Palestine. In short order the horrors 
of the Holocaust, and the refugee crisis it had spawned, became widely known, creating 
significant pockets of sympathy for Zionism, even among groups previously benign or 
hostile to the idea. This would come to include not only a majority of American Jewry, 
but also the new President, Harry S. Truman, and a large group of senators and 
congressmen. As the tide of sympathy for Zionism rose in the United States, British 
mandatory control of Palestine rapidly weakened, as developments in the territory and the 
wider region became difficult to manage for the circumscribed power. As a result, the 
Zionist lobby became increasingly focused on Washington, as it became evident that the 
American government, the preeminent political, economic and military power in the 
West, and rapidly warming to the idea of a Jewish Palestine, would be instrumental in 
securing such an end.  
The Vatican and the American bishops, on their part, continued to cultivate their 
informal yet effective „strategic alliance‟ with Washington. On a number of postwar 
questions, including displaced Catholic refugees in Europe, the containment of 
communism (particularly in Italy), assistance to persecuted Catholics in the Soviet 
sphere, and American aid to Germany and Poland, Washington and the American bishops 
did successfully collaborate. By the summer of 1947, the working alliance between 
Washington and the Vatican had become explicit, and the Vatican abandoned its 
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historically cherished neutrality for an open alignment with the West.  For this reason, the 
American hierarchy was hesitant to express its opposition to Zionism too explicitly, lest it 
hamper progress on other areas of cooperation. Developments in Palestine in 1946 and 
1947, however, pushed the Zionist dream of a Jewish state much closer to reality, which 
in turn spurred a more focused and determined institutional response from the American 
Catholic Church. The „Catholic lobby‟ on Palestine would finally emerge. American 
Catholic activism, inspired by the Vatican‟s own policies for the territory, now reached 
beyond the anti-Zionist rhetoric of the diocesan press to concrete action.  
Cold War Consensus: The Vatican, American Catholics and Truman 
In the early postwar years, the warming relationship between the Vatican, 
American Catholics and Washington continued to congeal. It was an informal alliance 
built on mutual dependencies. The Vatican clearly recognized the pre-eminent power of 
the postwar United States, and was eager to solidify its ties to the strongest international 
foe of communism. The Vatican similarly recognized the growing power of the American 
Catholic Church, not least for its financial might, and moved to place a number of 
American churchmen closer to the centre of power. Washington, on its part, regarded the 
Roman Catholic Church as a useful ideological ally in the emerging struggle against 
communism. Truman‟s maintenance of the Taylor mission after Roosevelt‟s death, 
despite the end of the war and growing Protestant opposition to it, was evidence of his 
commitment to preserving a Vatican channel.  
 After 1945, the Catholic Church in the United States entered a period of 
unprecedented vitality, confidence and institutional expansion. It was growth mirroring 
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that of the nation itself, which was embarking on an era of economic prosperity, 
unrivalled military preponderance and global political and cultural influence. Ardent 
Catholic participation in, and support of, the war effort, girded by the explicit 
endorsement of the American hierarchy, squelched much of the anti-Catholic bigotry of 
the prewar era, when critics charged that Catholic isolationism served as a cover for 
deeper fascist and totalitarian sympathies. The war, to be sure, contributed significantly to 
the „mainstreaming‟ of American Catholics in the postwar era, blurring remaining 
distinctions between „Americanism‟ and Catholicism that had persisted for over two 
centuries.
1
 The Catholic population stood at nearly twenty-five  million in 1945 (nearly 
20% of the population), and would rise to over forty-five million in the next two decades, 
bolstered by high birth rates and waves of Catholic immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe.
2
 The Catholic clergy grew by nearly fifty percent in the decade following 
the war, and numbers of enrolled seminarians nearly doubled. The prosperity of postwar 
America was shared by the American Church. Over a hundred new hospitals, three 
thousand new Catholic elementary and high schools, and ninety-four new Catholic 
colleges were built in the postwar decade, evidence of the institutional vigour of the 
postwar Church. Enrolment in Catholic educational institutions rose concurrently. The 
1944 G.I. Bill, which provided college or vocational training for returning servicemen, 
was a particular boon to Catholic colleges, which saw their enrolment increase by three 
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hundred percent (from 92, 426 in the prewar era to 384,526 in 1950), a development that 
further contributed to the „mainstreaming‟ of American Catholics after the war.3 
 The vitality of the postwar American Church did not escape the attention of the 
Vatican, which had long since recognized the unique role of American Catholic leaders to 
speak both as Catholics and as Americans. The steady integration of Catholics into 
mainstream political and social life, partially facilitated by their unflinching support of 
the war effort, and the pre-eminence of the United States in the postwar global order, only 
served to enhance Rome‟s view of the growing importance of the American Church.  
 The institutional expansion of the postwar American Church reflected the 
Vatican‟s growing cognizance of its power, both political and financial. Six new 
archdioceses were created for the United States between 1941 and 1952.
4
 To minister to 
its growing flock, particularly in the postwar decade, a legion of new bishops and 
archbishops were appointed by Rome, bolstering the American episcopate by 1950 to 
sixty percent above its prewar numbers. In private conversations, Pius XII expressed the 
need to give prominent American prelates a more visible presence in the administration 
of the universal Church, both in the College of Cardinals and in the Roman curia, to 
reflect the growing clout of American Catholics. He expressed as much to Harold 
Tittman, secretary to Myron Taylor, who recorded in July 1945 that the Pope “was 
emphatic that the Holy See must „look to the United States‟ and that many non-Italians 
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should be brought to the Holy See in important positions.”5 The Pope‟s words were 
backed with actions, as he quickly moved to integrate American prelates into positions of 
greater power. In July 1945, he named Cincinnati‟s Father Valentine Schaef the first 
American director of the Franciscan Order, passing over more senior European 
candidates. It was an appointment that allowed the Pope “to express his appreciation of 
the generous donations extended for relief purposes to the Holy See by American 
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy in the United States,” as well as to make a “gesture 
of appreciation and good-will to the Government and the people of the United States.”6 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the Franciscans also controlled the office of Custodian of the 
Holy Land, a centuries-old office which administered the order‟s extensive property in 
the Holy Land, which included Jerusalem‟s Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Bethlehem‟s 
Basilica of the Nativity, and Nazareth‟s Basilica of the Nativity.7  
In his first postwar consistory, held in February 1946, Pius XII elected four new 
American cardinals. Joining Archbishop James Dougherty of Philadelphia was the 
mercurial Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York, and Archbishops John Glennon of 
St. Louis, Edward Mooney of Detroit, and Samuel Stritch of Chicago. The fivefold 
increase in American cardinals in a single consistory further underscored Rome‟s postwar 
„turn‟ towards the United States. The Papal Curia also named a number of American 
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bishops to key posting in the Vatican‟s diplomatic service. Bishop Joseph Hurley of St. 
Augustine, Florida was named regent of the nunciature in Yugoslavia, Bishop Gerald 
O‟Hara of Savannah, Georgia was named regent of the nunciature in Romania, and 
Bishop Aloysius Muench of Fargo, North Dakota would soon be named apostolic 
delegate to Germany.
8
 The promotion of American Catholics prompted Lord Halifax, 
British ambassador in Washington, to observe that it was “an indication that the Vatican 
recognized America‟s pre-eminent position as a world power,” and that “the greater voice 
she will now have in Church affairs is regarded as only proper.”9 It did not escape Halifax 
that “creeping bolshevism” drove the Vatican‟s renewed interest in the American Church, 
commenting that “the lengthening shadow of the Soviet Union is leading to an increase in 
the influence of its most inveterate antagonist.”10 
 The seriousness with which the Vatican sought to place American prelates at the 
very height of curial power was made evident late in 1945, when Spellman was tabbed by 
Pius XII to succeed Luigi Maglione as Secretary of State. Spellman‟s suitability was 
emphasized on several fronts; to acknowledge a greater role for Americans in the curia, to 
facilitate the continuation of the Myron Taylor mission (in light of the war‟s end, and of 
Roosevelt‟s death), to tie the Vatican more closely to the strongest international foe of 
communism, and to ensure the cooperation of the United States in assisting with the re-
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settlement of Catholic refugees displaced by the war.
11
 It also would have achieved the 
Pope‟s objective of naming a close friend and confidant to the position which, by 1945, 
Spellman certainly was. Spellman‟s candidacy was one of the worst kept secrets of the 
period, as news of the potential appointment appeared in the Italian and American press 
by early 1946. Giovanni Capobianco, a wartime wireless operator for the Vatican, broke 
the story to the Italian press in January in Rome‟s Giornale del Mattino, much to the 
chagrin of Vatican officials. “An American Secretary of State of a universal Church,” he 
reported, “would be acceptable to the whole world in view of the high prestige which the 
United States has gained for itself, during the last few years especially. Then, too, Mgr. 
Spellman is an outstanding personality among American ecclesiastics, for aside from his 
highly charitable nature, he had throughout the war years pleaded for justice and 
universal brotherhood.”12 Spellman ultimately declined the nomination, a decision 
mutually agreed upon by the Archbishop and the Pope, who both felt that he would be 
more useful to the Vatican in the United States than in Rome. The seriousness of his 
candidacy, however, spoke to a new era of closer cooperation between the Holy See and 
the American Catholic Church. 
 Discussion of a formal diplomatic link between the Holy See and Washington was 
also raised in 1945. The Vatican, clearly sensing a need for closer ties to the United 
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States, particularly as the spectre of Soviet communism loomed ever larger, expressed 
such a desire to Taylor in the spring of that year. In June, Taylor forwarded a lengthy 
memorandum to incoming Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, outlining the practical 
advantages of formal diplomatic recognition. He emphasized the Holy See‟s utility as a 
Cold War “listening post”, given the range of ambassadors already stationed there. He 
also emphasized the significant number of non-Catholic states represented (including 
Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands), and he contended that a Vatican 
ambassador would strengthen America‟s „Good Neighbor Policy‟ with Latin America, 
creating a “favourable impression” among these largely Catholic states.13 Taylor also 
posited that a Vatican ambassador would be helpful in the “re-education” of occupied 
Germany and Austria, owing to the Church‟s historic standing in both of these states. In 
concluding, he emphasized that in the cause of peace, order and stability, the United 
States and the Holy See “shared a fundamental similarity of purpose in the postwar era”, 
and advised that mutual objectives could be better achieved through formal recognition.
14
  
President Harry Truman opted not to exchange ambassadors with the Vatican in 
1945, choosing not to pique the ire of Protestant opponents in the infancy of his 
presidency. Truman did, however, choose to extend Taylor‟s mission as „Personal 
Representative‟ to the Pope indefinitely, despite Roosevelt‟s assurance, in 1940, that the 
mission was “both special and temporary,” highlighting the importance the new president 
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placed on maintaining an informational channel with the Holy See.
15
 The very public 
exchange of letters between Pope and President in the summer of 1947, where each 
affirmed commitment to creating a world order based on peace, democracy, and freedom, 
underpinned by Christian morality, also seemed to buttress the American-Vatican 
relationship.
16
  Truman, furthermore, pressed Harold Tittman for a resident archbishop 
for Washington, giving him a high-ranking member of the hierarchy “right at hand, 
[whom] he could talk to whenever he wanted.”17 The Vatican erected the Archdiocese of 
Washington in November 1947, installing Patrick O‟Boyle as its first Archbishop.  
 This informal strategic alliance of the American government, the Holy See and 
the American Church was bound by a mutuality of concerns and objectives in the postwar 
years. Chief among these was the containment of Soviet communism, an ideological 
worldview long since condemned and vilified by the Vatican and American Church. The 
American bishops‟ Annual Statement for 1945, „Between War and Peace‟, anticipated 
George Kennan‟s „Long Telegram‟ of 1947 and even Winston Churchill‟s „Iron Curtain‟ 
speech of 1946 on the need for Soviet „containment‟.18 In it, the bishops emphasized the 
need for peace, democracy, justice and religious freedom as the underpinnings of a stable 
world order, and they expressed extreme reservations at the “soft hand” with which the 
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United States and Britain treated the Soviet Union. Echoing Domenico Tardini‟s 1946 
warning to Taylor, never to “trust lions disguised as lambs”, the bishops urged a firmer 
hand in dealing with Stalin.
19
 A frank admission of the “clash of ideologies” which 
existed between East and West, the statement continued, and an insistence on a universal 
adherence to justice and democracy, were crucial to the shaping of a stable world order.
20
 
The statement also emphasized the need for national self-determination, particularly in 
Eastern Europe, and called upon American assistance for Italy and Germany, insisting on 
a constructive, rather than punitive, peace.  
 To the spring of 1947, the Vatican continued to harbour hopes, increasingly faint, 
that some sort of „peaceful accommodation‟ could be found between the Soviet Union 
and the West, but its official „non-alignment‟ was becoming increasingly difficult to 
maintain. Behind the facade of official impartiality, the pope remained deeply concerned 
about Soviet expansionism, both for the predicament this created for Roman Catholics in 
the Eastern bloc, and for the potential of communist party electoral successes in Western 
Europe and beyond. The pope‟s paranoia of bolshevism indeed verged on the phobic, 
lending credence to Peter Hebblethwaite‟s musing that Pius XII was “obsessed with the 
possibility of Cossacks in St. Peter‟s Square.”21 This obsession led to a gradual yet steady 
alignment with the West and its leading power from the spring of 1947 forward, despite 
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the cherished neutrality and official impartiality which had historically comprised the 
essence of papal diplomacy. 
 There were a number of signs that the Vatican was more openly aligning itself 
with Washington from this point forward. The repression of the Roman Catholic Church 
in the Soviet sphere caused escalating anxiety for the pope, and Tito‟s 1946 persecution 
of the Archbishop of Zagred, Aloysius Stepinac, confirmed that the Church would not be 
spared Moscow‟s drive to consolidate its control. At the behest of the Vatican, which 
channelled numerous reports on the Church in the East to Washington, the NCWC 
generated a massive campaign in the American Catholic press to bring attention both to 
the trial of Stepinac and to the Soviet repression of the Christian churches generally. The 
NCWC campaign, which included outreach to a number of high-ranking congressmen, 
managed to attract the support of John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, the majority 
leader in the House of Representatives, who presented a thunderous denunciation of 
Stalinist aggression in a speech to the House on 27 July.
22
 Spellman, delighted with the 
speech, sent copies to the entire American episcopate. The Vatican, anxious to bolster the 
NCWC‟s publicity campaign,  and anxious to elicit a firmer American hand in dealing 
with Stalinist aggression, prepared its own memorandum on the Yugoslav situation, 
which it forwarded to the State Department in August.  
By the early winter of 1947, the American Catholic press was roundly lauding 
Washington‟s „new‟ foreign policy objectives, as outlined in a speech by the President to 
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Congress on 12 March.
23
 The „Truman Doctrine‟, in vowing military and financial 
support to Greece and Turkey, signalled a shift in American policy from detente to 
containment of Soviet expansion. The policy was extolled both at the Vatican and by 
leaders in the American Church, who had advocated a tougher line on Moscow for some 
time. Edmund J. Walsh, S.J., dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University and recent consultant to the American government at the Nuremberg Trials, 
praised Truman‟s resolute policy in a March speech to 1200 foreign service and 
diplomatic staff at Washington‟s Statler Hotel. In comparing the Monroe Doctrine with 
the “equally historic Truman Doctrine”, Walsh exclaimed that “the non-colonization of 
the world by communist aggression is now declared to be a cardinal principle of 
American foreign policy. The speed with which the American principle of free 
democracy rushed in to occupy the political vacuum created by the withdrawal of British 
power from the Middle East is an index of awakened responsibility in high places. It was 
a question of immediate response to an impelling emergency or else progressive 
surrender to the calculated advance of world communism.”24  
 Walsh‟s statement was echoed by the Vatican itself, which offered its unqualified 
endorsement of the Marshall Plan in a series of articles in the Osservatore Romano and Il 
Quotidiano (the paper of the Church‟s powerful lay organization, Catholic Action) in the 
summer of 1947. Though the Vatican had sought to maintain an impartial non-alignment 
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through 1946 and 1947, despite private fears of Soviet encroachment, an endorsement of 
the Marshall Plan amounted to a de facto alignment with Washington. The exchange of 
letters between Truman and Pius XII in August 1947, circulated in the secular and 
religious press to maximum effect, appeared to seal the Washington-Vatican axis. The 
exchange coincided with Myron Taylor‟s return to Rome, following Truman‟s decision, 
despite a rising tide of Protestant opposition, to send his „personal representative‟ back to 
the Vatican indefinitely. That Moscow considered the exchange of letters nothing short of 
a working alliance between the Vatican and the United States was suggested to Taylor‟s 
office by Don Manuel Sotomayor Luna, the Ecuadorian ambassador to the Holy See. 
Commenting that the Soviets considered the United States too strong for a “frontal 
attack”, he suggested that Stalin would “weaken it by two major flank attacks”, namely 
Latin America and the Roman Catholic Church.
25
 “The communists consider the 
exchange of letters between the President and the Pope”, he offered, “as tantamount to an 
alliance and as a source of moral strength to the United States. Accordingly, if it can 
defeat and weaken the Holy See, they will also be weakening the United States.” In 
concluding, the ambassador recalled a recent meeting with the pope, where he informed 
Pius that in Moscow, he was now referred to as “that American.”26 Sotomayor‟s inference 
was confirmed during a September 1948 meeting between Montini and James Dunn, the 
American ambassador to Italy. Montini informed his guest that he saw little hope of 
Vatican relations with any Soviet-controlled government, and that Moscow was “using 
the Orthodox Church as a political instrument to undermine the Vatican, whose 
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favourable attitude toward the Marshall Plan...was particularly resented by Stalin.”27 In 
closing, however, he pledged the Vatican‟s unwavering support of the Marshall Plan, 
repeating three times to Dunn that it “must succeed for the good of mankind.”28 
 Open cooperation between Washington, the Vatican and the American Church 
reached an apogee during the 1948 Italian elections, which pitted a left-wing bloc of 
communists and socialists, led by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), against a centre-
right bloc led by Alcide DeGasperi‟s Christian Democrats (DC). The Vatican, through 
the organs of Catholic Action, organized a capillary-like network of diocesan and parish 
organizations intended to steer Italian Catholics away from the PCI, and into the voting 
booth on election day.
29
 The American government, through the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), channelled money, supplies and expertise to the Holy See and the DC. On 
a public level, the Truman administration, until the eve of the election, subtly reminded 
Italians that American aid, including Marshall Plan dollars, would not necessarily 
continue flowing to a „red‟ Italy. The American Catholic Church, at the suggestion of 
Luigi Gedda, head of Catholic Action, initiated a letter-writing campaign which saw 
American-Italians writing relatives in Italy to warn them of the consequences of a PCI 
victory. Coordinated by the NCWC, through the office of Cicognani, the apostolic 
delegate, the campaign focused on dioceses and archdioceses with the highest 
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concentrations of Italian-American faithful.
30
 By mid-March 1948, the United States Post 
Office reported that mail to Italy had already doubled.
31
 American and Vatican efforts 
appeared to have succeeded: DeGasperi‟s coalition achieved a comfortable victory in the 
18 April election. The Vatican did not hesitate to thank the American Church for its 
services rendered. Through Cicognani, it relayed to the NCWC the “deep gratitude” of 
the Secretary of State “for the very active and efficient part taken by the NCWC in this 
campaign and its promotion.”32 
 American designs for the postwar world dovetailed quite closely with the 
American bishops‟ Statement of 1945. The episcopacy‟s call for “containment” became 
American policy by 1947, as a firmer hand in dealing with Moscow became entrenched. 
The Marshall Plan fulfilled the objective of foisting a judicious and measured peace on 
Germany, designed to prevent its absorption into the Soviet sphere. In Italy, the informal, 
yet highly effective, alliance of Washington, the American Church and the Vatican 
helped deliver victory to Alcide DeGasperi‟s Christian Democrats in the 1948 Italian 
elections, narrowly denying power to the communist-led Popular Democratic Front.  If 
Pius XII looked to Washington to shape a postwar order based the principles of 
democracy, peace, justice and religious freedom, the United States could equally, by late 
1945, view the Vatican and American Catholics as committed ideological partners in 
such a task. 
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Non Possumus: A New Roman Catholic Crusade for the Holy Land 
 Though a clutch of mutual, and vital, common concerns did draw Washington and 
the Vatican closer together in the years after 1945, Roman Catholic attitudes towards 
Zionism and the Holy Land grew increasingly at odds with positions beginning to prevail 
in the Senate and State Department, where support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
was growing. Favourable opinion on Zionism was also growing among the American 
public. By the summer of 1945, newsreel footage of Auschwitz, Buchenwald and other 
Nazi death camps had vividly brought the horrors of the Holocaust to bear on the 
American conscience, creating a groundswell of support for Zionism that had been 
building through the war years. It was a development that was about to put American 
Catholic opposition to Zionism in much sharper relief. 
The Vatican was certainly cognizant of the humanitarian crisis that the Holocaust 
had created for surviving European Jews, yet this did not alter its longstanding opposition 
to Zionism, as outlined in the 1922 aide memoire issued by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri to 
the League of Nations. 
33
 A series of private audiences with Pius XII in 1945 confirmed 
this. In a papal audience in April of that year, Moshe Sharett, future Prime Minister of 
Israel and then head of the pre-state Jewish Agency government, assured the Pope that 
there was “no clash between [Zionist] aspirations in Palestine and the high interests of 
Christianity and the Catholic Church.”34 The Pope acknowledged his guest‟s concerns, 
but continued to express the opinion on the unfeasibility of Zionism. “There are Arabs in 
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Palestine...They are the majority”, Pius XII offered in response. Though Sharett tried to 
emphasize the specific importance of Palestine to the Jewish diaspora, “the only place we 
have in the whole world”, he remained unconvinced that the Roman Church would be 
supportive moving forward.
35
 By his own later admission, his attempt to elicit some kind 
of Vatican sympathy for the program of postwar Zionism, based on a rational explanation 
of the political and humanitarian reality, and in the immediate wake of the Holocaust, 
“went nowhere”.36 
 In September, Pius XII received Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, a member of the 
Zionist Emergency Committee, and who would be assigned in 1946 by President Truman 
as an official advisor to the United States Army in Europe on the resettlement of nearly 
200,000 European Jews. During the audience, held at Castel Gandolfo, Bernstein thanked 
the Pope for his assistance to European Jewry during the war, and for his continuing 
assistance to Jewish refugees in postwar Italy. 
37
 The rabbi was impressed by the Pope‟s 
genuine anguish at the fate of European Jews, which he repeatedly described as 
“dreadful”. On the question of Jewish resettlement, however, Pius XII continued to 
disregard the option of a Jewish Palestine, informing his guest that Jewish immigration to 
the United States or to South America would be a suitable solution to the postwar refugee 
crisis. Bernstein then apprised the Pope of the resistance to Jewish immigration in the 
United States and elsewhere, coupled with a desire among many displaced European 
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Jews to settle in Palestine. “Yes, I recognize that as their desire”, the Pope admitted to 
Bernstein, but he suggested that “the United States was best equipped to absorb them”.38 
Bernstein left the meeting with Pius guardedly optimistic, noting that the Pope ended the 
audience with “another handshake, not firm but with enough pressure to suggest a 
positive clasp.” 
 That the American Catholic hierarchy was to maintain a line on Palestine parallel 
to that of the Vatican was emphasized in December 1945, when prominent archbishops in 
the American Church, including Spellman, Stritch, Mooney an Glennon, were again 
forwarded copies of the Vatican‟s 1922 aide memoire, as well as copies of Cardinal 
Gasparri‟s 1922 note to the British Minister to the Holy See, both of which outlined 
Rome‟s opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on political, theological and historical 
grounds.
39
 Both statements, now thirty years old, and composed long before the rise of 
the Nazis and the eventual tragedy of the Holocaust, were still to be regarded as the 
definitive positions of the Roman Catholic Church on the question of Palestine. That the 
statements were re-issued at the end of 1945, after having been distributed to the entire 
American episcopate through the NCWC in June 1944, was evidence that the cessation of 
hostilities in Europe, and a clearer appraisal of the tragedy of European Jewry, had not 
altered the Vatican‟s fundamental position on the future of Palestine.40 
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 Generally speaking, however, Catholic resistance to Zionism was not a policy 
aired too publically from the Holy See in the period immediately following the war. This 
was chiefly because Vatican priorities in the immediate postwar years centred squarely 
on “containment” of Soviet communism, which clearly posed the most severe threats to 
the interests of the Church in this period. As American public support for Zionism 
continued to grow in 1946 and 1947 (with a slim majority of Americans coming to 
support the idea), and as the American government increasingly pledged its support, an 
explicit Vatican opposition became increasingly difficult.
41
 President Truman‟s growing 
personal commitment to the Zionist idea made an oppositional stance more difficult still. 
In the interests of maintaining sound relations with Washington, and particularly not to 
jeopardize the Taylor mission, the Vatican remained publically silent on the question of 
Zionism, though resistance to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine remained 
the formal policy of the Church both in Rome and the United States. 
 Given the convergence of interests between the American Church and 
Washington in the postwar years, leading figures in the American hierarchy were 
similarly reticent to trumpet an opposition to Zionism too loudly, lest it hamper the 
ability of the Church to work with the American government on other mutual objectives. 
Seeking American aid for war-ravaged Italy was one such objective, in accordance with 
the bishop‟s postwar commitments to building international democracy, justice and 
religious freedom. In the weeks before he was raised to the College of Cardinals by Pius 
XII, in April 1946, Chicago‟s archbishop Stritch emphasized the need for American aid 
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to Italy during an hour-long meeting with President Truman at the White House.
42
 Stritch 
emphasized the need for the United States to “make good” on its promises “in support of 
the reconstruction of Italy on the basis of the core principles of Western civilization,” 
warning that the devastation wrought by war had made communism a viable alternative 
for many Italians. Though Stritch was not sure that the President understood the gravity 
of the communist threat in Italy, he was confident that he shared the postwar ambitions of 
both the Vatican and American Catholics.
43
 As increasingly important intermediaries 
between Rome and Washington, however, American Catholic leaders shared the 
Vatican‟s apprehensions on taking visibly oppositional positions with the American 
government, including the divergence of opinion on Zionism. The American bishops 
were well aware that a definitive public stand against Zionism could jeopardize other 
areas of cooperation with Washington, precisely at the moment when relations with the 
Truman administration appeared progressively fruitful. The bishops preferred to remain 
circumspect, withholding public statements as they pursued other areas of cooperation. 
 The American Catholic press, however, expressed opinion more freely than the 
bishops could.  While the bishops exercised strategic restraint on the question, anti-
Zionist musings continued to be expressed liberally through the diocesan and wider 
American Catholic press, in line with Cardinal Maglione‟s call in August 1943 that the 
Catholic press trumpet the Vatican‟s line on Palestine. By 1945, such delineation in 
Catholic journals became increasingly important in shaping public opinion on the 
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Palestine question, particularly as sympathy for a Jewish home in Palestine grew in the 
wake of the war. As outlined in the previous chapter, a series of articles in the diocesan 
press in the fall and winter of 1945 continued to heap criticism on Zionism. Anthony 
Bruya, an American Franciscan and the Jerusalem correspondent for the NCWC News 
Service, produced a series of such articles, eventually carried by the Brooklyn Tablet, the 
Boston Pilot, the New World (Chicago), Catholic Mind, and other large circulation 
diocesan papers.
44
 Bruya, closely echoing the Vatican, questioned the “absorptive 
capacity” of Palestine to accommodate Europe‟s displaced Jews. He criticized Jews who 
looked to the territory as a “new lebensraum for commercial enterprise and expansion”, 
crassly linking Zionism to the Nazi drive for empire. As the Pope had expressed 
privately, Bruya touted alternatives for Jews seeking refuge and settlement, suggesting 
North and South America as ideal points of emigration. He also juxtaposed the 
safeguarding of Christian holy sites in Palestine with Zionist dreams of a Jewish state, 
arguing that the latter was wholly incompatible with the former, a position more firmly 
expressed in the Catholic press from 1945 forward.  “For thousands of years Palestine has 
been the Holy Land”, Bruya observed, “and it must continue to be such in the years 
which follow the devastation of this global war. In defence of its sacred character and its 
Holy Places the flower of European manhood once purpled with Crusader blood many a 
Palestine battlefield. It would be unthinkable that now, from the unspeakable wreckage of 
this war, which in the Providence of God passed by this Holy Land, should come a new 
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desecration of the home land of Jesus Christ.”45 The article reflected the increasingly dire, 
crusade-inspired rhetoric that was coming to characterize American Catholic reportage on 
Palestine. In concluding, Bruya suggested an international trusteeship for the territory, 
under the auspices of the recently formed United Nations (UN), as the only solution that 
could reliably protect Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land. Once again, he floated 
an idea that the Vatican, and American Catholic leaders, had only suggested in private 
conversations. 
 Bruya‟s sentiments were echoed further in the Catholic press by Mgr. Michael 
Assemani, the representative of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem to the United States, and 
also an NCWC correspondent in Palestine. In a series of articles in the fall of 1945, 
Assemani defended Christianity‟s ancient claims to the territory, arguing that any 
solution that handed political control of the territory to “either Jews or Mohammedans” 
would represent a violation of Christianity‟s stake to the territory. He similarly suggested 
a UN stewardship of the territory, and urged allied governments to “put a stop to the 
religious and racial bickering” between Jew and Arab in the territory.46 
 As Assemani‟s condemnations of Zionist designs for Palestine grew progressively 
more acerbic in the spring of 1946, the NCWC Press Department became increasingly 
reticent to proclaim such a conspicuously anti-Zionist editorial line. This was particularly 
so in light of the 1946 Anglo-American Report on Palestine, which suggested that a UN 
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commission be established to administer the territory, much to the consternation of 
Zionist leaders in the United States and Europe. As it appeared that Catholic designs for 
the territory were being fulfilled by the recommendations of the report, the NCWC 
adopted a guardedly neutral line on Zionism, preferring not to inflame public opinion, 
particularly as sympathy for Zionism continued to rise. The NCWC was also concerned 
with cultivating its closer ties to Washington, an objective that could be complicated by 
an effervescent anti-Zionism among American Catholics.  
Much like the Vatican‟s official organ, the Osservatore Romano, diocesan papers, 
under the auspices of the NCWC, adopted an increasingly ambivalent line on Zionism 
through the spring and summer of 1946, confident that a settlement on the territory 
amenable to the Vatican and the American Church, namely a UN administration of the 
territory, was unfolding. The NCWC‟s desire for a more ambivalent stance was revealed 
in May 1946 when Frank Hall, director of the NCWC‟s Press Department, informed 
General Secretary Mgr. Howard Carroll that Assemani‟s articles, increasingly critical of 
Zionism, risked creating an anti-Catholic backlash against the Church in the United 
States, hampering its ability to pursue common objectives with the American government 
(where sympathy with Zionism continued to rise).
47
 Hall preferred a neutral stance, 
reminding Carroll that neither the Vatican nor the American hierarchy had issued a 
definitive and public statement “expressing positive agreement or disagreement with the 
Zionists hopes for a Jewish homeland.” In touting the value of neutrality on the issue, he 
continued that  
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...we seem at present on the fence, in the sense that no one can say we took a 
position for or against (I realize what some persons think on the subject, but they 
haven‟t gone on record). Now, Father Assemani could be described as having an 
official position of great importance with regard to Palestine. We could be 
described as the news agency of the American hierarchy. If we sent out [his] 
articles, it could be described as giving the Catholic position on the Zionist‟s 
hopes for a Jewish homeland. It would be a position in the opposition.
48
   
 
Carroll‟s handwritten response stated that Assemani‟s articles “should be held in  
abeyance for the present.” 
 A Commonweal editorial on the Palestine question from May 1946 epitomized the 
cautious position adopted by the American Catholic press in the early postwar period.  
We have never been able to make up our minds on the subject of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine. We fully recognize the desperate need of Europe‟s 
remaining Jews for a homeland in which they can be reasonably confident of 
living unmolested... But we are likewise equally suspicious of Zionist nationalism 
and we cannot withhold our sympathy from the natives of Palestine who, however 
short-sightedly, seem to prefer to keep their country for their own use. Americans, 
of all people, can with the least grace criticize others for attempts to restrict 
immigration. And hence we cannot make up our minds, especially since we 
believe that the first duty of our own country is itself to provide a haven of refuge 
for the harborless.
49
 
 
The editorial closely mirrored the Vatican‟s position on the issue: that a refuge for 
displaced Jews had to be found, but that the Zionist program was problematic on a 
number of fronts, and that Jewish emigration, particularly to the United States, 
represented a more viable solution.  
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 The restraint exhibited by the NCWC on the Palestine question in the spring and 
summer of 1946 was not as evident in other organs of the American Catholic press. The 
national Jesuit weekly America, for example, continued to openly criticize Zionist 
demands, characterizing them as belligerent and wholly incompatible with Christian and 
Muslim rights in the territory. Publishing outside the auspices of the NCWC, America 
largely abandoned its wartime editorial line which alternated between a show of Catholic 
solidarity with persecuted Jews and a stern scepticism for Zionism, to focus more 
singularly on criticisms of the latter. The journal admitted that a viable solution had to be 
found for Europe‟s displaced Jews, but it clearly expressed its reservations with Zionism 
as that solution. As early as December 1945, America accused Zionist organizations of 
exploiting the suffering of Jews as an expedient to the erecting of a sovereign Jewish 
state.
50
 America suggested that unity among Jews was based on religion rather than 
nationality, and that Zionism sought to create a question of national sovereignty out of 
what was properly a humanitarian crisis. The journal seconded Hans Morgenthau‟s 
November 1945 assertion that Palestine be placed “under the auspices of the UN,” and it 
claimed to stand with Jews “embarrassed at aggressive Zionism.”51 
 Throughout 1946, America expressed consternation at Zionist impatience with the 
Anglo-American Report on Palestine (which represented a repudiation of the Zionist 
program), and criticized the increasingly violent tactics adopted by Jewish nationalists in 
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Palestine.
52
 It regarded the Report as the most pragmatic solution to what was becoming 
an intractable political situation. “A fairer compromise”, the journal described it, “in view 
of the complications that thirty years have added to the original 1917 arrangement, could 
scarcely have been forthcoming.”53  It charged that Zionist belligerence, which was 
spilling into violence, hampered the “Jewish cause” more severely than even Arab 
intransigence, and urged that British diplomacy, which favoured an international mandate 
for the territory, be given a chance to succeed. America repeatedly criticized the “narrow 
nationalism” of the Zionists, charging that it “[appeared] that the Zionist nationalists no 
longer fight the battle to secure a refuge for persecuted brethren, but rather to further 
national ambitions.”54 In a later editorial, the journal accused Zionist leaders of leaders of 
exploiting the refugee crisis to fuel the “religio-nationalist mystique” of Zionism, all to 
push forward “an obscure claim for a Jewish „nationality‟ and a small strip of land where 
it may be expressed.” America also invoked the communist bogey with regularity, 
suggesting in a number of editorials that the success of the Zionist program in Palestine 
would only give a stronger toehold to the Soviets in the region, where Arab dispossession 
would only worsen with the establishment of a Jewish state.
55
 
 That the Holy See endorsed the editorial line of America, including its critical 
stance on the Zionist program, was made clear in May of 1946, when Pius XII issued a 
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letter to John LaFarge S. J., the noted liberal Catholic leader who had edited the journal 
since 1944.
56
 The letter, printed in the pages of America in July, praised LaFarge and his 
editorial staff for principled and practical “Catholic” solutions to the myriad of problems 
that faced the postwar world. The pope lauded America for calling “the attention of 
statesmen and leaders in the social and economic field to the cankers that weaken the 
body politic in its national and international life,” and for critiquing “exaggerated 
nationalisms that would close [their] eyes to the unity of the human family.”57 Pius XII 
further praised LaFarge for the “spirit of obedience constantly guiding the policy of [the] 
review in analyzing in a careful and scholarly manner the complex issues of the day, and 
pointing to the solution offered for them by the principles of Christian philosophy.” The 
letter represented an implicit Vatican endorsement of America’s views on the Palestine 
question, evidence that Rome stood behind the various criticisms of Zionism expressed in 
the American Catholic press. 
 Events in Palestine itself would only harden Catholic opinion, as tensions there 
continued to intensify through 1946. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Zionists were 
confident that Britain would deliver on the promises of the Balfour Declaration and 
acquiesce to their demands for a Jewish state. The victory of Clement Atlee‟s Labour 
Party in the July 1945 British election only heightened Zionist hopes, given Labour‟s 
previous endorsements for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This optimism quickly 
soured, however, when it became evident that Atlee‟s Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, 
had no intentions of facilitating Zionist designs in Palestine. Bevin extended Britain‟s 
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cautious course on Palestine, imposing renewed immigration quotas and promising only 
to launch another inquiry into the situation. This inquiry, which became the 1946 Anglo-
American Report, represented a check on the momentum that mainstream Zionist 
organizations appeared to have gained during the war, and contributed to decaying 
relations between Jewish Palestinians and British occupying forces in the territory. 
 Maintaining stability in the territory from early 1946 forward proved a difficult 
task for Britain, which stationed nearly 80,000 soldiers there to maintain order. 
Underground Zionist organizations such as the Irgun and the Haganah, increasingly 
frustrated with Britain‟s stonewalling of their ambitions, waged an intermittent campaign 
of sabotage and bombings through the spring and summer. This resistance began with the 
sinking of two British police boats in Haifa in October 1944, and continued with attacks 
on other symbols of British control in the territory, including railroads, police stations 
and military bases. By July, British authorities had arrested nearly three thousand Jews on 
suspicions of sabotage and terrorism. Though the recognized Jewish Agency government 
officially criticized the campaign of such clandestine groups, it became clear that 
Britain‟s „Palestine policy‟ was an affront to mainstream Zionist organizations as well. 
Irgun and Haganah attacks increased in frequency and severity from July forward. 
Jerusalem‟s King David Hotel, which served as the Britain‟s administrative headquarters 
in Palestine, was bombed on 22 July, followed by the bombing of the British embassy in 
Rome in October, both incidences suspected work of the Zionist underground. 
 The intensifying of the terror campaign by the Irgun and other groups drew a 
predictable response from America, which again linked Zionism to a crude “crypto-
nationalism” that was little interested in seeking a genuine solution to the Jewish refugee 
169 
 
crisis.
58
 The violence of 1946, the journal suggested, “encourages the suspicion that 
certain elements of the Zionists are no more responsible or politically mature, despite 
superior material culture, than some Arab extremists who would resort to the same means 
if they got the chance and hope of success. Zionism is now in the difficult position of 
having to prove the possibility of peaceful government in Palestine.”59 America‟s position 
closely reflected that of the Vatican, which viewed both Jewish and Arab nationalism 
with deep suspicion, consistently preferring an international mandate over the territory 
than the victory of either of these national movements.
60
 
 The escalation of violence in Palestine from the summer of 1946 forward, in fact, 
marked the beginning of a more widespread condemnation of Zionism and its methods 
across a wider spectrum of the American diocesan press. The Commonweal, which had 
previously offered only a convoluted and cautious opinion on Zionism in the period 
immediately following the war (in line with the Vatican‟s own circumspection), became 
more hostile from this point forward. It linked the July bombing of the King David Hotel 
not to the underground groups that had planned and undertaken it, but “to Zionism 
itself...that must bear responsibility for an act that threatens all it ever aimed to create.”61 
Like America, the Commonweal characterized the aims of Zionists as distinct and 
separate from those of a majority of world Jewry who, in the opinion of these Catholic 
journals, only sought to live in peace and security in the various states that would accept 
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them as immigrants. “Zionists”, it commented further, “never in contemporary times a 
majority of the Jews, sought to use intimidation and violence to achieve an end not 
widely supported by their global co-religionists.” It further opined that it “could not 
conceal [its] anger and distress now that a long and mistaken campaign has brought one 
more bitter nationalism into a world that has too many of them.”62 Denunciations on 
similar grounds could be found in a variety of American Catholic journals and papers, 
including the Boston Pilot, Sign, Catholic Mind, Catholic Worker, the Brooklyn Tablet 
and others, evidence that the circumscribed and cautious anti-Zionism of 1945-1946 was 
giving way to a more uniform chorus denouncing the idea of Jewish statehood in 
Palestine.
63
 
  The notion that Roman Catholic interests in the territory were taking a back seat 
to the Arab-Israeli struggle was also emphasized from 1947 onward. Once again Anthony 
Bruya, the NCWC‟s Jerusalem correspondent, provided the reportage. He decried the 
“third rate status” of Christian claims, and frequently quoted the Anglo-American 
Report‟s admission that “the great interest of the Christian world in Palestine has been 
completely overlooked, glossed over, or brushed aside.”64 By the summer of 1947, Bruya 
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assured his readers, little had changed. In June, Bruya fanned the flames of a “new 
crusade” for Palestine, employing a motif which was appearing with increased frequency. 
In commenting on the dangers of a solution which ignored the Christian stake, he quoted 
an un-named former British High Commissioner to Palestine, who “bluntly expressed” to 
Bruya that “the disregard of Christian sentiment and Christian rights in any settlement of 
the Holy Land problem would arouse a new crusading spirit like that of ages past.”65 In 
July, Bruya expressed the apprehension, shared by the Vatican and the American 
hierarchy, of either Arab or Jewish control over the whole territory. “The process of 
industrialization and modernization”, he observed, “rapidly carried out by immigrant 
Jews in many parts of Palestine is taken as an ill omen even by progressive Church 
leaders,” while “an Arab Palestinian state with a Moslem majority, it is feared, will clamp 
down discrimination against the Christians, especially Western missions, forbidding their 
missionary work and forcing them to leave the country as undesirables.”66 Bruya‟s 
columns reflected the tone of the diocesan press for much of 1947, which lent tentative 
support to the UN‟s search for a solution to the conundrum, while „holding to account‟ 
the world body on its promises to protect the Christian stake in the territory. Taken 
collectively, it was an editorial line which reflected the Vatican‟s own position on 
Palestine by the summer of 1947. 
 Similar patterns were found in other organs of the American Catholic press. The 
thinly-veiled scepticism of UN efforts, so prominent in the diocesan press, was echoed in 
the Jesuit weekly America, though this journal barely restrained its longstanding disdain 
                                                          
65
 Brooklyn Tablet, ‘Sees Christian Rights Already Ignored in the Holy Land’, 28 June 1947, 11. 
66
 Brooklyn Tablet, ‘UN Group Studies Plea on Christians in Palestine’, 26 July 1947, 1. 
172 
 
for political Zionism. Though editorship of the journal had passed in 1944 to John 
LaFarge, S.J., a liberal figure known for his tireless advocacy for racial equality and 
justice in the United States, its editorial line on Zionism remained intact, further evidence 
of an analogous and unchanging Roman Catholic position on the Holy Land. Throughout 
1947, America characterized the demands of Zionists as opportune, cynical, perilous and 
ill-advised. The stability of the whole region, let alone the interests of Roman Catholics, 
the journal implored, was put at risk by “impatient Zionism” and its drive to create a 
Jewish state.
67
 To this end, America consistently emphasized the fact that Zionism 
enjoyed no universal support among Western Jewry, asserting in a May editorial that “In 
no nation are the Jews found to be united on the political objectives of Zionism, however 
universal the chorus of admiration for their prodigious social and economic 
achievements.”68 In October, the journal presented the views of Elmer Berger, Director of 
the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, which insisted that global Jewry, as a 
religious and not a national group, should focus its efforts on securing legal safeguards 
and religious freedoms and the inalienable rights of the individual, but not statehood.
69
 
America conceded, however, that anti-Zionist Jewish groups “will scarcely prevail, 
inasmuch as their insistence on religious unity, as against unified nationality, separates 
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them too sharply from the Zionist tendency, which has been a half a century in 
growing.”70 
 America placed similarly little faith in Arab control of the territory. It opined that 
the Arab League “had put a bold face on their plea for self-government and 
independence, with only vague and meagre promises that their first „democratic 
experiment‟ would work in a land of such cynically divided loyalties.”71 It maintained 
that while the Arabs presented a consistent claim for nationalism, “Arab intransigence”, 
and “the strong Arab tendency to particularism, which could hardly be called 
nationalism” would bedevil any successful Arab administration of the territory. The 
journal initially its support behind an international trusteeship for Palestine, observing 
that “to practically every [UN] member-nation Palestine- all of it, not merely this or that 
enclave- is Holy Land first, and only by regrettable concomitance a political problem at 
all.”72 As the situation in Palestine continued to worsen, the American Catholic press 
placed Christian interests in the territory front and centre, girding Catholic opinion for the 
coming struggle for the future of the territory at the UN. 
The UN Partition Plan and the Birth of the „Corpus Separatum‟, 1947-1948 
Events in Palestine after the bombing of the King David Hotel made it evident 
that Britain‟s mandatory control over the territory was becoming increasingly fragile. The 
Irgun, and other underground groups, were becoming progressively emboldened in their 
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successes against British targets in the Holy Land, and stepped up their campaign in the 
fall and winter of 1946 and the spring of 1947. The Irgun’s tactic of capturing and 
executing British soldiers and administrators for each of their own casualties (often by 
hanging) added a sinister odium to the struggle. As international sympathy for Zionism 
continued to gain traction, particularly in the United States, and as the struggle against 
underground Zionist groups continued to intensify, necessitating an occupying force of 
nearly 100,000 personnel, the British Foreign Office began to seriously question its 
commitment to the mandate. 
As domestic and international pressure mounted, Britain finally decided in 
February 1947 to turn the question of Palestine over to the United Nations, stipulating 
only that any proposed solution would have to be acceptable to both Arabs and Jews in 
the territory.
73
 The General Assembly promptly established the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), a body created to investigate the conflict in the Holy 
Land, and to propose a viable solution.
74
 Throughout 1947, UNSCOP delegates examined 
a variety of political solutions for Palestine, including a Jewish state with guaranteed 
rights for Arab minorities, an Arab state with guaranteed rights for Jewish minorities, UN 
trusteeship for the territory, and a partitioned state. By the fall, the committee had 
prepared a majority report, which favoured a partitioned state with UN trusteeship for the 
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„Old City‟ of Jerusalem, and a minority report which recommended a federated 
Palestinian state to be administered by the Arabs, with constitutional protections for the 
Jewish minority. The majority report prevailed, and on 29 November 1947, the UN 
adopted a resolution to create both a Jewish and an Arab state in the territory, while 
maintaining Jerusalem as an “international zone” under the auspices of the UN. 
News of the UN resolution on Palestine elicited little official reaction from either 
the Vatican or the leading figures of the American Church. The Holy See remained 
opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, but it continued, on an official 
level, to cloister this policy, cognizant of the broad international support for the partition 
plan, and desirous to maintain its growing strategic and ideological alliance with the 
United States (which had firmly supported the UN plan). Though the Vatican remained 
opposed in principle to a Jewish Palestine, it was equally wary of an Arab state in the 
territory, a prospect that it had long since regarded, like Zionism, as a threat to Roman 
Catholic interests in the Holy Land. The views of the Vatican on Arab nationalism were 
shared by Myron Taylor, who expressed his apprehensions in a memo to Cordell Hull 
during the closing months of the Second World War: 
I have repeatedly expressed the opinion that no encouragement should be given  
to the establishment, after the war, of a pan-Arab confederation. I have serious  
doubts as to the opportuneness of encouraging a similar racial and religious bloc  
that would put in motion such external and internal controversies as would render   
vain any effort to control, influence or deal with problems concerning [its] single  
parts...It seems to me that the whole plan to encourage a consolidation of the Arab   
world is full of dangers of many kinds.
75
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Similar apprehensions towards Arab nationalism in Palestine could be found both 
in the Vatican‟s press organs and in American Catholic periodicals from the 1920‟s 
forward. 
 The plan to divide Palestine appeared to create for the Holy See a „worst of both 
worlds‟ political scenario: a situation whereby two non-Christian states would be created, 
each of which would presumably pose challenges to Roman Catholic influence in the 
region. Given the broad-based support for partition, however (particularly that of the 
United States, Britain, and a clutch of predominantly Catholic South American states), an 
outright denunciation of the plan to divide Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews, 
either from Rome or from leaders of the American Church, was fraught with risks. The 
Vatican remained keen to maintain sound relations with the United States, and was 
reluctant to create a breach with Washington by an open rejection of the partition plan. 
This was particularly so considering that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) continued to 
expand its political influence on the peninsula, a threat the Vatican would need continued 
American assistance to contain. 
 In lieu of UN trusteeship for Palestine, which Maglione considered optimal, 
Vatican policymakers seized upon promises made in the partition plan to maintain 
Jerusalem as a UN administered international zone, a „corpus separatum‟ protecting the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
synthesis between the Arab peoples of the Middle East, and specifically proposed a ‘Greater Syria’ which 
would encompass, among other territories, most of Palestine. The idea was as alarming to the Vatican as 
was the program of Zionism, as both threatened the Church in the Holy Land.  
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Holy Places by placing neither Jews nor Arabs in control of the Old City.
76
 In this way, 
the holiest sites of Christendom would remain outside of the political jurisdiction of a 
non-Christian sovereign power, preserving for the Roman Catholic Church at least a base 
for continued influence in the region.  
 Leading figures in the American hierarchy were similarly wary of the prospects of 
either Arab or Jewish control of Palestine. New York‟s Mgr. Thomas McMahon, who 
would advocate tirelessly on behalf of the Holy See as the head of the New York Based 
Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) from 1943 to 1955, expressed 
American Catholic support for UN trusteeship of Palestine as early as June 1945, when 
he weighed in on the options for the territory: “Palestine is international, an international 
UN government is another idea proposed; the idea is good, in fact far better than the 
others, because it does safeguard the sacred character of Christ‟s homeland.”77 By 1947, 
however, American churchmen, in accord with the views of the Vatican secretariat, had 
accepted the partition of Palestine as a virtual inevitability, and focused their efforts on 
guaranteeing the maintenance of Jerusalem as an international „corpus separatum‟. 
Spellman, the foremost figure in American Catholicism, expressed as much to an 
American diplomat in January 1947, stating that though the Catholic Church “strongly 
[opposed] any form of partition, primarily on the ground that the whole of the land [was] 
sacred to Christ”, he conceded that “a carefully conceived, detailed regime of guarantees 
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and safeguards for the Holy Places and for the Christian minorities, both under the 
supervision of appropriate organs of the United Nations”, would be the least that the 
Church would expect in properly resolving the „Palestine Question‟.78  
 That the Vatican and the American bishops so quickly conceded defeat on the 
partition plan spoke volumes on the limits of Vatican diplomacy in the early Cold War. 
The close cooperation of the American bishops and Washington on a number of areas of 
mutual concern, combined with staunch American support of the partition plan, 
effectively nullified the Vatican‟s longstanding opposition to a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. Within a matter of weeks, Gasparri‟s 1922 Aide Mémoire, which had been 
trotted out frequently to outline the Vatican‟s longstanding policy, had been rendered a 
dead letter. The prospect of a corpus separatum for Jerusalem, however, appeared as a 
chance to salvage a victory from the jaws of defeat, a chance for the Vatican to save-face 
on the Palestine question, and to preserve the very heart of the Terra Santa from either 
Jewish or Jordanian sovereign control. Supporting the plan, moreover, would allow for a 
continuation of fruitful relations between the Vatican, the American bishops and 
Washington, a tripartite relationship which appeared to be bearing fruit. Vatican figures, 
no doubt, also saw in the plan the potential for papal control in Jerusalem, another factor 
contributing to Catholic acquiescence on the partition plan. Though anti-Zionist 
sentiment continued to be expressed in both Vatican and American Catholic quarters, 
particularly in the context of delays to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the 
establishment of a corpus separatum became the focal point of Catholic lobbying from 
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the summer of 1947 forward. Truman, on his part, sensing the Catholic stand down on the 
partition plan, specifically vowed “support for the internationalization of Jerusalem and 
the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine” in the Democratic platform for 1948, 
evidence of the President‟s careful politicking on the Palestine question.79 American 
Catholics, both in Washington and at the UN, would now strenuously advocate for just 
such an outcome. 
The NCWC „Office for UN Affairs‟ and the „Jerusalem Question‟ 
 The NCWC, established in 1919 as a permanent replacement for the National 
Catholic War Council (NCWC) had, by 1945, served as the organizational nerve centre of 
the Catholic Church in the United States for nearly three decades.
80
 Essentially a council 
of the American bishops, its various bodies and departments had lobbied the American 
government on a variety of domestic and international questions pertinent to Roman 
Catholic interests, which had included Washington‟s interwar relations with Spain and 
Mexico.
81
 As the first bureaucracy of a major religious denomination to be headquartered 
in the national capital, the NCWC was specifically mandated to “organize, unify and 
coordinate Catholic activities for the general welfare of the Church, near the seat of 
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federal power.”82 By 1945 the organization, emboldened by an increasingly intimate 
relationship with the American government and by the steady growth of the Church in the 
United States, continued in its attempts to shape domestic and international questions 
along lines amenable to the Roman Catholic Church.  
 An American Catholic presence at the UN was deemed vital, both by the Vatican 
and by the NCWC, in attempts to communicate a „Catholic‟ worldview to the nascent 
world body, and was in line with Pope Pius XII‟s support of the new world organization 
and its objectives. Though the Vatican was wary of an international forum that afforded 
the Soviet Union a significant „seat at the table‟, it remained optimistic that the UN would 
be central to the construction of a peaceable world order. Soon after the war, the Pope 
expressed his admiration for the global body and its quest for world peace. “Nobody”, he 
intoned, “who has taken to his breast, as a sacred obligation, the fight for a worthy peace 
should renounce the use of this possibility, however limited it may be, to stir up the 
conscience of the world from a place so high and clear.”83 
 That the UN was based in the north eastern United States, first at Lake Success, 
New York and later in New York City itself, made the NCWC a natural focal point for 
Roman Catholic advocacy at the new world body. The NCWC first appointed consultants 
to the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) at San 
Francisco, where delegates lobbied to modify the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta proposals 
along lines suggested in Pope Pius XII‟s Five Point Peace Program of 1945, and the 
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American hierarchies annual statements On International Order (1944) and On 
Organizing World Peace (1945).
84
 Though American Catholic delegates experienced 
frustration at San Francisco in placing a Catholic stamp on the UN charter, the NCWC 
was sufficiently encouraged to appoint a permanent observer at the UN, someone who 
could track developments at the various agencies, prepare summaries of debates for use 
by the bishops and by the Catholic press, and who, when opportunity merited, advance 
Catholic perspectives and positions among members of the world body. The NCWC‟s 
Father Edward Conway, S.J., who was charged with creating the organization‟s UN 
office, also envisaged the post as creating a bridge between the American Catholic 
Church and the American delegation to the UN, producing an envoy who could serve in 
the dual capacity of “rapporteur to the NCWC and as liaison between the NCWC and the 
American delegation.”85 
 On 11 September 1946, the NCWC‟s „Office for UN Affairs‟ was formally 
established, using office space in Spellman‟s New York archdiocesan headquarters. The 
establishment of the office was not a surprise, given the growing consensus among the 
bishops of the advantage of having an NCWC observer at the UN.
86
 The choice to lead 
the new office was, however, unorthodox. In August, at the behest of Chicago‟s Cardinal 
Samuel Stritch, Catherine Schaefer, an officer in the powerful lay National Council of 
Catholic Women (NCCW) was tabbed to head the new endeavour. Schaefer‟s selection, 
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given the availability of more senior candidates, and given the male-dominated culture of 
the NCWC, was significant. It was particularly so as Conway, who had been central to 
conceiving the mandate of such an office, had also coveted the position.  Dr. Ross 
Hoffman, chairman of the department of history at Fordham University, who had served 
as an occasional NCWC observer at the Security Council sessions, had also expressed an 
interest.
87
 Schaefer‟s selection, then, spoke volumes on the faith which senior figures 
placed in her ability to succeed in such a role.  
 In addition to her role with the NCCW, Schaefer had also been employed in the 
NCWC‟s Social Action department, where she worked as an assistant to its director, 
Father Raymond McGowan. The Social Action department had been established in 1920 
to promote the social thought of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, and 
used Catholic doctrine and papal teachings as guides to framing solutions to modern 
social questions. The department examined questions both domestic and international, 
with a particular eye on the threat that communism posed to the interests of the 
international Church. Schaefer‟s role in working with McGowan in this capacity, which 
included the writing of speeches and the production of books and pamphlets, impressed 
upon him her potential in an even larger capacity. In August 1945, Schaefer was 
appointed by McGowan as the NCWC observer to the UNCIO meetings in San 
Francisco, further evidence of his growing confidence in his assistant. Her appointment to 
the new office was a clear reflection of her growing reputation at the NCWC. As the 
office expanded in importance in the years after 1946, and as it became central to 
                                                          
87
 Ross Hoffman to Howard Carroll, 3 June 1946, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 53, File 22. 
183 
 
American Catholic attempts to shape the Palestine question, the bishops would be well 
pleased with the selection of Schaefer. 
Once in New York, her ambitions extended beyond the initial mandate of the 
office. Though she had been authorized to observe and report on developments at the UN 
for the purposes of keeping the American bishops updated and informed, it was clear that 
her vision for the office extended further. She clearly conceived of an activist office that 
sought contact both with other Catholic organizations at the UN, as well as international 
NGO‟s and delegations. Six months after she had established the office, she revealed this 
vision in an annual report to Carroll. “As Catholics at the UN get to know each other 
better,” she apprised Carroll, “and as Catholic organizations are admitted to consultative 
relationships, the utility of the NCWC‟s Office for UN Affairs should increase, in the 
informational, liaison and other assistance it may be able to render, and in its efforts to 
integrate Catholic principles into the formal action and atmosphere of the UN and of 
international life, and to inform Catholics of developments to which these principles 
might be applied.”88 
As such, in addition to observing and reporting on the numerous sessions and 
committees, Schaefer actively sought to build bridges between the major American and 
international Catholic organizations accredited to the UN. In this respect, her objectives 
appeared to have been the establishment of an “international Catholic circle” along the 
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lines of which had existed among the Catholic powers at the League of Nations.
89
 She 
also envisioned the NCWC‟s office as the co-ordinating body for those delegations. 
Within months of the establishment of the office, Schaefer had established links with a 
number of international Catholic observer groups at the UN, including the International 
Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the International Union of Catholic Women‟s 
Leagues, Caritas International and Pax Romana. By the end of 1946, the NCWC office 
was already established as the “convening agent” for American Catholic observer groups 
at the UN, which included the powerful NCCW and the Catholic Association for 
International Peace (CAIP).
90
 
 Schaefer‟s office monitored a number of issues relevant to Catholic interests, 
including the development of the UN‟s Bill of Human Rights, the status of and assistance 
to European refugees (particularly Catholics), religious freedom in Eastern Europe, the 
development of UNICEF, and a variety of other questions. No issue, however, 
commanded the time and attention of the office as did the „Palestine Question‟ and, 
specifically from the spring of 1947 forward, the status of Jerusalem as an internationally 
administered corpus separatum. In addition to producing a monthly bulletin on UN 
affairs entitled „Foreign Affairs‟, which summarized aspects of the various debates 
winding through the UN, the office also produced numerous reports specifically 
examining the debates on Jerusalem. By 1950, Schaefer and her later assistant, Alba 
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Zizzamia, had produced nearly forty lengthy and detailed memoranda on a variety of 
aspects on the Palestine issue, providing a key source of information on the debate for 
both the American hierarchy and the Catholic press.
91
 On a number of occasions over the 
same period, the Holy See also requested Schaefer‟s memos and monthly bulletins, 
evidence of the importance the Vatican placed on the NCWC‟s UN office as a source of 
information.
92
 It would not be until 1964, in fact, that the Vatican appointed its own 
permanent observer to the UN, underscoring the importance of Schaefer‟s office as a 
clearinghouse of information for the international Church.
93
 
 From the formulation of the partition plan in the summer of 1947 to the creation 
of the State of Israel in May 1948 (when Britain formally absconded from the mandate 
and withdrew its troops from the territory), Schaefer‟s office (which consisted, 
remarkably, of herself and a secretary) kept the NCWC apprised of the myriad debates on 
the „Palestine Question‟. This included a series of reports in the spring of 1947 which 
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revealed the stands of various states on the partition plan itself, from Arab (Egyptian, 
Iraqi, Lebanese, and Syrian) calls for an Arab-dominated state, to a disparate collection of 
states (including the United States and Britain, but also Czechoslovakia, Guatemala and 
Uruguay) who favoured the creation of both an Arab and a Jewish state (as was 
ensconced by the partition plan).
94
 Schaefer consistently tracked the question of the 
protection of the Holy Places in Palestine, an issue central to both the Vatican and 
American Catholic interests. She expressed concern in the early stages of the UNSCOP 
meetings that Christian rights in the Holy Land were not a priority to delegates, citing the 
refusal of UNSCOP to grant a hearing to the CNEWA, who wished to speak “in the 
interests of universal Christendom in the Holy Places.”95 
 During the April-May 1947 meetings that led to the creation of UNSCOP 
Schaefer, while reporting that the Christian stake in Palestine “did not receive much 
formal discussion”, was encouraged by a draft resolution passed by El Salvador on 7 
May, which recommended that careful consideration be given to “the interests of the 
Christian world in the Holy Land and of the Christian population of Palestine.”96 The 
following day, the Brazilian delegation, along with a number of smaller South American 
states, endorsed the “religious interests” clause. The inclusion of the clause was 
eventually passed by a vote of twenty-seven in favour, nine opposed and sixteen 
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abstaining, with Russia, which had been steadfastly opposed to its inclusion, representing 
the most notable of opposing states. In later meetings, both Schaefer and representatives 
of the CAIP raised the issue of the Christian stake in Palestine, receiving the assurances 
of the American ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, that concern for Christian rights 
in the territory would receive the full consideration of UNSCOP delegates.
97
  
It was at this point, in the spring of 1947, that Schaefer‟s office began to more 
actively press the Catholic case at the UN. The positions presented by Schaefer were, of 
course, formulated by the American bishops, and closely mirrored the Vatican‟s own 
desires for the territory. In April, the NCWC formulated a detailed position paper on 
Roman Catholic demands for the future of Palestine. In May, Schaefer forwarded copies 
of the NCWC‟s „Resolution on the Holy Places‟ to both Austin and Chester Williams, 
public liaison of the American delegation to the UN, which stated that: 
...all our sanctuaries will be respected and continuously and unconditionally   
accessible, and that the Christian minority will actually enjoy not merely that 
vague, frequently distorted and facetiously neutralized right of freedom of 
religion, but also freedom of religious assemblage, freedom of religious 
organization in conducting schools, orphanages, hospitals, and other institutions 
of welfare and mercy and freedom from civil, social and economic 
discrimination.
98
 
 
 In the same month, Schaefer presented the lengthier NCWC position paper on the 
future of the Holy Land to UNSCOP. Penned by James Griffiths, who had been 
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appointed by Spellman as chancellor of the Military Ordinariate in 1943, the statement 
represented as comprehensive an American Catholic position on the future of Palestine 
yet.
99
 It argued, chiefly, that the Palestinian problem was “not merely bipartite, but 
tripartite” and that Christian rights had for too long been ignored in the struggle between 
Jews and Arabs for control of the territory.
100
 It emphasized that for the world‟s 700 
million Christians, the territory was sacred, representing “the cradle of their religion.” 
The document emphasized the historical legitimacy of Christian claims to the territory, 
and rejected suggestions that they be relocated to neighbouring Christian states, such as 
Lebanon. “The Christians of Palestine are not new arrivals”, it declared. “They have been 
there for nearly twenty centuries. They are rooted in the subsoil of their Holy Land. They 
have suffered every type of totalitarian persecution and countless thousands have shed 
their blood precisely because they would not disavow the principles of the Master whose 
land was their land. The Christian minority has been reluctantly tolerated, civically 
ostracized and economically pauperized because they have clung to the teachings of 
Christ in the very footsteps of Christ.”101 The document continued to endorse the British 
„White Paper‟ of 1939, which advocated an international trusteeship for the territory, 
while permitting the complete internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs as the 
minimally acceptable solution to the Roman Catholic Church. Finally, the statement 
raised the Bolshevik spectre, tying Roman Catholic concerns for the future of Palestine to 
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wider Cold War objectives. In insinuating that Moscow had already “infiltrated” the 
territory through the state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, it argued that the 
protection of Christian (and specifically Roman Catholic) rights was imperative to 
checking the spread of communism in the region.
102
 The statement was disseminated by 
Schaefer during the UNSCOP special committee, and it received wide coverage in the 
Catholic press, apprising American Catholics of the Church‟s detailed position on the 
Holy Land.
103
 
The activism of American Zionist observer groups at the UN was not unknown to 
Schaefer, and provided additional impetus to her lobbying efforts. The importance 
Schaefer placed upon disseminating and publicizing the American Catholic viewpoint 
was lauded by Karol Krczmery, a Catholic and member of the Czechoslovakian 
delegation, who assured her that the influence of observer organizations such as the 
NCWC and the CAIP was significant, and that Jewish observer organizations at the UN, 
including the Jewish Agency for Palestine (which included powerful American Zionist 
leaders such as Nahum Goldman and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver), the American Jewish 
Committee and the World Jewish Congress, were “operating like mad” with UNSCOP 
delegates.
104
 Along with advocating Catholic positions, Schaefer‟s office also tracked the 
positions of the various American Jewish and Zionist observer groups at the UN which, 
in general, favoured the partition plan and accepted the internationalization of Jerusalem 
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as a necessary concession in gaining a sovereign Jewish state. This also included, 
however, a number of anti-Zionist Jewish groups, which often worked at cross-purposes 
with mainstream Zionist organizations, and emphasized the need for a strengthened 
international Jewish consciousness and greater protections under international law, but 
which did not advocate for a political and juridical state. In May, Schaefer forwarded the 
policy of one such UN-accredited group, the Agudas Israel World Organization, back to 
the NCWC for the use of the bishops and the press office.
105
 In May and June, the 
diocesan press delineated the program of Augudas Israel in a range of papers, 
emphasizing that Zionist designs for Palestine were not the only viable solutions for the 
territory. 
 By the fall of 1947, Schaefer had developed a significant list of contacts within 
the various delegation and committees to the UN. Among American delegates, this 
included Austin and Williams and later Secretary of State George Marshall, who confided 
to Schaefer and other Catholic observers in October that Jewish groups were concerned 
that the United States was not “pressing its position on Palestine with enough strength”, 
and was not doing enough in “getting the votes out” for the partition plan.106 Schaefer 
also maintained contacts with members of delegations sympathetic to Roman Catholic 
concerns on Palestine, which often included Catholic and Arab states. These delegates, 
which comprised numerous chiefs of missions, included Mahmoud Hassan Pasha of 
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Egypt, Asaf Ali of India, Dr. Fadhil Jamali of Iraq, and Dr. Ramon Muniz of Brazil, 
among others. Schaefer‟s closest contact at the UN between 1947 and the early 1950‟s, 
however, remained the head of the Lebanese delegation, Dr. Charles Malik (whom 
Schaefer described as an “intensely sincere Christian”), who consistently pressed 
positions amenable to Roman Catholic interests in Palestine, and who consistently 
apprised Schaefer of committee-level progress, and setbacks, on the „Palestine Question.‟ 
107
 Malik, in fact, would become a key ally of the NCWC and Schaefer‟s office as the UN 
debate on fate of Jerusalem wore on in the later 1940‟s. His own reputation undoubtedly 
lent additional credence to Roman Catholic claims at the UN. A graduate of Harvard and 
a student of philosophers Alfred North Whitehead and Martin Heidegger (on whom 
Malik wrote his doctoral dissertation), he had served as the Lebanese ambassador to the 
United States and the UN from 1945 to 1948.  As a rapporteur for the Commission on 
Human Rights, he was instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In the same year, he was named president of the 
UN‟s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), underscoring the influence and clout 
that he wielded at the world body. 
 Though both American Catholic and Protestant groups were present at the UN in 
observer roles, evidence suggests that coherence and cooperation between them, 
particularly on the question of Palestine, was not particularly close. This was despite the 
fact that both Catholic and Protestant groups shared a basic concern for the future of 
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Palestine, particularly in regard to the protection of the Holy Places.
108
 Most mainline 
Protestant Churches, like the Roman Catholic Church, favoured neither Arab nor Jewish 
control over Palestine, but rather an international trusteeship for the territory administered 
by the UN. This sentiment was expressed by the Rev. William Clark-Kerr, moderator of 
the Jerusalem Presbytery of the Church of Scotland, in July 1947. As one of the first 
Christian leaders to testify before the UNSCOP special committee on religious freedoms 
in Palestine, he declared that “at least, to the Western Christian mind, this whole country 
is holy”, suggesting that plans to protect only Christian heritage sights and their 
immediate surroundings were futile and ill-advised.
109
 Clark-Kerr‟s notion was seconded 
by a majority of Protestant leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, including Dr. Cyril 
Forster Garbett, Anglican Archbishop of York, who intoned in a radio address early in 
1948 that “no one who has personal knowledge of Jerusalem believes that it is practical to 
divide it in this way”, and warned that any such attempt “would lead to endless trouble 
and bloodshed.”110 
 In the same address, the Archbishop urged American Christians to “do all they 
[could] for the protection of their fellow Christians in Palestine from persecution, and of 
the Holy Places from desecration.” He asked them, in addition, “to use their great 
influence to save Palestine from lapsing into anarchy.”111 Despite his sentiment, Catholic-
Protestant joint action on the question of Palestine was not particularly strong. Schaefer 
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alluded to this early in 1948, when she revealed that relations with Protestant observer 
groups at the UN “were friendly and cooperative when possible”, but that in some cases, 
“it had been impossible to enlist active cooperation.”112 Eliciting a joint Catholic-
Protestant statement on the Palestine issue was one such area of contention. In April 1947 
Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the (Protestant) Churches of Christ in 
America (CCA) approached the NCWC‟s General Secretary, Howard Carroll, on the 
possibility of releasing a “parallel Catholic-Protestant statement on Palestine”, 
emphasizing to Carroll that “it was not only Jews and Arabs that had a vital interest in 
Palestine.”113 At an NCWC board meeting later in the same month, the question of a joint 
statement was raised, and it was determined that no such parallel stand would be issued. 
It was also determined that any Catholic statement would be vetted by the Apostolic 
Delegate, Amleto Cicognani, “so that the Holy See...would have the opportunity, if time 
permitted, to offer suggestions on the topic.”114 At the same meeting, the Holy See‟s 1922 
aide memoire on Palestine was again circulated to attending bishops, emphasizing the 
degree to which Roman policies continued to guide American Catholic responses to the 
issue, despite rapid developments „on the ground‟ in Palestine. No Catholic response on 
the question of a parallel statement was issued until early May, when the CCA forwarded 
the NCWC a draft of their own statement, at which time Carroll informed the Protestant 
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body that his organization had not yet formulated their own definitive statement.
115
 
Schaefer, as noted, presented the NCWC‟s position to the UNSCOP special committee on 
Palestine just weeks later, evidence that the American bishops had, in fact, been 
preparing a policy statement for the UN.  While Catholic and Protestant groups shared a 
cluster of concerns on the future of the Holy Land, the NCWC preferred to steer an 
independent course, advocating in parallel lines with Protestant organizations on certain 
issues, but rarely in close cooperation or conjunction.  
 Contributing to tenuous Catholic-Protestant cooperation on the Palestine question 
was the demand by certain Protestant groups for the recall of Myron Taylor from Rome, 
on the grounds that his appointment violated the American constitutional separation of 
church and state. From the fall of 1946 forward, groups such as the Northern Baptist 
Convention agitated loudly for the removal of Taylor, publicly urging Truman, a Baptist 
himself, to terminate the office of his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See. This was 
despite a general support of the Taylor mission in the secular press, including an editorial 
in New York‟s Herald Tribune by former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 
which emphasized the strategic advantages of Taylor‟s posting. The Taylor mission was 
also endorsed by several prominent Protestant leaders, who similarly noted the benefits of 
a Vatican link.
116
 These included Harold Staasen, a Baptist and former governor of 
Minnesota, who expressed in May 1947 that “in this postwar situation of world 
emergency and of conflicting ideological views, if President Truman wishes to have a 
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representative at the Vatican, that it is not the kind of situation either constructive or 
helpful for [Baptists] to protest.”117 He was seconded by Dr. Everett Clinchy, founder and 
first president of the interfaith National Conference for Christians and Jews (NCCJ), who 
stated that there was “nothing in the [Taylor] mission which need alarm any sincere 
Protestant.”118 Despite this, the chorus of anti-Taylor rhetoric among a number of 
mainstream Protestant groups continued to grow. Spellman, in his customary fashion, did 
little to assuage Catholic-Protestant tensions over the Taylor mission, attributing 
opposition to the mission to “the anti-Catholicism of un-hooded Klansmen sowing seeds 
of dissension and disunion.”119 The situation was strained further in August 1947, when a 
public exchange of letters between President Truman and Pope Pius XII, which 
emphasized the common stand of the United States and the Vatican in the postwar world 
order, also served to strengthen the president‟s commitment to Taylor‟s mission, and 
further piqued Protestant groups committed to his recall.
120
  
 The representations of Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟, then, were to remain distinctly 
Roman Catholic in character, advocating for positions that emanated specifically from the 
American bishops and, ultimately, the Vatican. Joint statements with other Christian 
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denominations were to be avoided, a reflection of the Vatican‟s desire to claim its own 
independent stake in the future of Palestine. Schaefer‟s efforts over the spring and 
summer of 1947 did not go unrewarded. That the internationalization of Jerusalem was 
ensconced in the November partition plan could be credited to the persistent pressure of 
both Catholic and Arab states and observer organizations to the UN, exemplified by the 
NCWC‟s „UN Office‟, which raised the issue clearly and consistently over these crucial 
months. 
The CNEWA and the „Palestine Question‟ 
 The NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ was seconded on the Palestine question by the New 
York based and Vatican funded Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA). 
Founded in 1926 by Pope Pius XI, and headed from its inception by American 
churchmen, the association‟s original mandate was to develop links between the Roman 
Catholic Church and Russia. The provision of aid to famine-stricken Russians was 
intended to create a beach-head for future evangelization, as well as create a modus 
vivendi with bolshevism, which the Vatican had long since identified as a grave 
ideological threat. By 1945, the Vatican had long since abandoned any pretence of 
normalized relations with Moscow, particularly in light of the severe repressions against 
Roman Catholic bishops and cardinals in the Soviet sphere. 
 The CNEWA, however, was never formally suspended, and in 1931 was placed 
under the perpetual control of the American hierarchy. The Archbishop of New York, 
resolved Pope Pius XI, would serve in perpetuity as the association‟s president. In 1945, 
the CNEWA received a revived mandate in to deal specifically with the Christian 
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populations of Palestine and the wider region. Spellman, who as Archbishop of New 
York also assumed the presidency of the CNEWA, took a keen interest in the advocacy 
of the association, particularly as it pertained to postwar Palestine. In June 1943 he 
named thirty-three year old Mgr. Thomas McMahon, a priest in the New York 
Archdiocese, as the association‟s assistant national secretary, a position he would hold 
until 1955. Upon his appointment, McMahon had been professor of Church history at St. 
Joseph‟s Seminary in Yonkers, having recently completed a doctoral degree at Fordham 
University.
121
 Though he had served, in 1935, as a secretary at the Sacred Congregation 
for the Oriental Churches in Rome (the Vatican congregation which controlled the 
CNEWA), his selection was unexpected, given his age and the gravity of such a posting. 
His appointment as Master of Ceremonies to Spellman in the same month, however, 
indicated the close working relationship between McMahon and the most powerful figure 
in American Catholicism.
122
 The appointment would move McMahon from the obscurity 
of the seminary to the head of an association which wielded significant financial clout, 
and with a mandate to defend Roman Catholic interests in the Holy Land. In short order, 
in fact, Spellman and McMahon would become leading advocates, both for the American 
hierarchy and for the international Church, on the question of Palestine. Under their 
leadership, the CNEWA would play a crucial role in the Vatican‟s attempts to steer 
American and UN policy toward lines amenable to the Church. In the immediate postwar 
period, this of course meant an international trusteeship for Palestine, which both the 
Vatican and American Catholic leaders considered optimal. McMahon had proposed 
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trusteeship as early as 1945, when in the Catholic journal Sign he advocated for the 
internationalization of the whole territory, citing the example of Trieste (which was 
internationalized in July 1946). “No partition of the Holy Land can satisfy us”, he 
exclaimed, “because some part of it would thereby be without Christ.”123 
 By the summer of 1947 the Vatican and American Catholic leaders, for a number 
of factors (not least the surging support for Zionism in the United States), had come to 
regard the partition of Palestine as a fait accompli, and had turned their attention to 
ensuring the internationalization of Jerusalem as a means of preserving a base for Roman 
Catholic influence in the region, and protecting the rights of their co-religionists in the 
territory. Given the widespread support for partition, the Vatican did not publically 
oppose the plan. Spellman, however, apprised the state department of the Vatican‟s 
revised objectives in January 1947. During a meeting with the American ambassador to 
Iraq, George Wadsworth, he expressed continued dismay with the partition plan, but he 
revealed that the Vatican would be willing to accept partition if it could be guaranteed the 
sanctity of Jerusalem and protection for Roman Catholics in Palestine.  
If partition be imposed, the opportunity must not be lost to prescribe a carefully   
conceived, detailed regime of guarantees and safeguards for the Holy Places   and 
for the Christian minorities, both under the supervision of the United   Nations 
and the latter (i.e. provisions for the protection of Christian groups)   to be such as 
might serve as a model, accepted by the Arab and all other    Eastern states for the 
treatment of their religious minorities.
124
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The statement would represent the essence of both Vatican and American Catholic 
visions for Palestine from the spring of 1947 forward, providing a mission statement for 
Roman Catholic advocacy both in Washington and at the UN. 
 The CNEWA, like the NCWC, attempted to transmute a Roman Catholic vision 
for the future of Palestine directly to the UN, commencing with the UNSCOP special 
committee on Palestine in the spring of 1947. As an „observer‟ group at the UN, however, 
the CNEWA, like its sister organization, was not permitted to present petitions or 
testimonials directly to UNSCOP, a situation which both Spellman and McMahon 
regarded as a threat to vital Roman Catholic interests in the territory. In early February 
McMahon, at the behest of Spellman, was granted a meeting with Senator Warren Austin, 
head of the American delegation to the UN, and Ambassador Wadsworth.
125
 During the 
hour-long visit, McMahon detailed the Vatican‟s demands for the territory, citing the 
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs as a minimum starting point. 
McMahon, as he had in his 1945 Sign article, used the example of Trieste as a model of 
functional internationalization, and suggested a similar scheme be employed at the UN 
for Jerusalem. This suggestion, he reported optimistically to Spellman, “awakened a 
responsive chord in the Senator.”126 
Spellman, on his part, took full advantage of a meeting with the UN‟s Political 
and Security Committee in early May, emphasizing the need for observer groups such as 
the CNEWA to be heard in committees and sub-committees, particularly on issues as 
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crucial as the future of Palestine. During this meeting, Spellman presented the CNEWA‟s 
formal petition, penned by McMahon, which emphasized the necessity for a Christian, 
and specifically Roman Catholic, voice at the UNSCOP hearings. The statement refuted 
suggestions that the CNEWA did not directly represent the Christians of Palestine (a 
charge made by certain USNCOP delegates who refuted the need to consider petitions 
and testimonies from faith organizations), emphasizing both the universality of the 
CNEWA‟s voice, as well as the international nature of the Palestine question itself. “It is 
our considered opinion that the CNEWA,” it stated, “an international body, qualifies as 
an organizational representative of a considerable portion of the population of Palestine, 
since it officially represents the Roman Catholic population of Palestine. Moreover, the 
CNEWA, by its very nature and constitution and activities, is intimately concerned with 
the spiritual, moral educational and social interests of the Roman Catholic population, 
whether of the Latin or Eastern rites.”127  
 McMahon‟s petition also drew attention to the 1946 Anglo-American report, 
which maintained that no solution to the Palestine problem could be found without 
addressing the “religious phase” of the problem. The Catholic stake in the territory, 
McMahon insisted, had to be addressed. In emphasizing the international nature of the 
problem, and the legitimacy of the CNEWA‟s right to present its views, the statement 
continued that 
...our Association foresees the necessity of honestly confronting other more   
extensive problems which are inextricably involved in the Palestinian question   
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and its solution which are the responsibility of Christians throughout the   
world...The character of Palestine sets it in a unique class, totally different   from 
all other nations. The interests of universal Christendom in the Holy   Land 
transcend the political and national interests of the minority Christian   population 
of Palestine, which numbers 130, 750. Although there may be    included in the 
personnel of the Arab Higher Committee one or two   spokesmen for the Christian 
minority, nevertheless the Committee itself,   by reason of its tradition, its 
leadership, its overwhelming Moslem majority   and by the fact of its purpose to 
present the case for a predominantly Arab   Moslem population of one million, 
cannot reasonably be charged with the task    or expected to represent adequately 
the interests of universal Christendom in   the Holy Land.
128
 
The statement suggested not only that the CNEWA would advocate for the rights 
of Roman Catholics in Palestine, but that it would represent “the interests of universal 
Christendom” on the question, clearly inferring that Spellman‟s organization represented 
the desires of the Vatican and the international Church on the question of Palestine. 
Despite stiff opposition to the consideration of religious factors in debating the future of 
Palestine, including that of Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko, who considered religious 
concerns “superfluous detail”, the „religious clause‟ was accepted by UNSCOP after a 
heated two hour debate on 22 May.
129
  
 Having won the right to submit its views to UNSCOP, the CNEWA presented a 
report to the Committee on 5 June 1947.
130
 It stressed that the Roman Catholic Church 
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did not favour or endorse any particular political arrangement for Palestine, so long as the 
sanctity and the sovereignty of Jerusalem and the Holy Places was preserved, and that 
protections would be guaranteed for the Catholic population of the territory. Its 
commitment to political neutrality marked a shift away from the Vatican‟s early postwar 
desire for an international trusteeship for the whole territory. The statement echoed Pius 
XII‟s August 1946 address to the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, when the Pope 
informed his guests at the Vatican that his Church did not favour either Jewish or Arab 
control of Palestine, proclaiming that the papal office “had always observed this attitude 
of perfect impartiality, even in the most diverse circumstances, and [intended] to conform 
thereto in the future as well.”131 While the Pope‟s 1946 stance continued to implicitly 
endorse trusteeship, the CNEWA‟s 1947 representation to the UN revealed the Church‟s 
moderated demands, accepting internationalization of Jerusalem and juridical protections 
for Roman Catholics in lieu of its previous demands. As it was the CNEWA that 
officially represented the international Church in the Middle East, the 1947 statement can 
be read as a change in the „official‟ policy of the Vatican itself. Gasparri‟s aide mémoire 
of 1922 had definitely been superseded by the circumscribed demands presented by 
McMahon. It was evidence, no doubt, of papal pragmatism on the question of Palestine, 
and was a policy designed to salvage core, non-negotiable rights in the territory while 
maintaining amicable relations with Washington. 
 As such, the statement strongly defended Roman Catholicism‟s ancient stake in 
the territory, highlighting twenty centuries of unbroken presence in Palestine, a presence 
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that had been “uncontrovertibly and juridically established since the thirteenth 
century.”132 It further asserted that “although persecuted and, indeed, decimated, [Roman 
Catholics] have never left or given up.”133 It specifically refuted the claims of the ESCO 
Foundation for Palestine, which maintained in a 1946 publication that Christianity “was 
not an indigenous force in Palestine, although it [was] based on the life and teachings of 
Jesus. As an organized religion it is the creation of Rome and always represented in the 
East the introduction of a foreign civilization.”134 McMahon termed this “spiritual 
jingoism and an intolerant indictment of Roman Catholics throughout the entire world.” 
In evoking the Crusader imagery that the Catholic press had so prominently employed in 
its anti-Zionist editorials, McMahon spoke to the centuries-long Roman Catholic struggle 
for the territory. “If only for these centuries of heroism, sacrifice and blood-letting,” he 
intoned, “Christendom can hardly be expected to stand by silently and be ignored, as your 
estimable Committee seeks an answer to the riddle of Palestine.”135 
 The statement, however, did not dwell on historical precedent, analyzing the 
contemporary Roman Catholic stake in the Holy Land, including the extensive charitable 
and educational activities administered by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem (the official 
representation of the Holy See in Palestine). This network included over 200 churches 
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and religious houses, 130 schools (which educated male and female students in almost 
equal numbers), and 30 charitable institutions, all of which, the statement continued, 
contributed to the stability and prosperity of both the Roman Catholic and wider 
community. McMahon, therefore, sought tangible guarantees for Roman Catholics and 
their institutions, which included “a freedom of religious organization and development, 
unimpaired by confiscatory taxation or disabling legislation, in building and conducting 
churches, schools, orphanages, hospitals and similar institutions of welfare and mercy.” 
In essence, McMahon sought concrete guarantees for the institutional livelihood of the 
Church in Palestine, regardless of the form of the regime decided upon by UNSCOP. His 
objective reflected that emanating from the Vatican secretariat itself, where safeguarding 
Roman Catholic interests through legal guarantees and the internationalization of 
Jerusalem had supplanted the grander desire of establishing a UN trusteeship for the 
entire territory.  
 That it was the CNEWA that spoke at the UN for Roman Catholic interests in the 
Holy Land, and not the Vatican directly or the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem 
(represented, at that time, by Monsignor Louis Barlassina), was made clear in the 
conclusion of McMahon‟s statement.  
This Association, under the presidency of His Eminence, Francis Cardinal   
Spellman of New York, is the sole official mission and relief agency of the   
Sacred Oriental Congregation in Rome. This Congregation, of which Pope   Pius 
XII is direct superior, and Eugene Cardinal Tisserant, Secretary, has   jurisdiction 
over all the above-mentioned activities of the Catholic Church   in Palestine. 
Thus, our Association has an international scope and is expected   to supply not 
only financial aid but also intellectual support, wherever the   interests in the Holy 
Land are at stake. We fear that these Christian and    Catholic interests may be 
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disregarded, and we consider it our bounden duty   to indicate this to your Special 
Commitee.
136
 
The statement concluded with a veiled warning that an infringement of the 
freedoms of Palestinian Roman Catholics, whose claims were as ancient as any of their 
compatriots, would be considered a “crime” against not only the indigenous Catholic 
community, but against the international Roman Catholic Church. “Indeed, because 
Palestine is the Holy Land for millions of Christians all over the world,” it exhorted, “this 
gigantic injustice would rightfully be resented by them and by all men of good will.”137 
 In the weeks after the submission of the CNEWA statement, McMahon received 
the assurances of both Arab and Jewish leaders that Roman Catholic rights would be 
protected in a partitioned Palestine. On 16 June, a week after issuing the CNEWA 
statement, McMahon received a cable from Issa Nakleh, the New York representative of 
the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, who assured him that the Committee “gave all 
assurances and guarantees the rights of Christians and access to the Holy Places.”138 On 1 
July this was followed by a personal visit from Nakleh, a Palestinian Christian and 
virulent anti-Zionist, where he again assured McMahon that the Arab Higher Committee 
was committed to protecting Christian rights in the territory.
139
 Nakleh suggested, 
moreover, that Arabs and Catholics shared a common cause and a common foe in the 
territory, and that the Roman Catholic Church should “more openly come out against the 
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Jews and proclaim itself for the Arabs.”140 McMahon, of course, offered no such 
assurances, emphasizing the purely apolitical nature of papal demands in the territory.  
In the autumn of 1947, McMahon received similar sentiments from Rabbi Gold of 
the Jewish Agency for Palestine and Rabbi Lander who, in a visit to CNEWA offices, 
pledged unconditional Jewish support for Christian rights in a partitioned state, while 
confiding that “in a Jewish state”, Roman Catholics could expect “far greater security 
than they could ever expect from the Arabs.”141  McMahon‟s guests, however, expressed 
the “impression that Catholics [in the United States] were opposed to the creation of a 
Jewish state”, and asked if “the powerful Catholic Church in America could help the 
cause in an unofficial way by letting leaders, especially in government, know her 
sympathy with the majority report.”142 McMahon challenged the Rabbis to provide 
evidence of official Catholic reticence to the creation of a Jewish state, a response that 
spoke volumes on the position of the Church on Jewish statehood. In November, 
McMahon lauded American Catholic efforts to secure an internationalized zone for 
Jerusalem, reporting to Spellman that CNEWA efforts had “forced both Arab and Jewish 
leaders to approach us, and it has influenced [UNSCOP] in making its report.”143  
 Evidence does suggest that Roman Catholic pressure through 1947 was a factor in 
securing a corpus separatum for Jerusalem in the 1947 partition plan. American officials, 
on their part, seemed particularly reticent to raise the ire of the Christian churches. State 
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Department officials Gordon Merriam (head of the Near East desk) and Fraser Wilkins 
(head of the Palestine desk) opposed entreaties to limit the internationalization of 
Jerusalem to the „Old City‟, in the belief that many sites sacred to Christians fell outside 
this area. This led them to conclude that “the majority of Christian establishments would 
fall within the area of either Jewish or Arab states. Considerable Christian opposition to 
such a move could be expected.”144 Jewish Agency officials, moreover, revealed the 
efficacy of Roman Catholic pressure at the UN. Eliahu Elath, Israel‟s first ambassador to 
Washington and a leading participant in the discussions surrounding adoption of the 
partition plan, reflected on the influence of the Roman Catholic lobby at Lake Success. 
The Christian states were clearly determined to prevent the Jews or the Moslems   
from establishing their sovereignty over the city and to avoid this by according   a 
special status to Jerusalem under the auspices of the UN...Definition of the   
function of the Governor made it almost inevitable that a citizen of a Christian   
state would be appointed to this office, and this would afford him considerable   
leverage to turn Jerusalem into an independent political entity.
145
     
Moshe Sharett, then head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, 
elaborated further on the specific influence of the Vatican and the Roman Catholic lobby 
in securing a corpus separatum. 
It became evident that the requisite majority for the Partition Plan could not   be 
mustered if the internationalization of the Holy City was omitted from it...   The 
Vatican regarded the latter measure as [one which would]...vest the Catholic   
Church with predominant influence...[thus] warranting acquiescence in the   
elevation of the Jewish people to the level of sovereign statehood.
146
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 That the internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs was ensconced by 
UNSCOP‟s final resolution of 19 November 1947, then, could only be considered a 
victory for the Vatican and for international Roman Catholic interests. While acquiescing 
to the partition plan, the Church had at least appeared to have preserved a base for 
continued influence in the region, free from the interference of a sovereign power. By the 
resolution, the city of Jerusalem was indeed established as a corpus separatum under an 
international regime to be administered by the UN. The area was to encompass Jerusalem 
and its surrounding hinterland, including southern Bethlehem and Nazareth, other regions 
of spiritual and historical importance to the Roman Catholic Church. Other provisions, 
such as freedoms guaranteed to charitable and educational institutions, and pledges not to 
tax or deny access to any churches or houses of worship, also appeared to appease Roman 
Catholic concerns.
147
 The representations of American Catholic agencies at the UN on the 
Palestine question were crucial to securing these ends. Indeed, the advocacy of the 
NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ and the CNEWA represented the leading edge of the Roman 
Catholic lobby on the shape of postwar Palestine. These concessions won, however, were 
about to be challenged by the newly formed state of Israel, and the American Catholic 
„lobby‟ was about to encounter some of its stiffest challenges. 
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Chapter 4 
Chimerical Triumph: The International Catholic Orbit and the Corpus 
Separatum 
 
 Though the Vatican and American Catholics considered the 1947 UN partition 
plan a victory, insofar as it preserved Jerusalem as an international corpus separatum, the 
outbreak of violence immediately following its ratification confirmed the fears long held 
in Catholic circles: namely that Israel would seize through force what it could not obtain 
by international consensus. The instability in Palestine in early 1948, in fact, caused the 
Vatican to reconsider its very support for the partition plan. The nascent state of Israel, on 
its part, challenged the UN‟s internationalization of Jerusalem, favouring a modified 
compact for the city that would see only the protection of „holy sites‟, a position 
buttressed by Israeli military victories. In December 1948, the increasingly intractable 
question was referred to a UN body, the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), 
which was tasked with devising a solution to the Jerusalem question. Throughout 1949, 
American Catholics remained at the forefront of the Vatican‟s efforts to steer the PCC, 
and the American delegation at the UN, towards a favourable Palestine solution. The 
American Catholic lobby, however, was confronted with a powerful American Zionist 
lobby, comprised of Jews and Protestants, determined to secure a Jewish Jerusalem. That 
the American government, including President Truman himself, favoured a modified 
agreement on Jerusalem (one unsatisfactory to the Vatican) only complicated American 
Catholic efforts. The survival of the corpus separatum after the December 1949 vote on 
the PCC proposal, therefore, exemplified the leadership of the American Catholic 
Church, and its various organs, in securing an outcome long sought by the Vatican.  
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The Dies Fatalis: The Roman Catholic Church and the Birth of Israel 
 Despite a deep and genuine convergence on the question of communism and 
Soviet containment, Rome and Washington drifted apart on the question of Palestine 
from the winter of 1947-1948 onward. The Vatican continued to lend tentative support to 
the November 1947 UN partition plan on the condition that Jerusalem, which it 
considered the inalienable cradle of Christian faith, be protected by an international 
mandate, preserving a crucial and symbolic base for Roman Catholic influence in the 
region and beyond. The outbreak of violence almost immediately following the 
December ratification of the partition plan, however, tested the Vatican‟s tentative 
support, confirming fears that the plan only facilitated open competition between Jewish 
and Arab nationalisms, producing bloodshed and disorder. In the months that followed, 
tensions and outbreaks of violence between Jews and Arabs only intensified, 
compounded by the Jewish underground‟s continuing struggle against the British 
presence in the territory. The April 1948 capture of the Arab town of Deir Yassin by the 
Irgun, which resulted in the murder of dozens of civilians, followed by an Arab attack on 
a Jewish medical column just days later, resulting in the deaths of doctors, nurses and 
patients, epitomized the vitriolic atmosphere in the territory on the very eve of Jewish 
statehood. 
 The escalation of violence caused the Vatican to question whether the functional 
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs could be achieved. The establishment 
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of a corpus separatum, and the guarantee of rights for Roman Catholic institutions and 
faithful had, after all, constituted the basis of Vatican support for partition. Added to this 
were Vatican fears that instability in the territory would lead to the spread of communism 
in Palestine and the wider territory. The Holy See‟s diminishing support for partition (in 
light of the worsening violence in the territory), was revealed to Taylor‟s office in 
February 1948 by Domenico Tardini, Pope Pius XII‟s acting Secretary of State. In a 
“brutally frank” discussion with Taylor‟s assistant, Graham Parsons, Tardini spoke of the 
“mistakes of the United States now replacing the mistakes of Britain [in Palestine],” 
suggesting that partition, as conceived in the UN plan, could produce no lasting peace in 
the Holy Land, producing a chaotic situation in which only Moscow could profit.
1
 In 
linking Zionism and bolshevism, he apprised Parsons of the observations of Mgr. 
Tommaso Valeri, former apostolic delegate to Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus, who had 
“repeated twenty years ago the existence of flourishing communist cells in Tel Aviv.”2 
 Similar sentiments were echoed later in the same month by Mgr. Gustavo Testa, 
the recently appointed apostolic delegate to Palestine and Jerusalem.
3
 The posting 
replaced the former nunciature to Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Cyprus, creating a 
structure where Egypt, Palestine and Jordan received separate nuncios, reflective of the 
Holy See‟s desire to have a singular ambassador committed to the rapidly evolving 
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situation in the Holy Land.
4
 During a lengthy conversation with Parsons in late February, 
Testa reiterated Tardini‟s apprehensions on the partition plan, expressing frustration that 
the American government, and leading papers such as the New York Times, couldn‟t see 
that “only Russia would benefit from carrying through the tragedy of partition.”5 He 
continued that the full implementation of the partition plan would only lead to deepening 
violence, and was confounded by Washington‟s willingness “to oppose Russia at the 
Dardanelles and yet promote conditions [in Palestine] which will place her so much 
nearer to important objectives.”6 “Once astride in the eastern Mediterranean”, he warned, 
“Russia will not leave.”  
The conversation, in fact, hinted at a formal reversal of Vatican policy. Testa 
suggested reconsideration of partition by the UN General Assembly as the only viable 
solution, detailing to Parsons his idea of a federated state with Swiss-style cantonal 
governments, akin to the proposal put forward by the Colombian delegation to the UN, 
which was already urging the General Assembly to repeal the partition plan. Throughout 
the conversation, Parsons reminded Testa of the growing public support for political 
Zionism in the United States, summarizing for him the points contained in the January 
1948 „Confidential Survey of American Opinion‟, and alluded to the difficulties, both 
domestic and international, of an American reversal on the partition plan.
7
 It was a 
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reminder to the Vatican of the power of public opinion, particularly in the United States, 
on the question of Palestine. Parsons‟ conversations with these leading Vatican figures, in 
sum, confirmed that Washington and Rome were drifting apart on Palestine, even if the 
Vatican maintained a stoic public silence on the issue. In his report to George Marshall, 
Parsons noted the similarities of Tardini and Testa‟s positions, observing that “however 
much they represented [Testa‟s] personal views, they also represented the official Vatican 
viewpoint.”8 
 The Vatican‟s apparent reversal of policy did not take long to register with a 
number of Latin American delegations at the UN, where dissatisfaction with the partition 
plan in the wider Roman Catholic firmament became quickly evident. In February 1948, 
the Colombian delegation, as noted, officially submitted a motion to reconsider the 
partition plan, on the grounds that subsequent strife had proven its futility. On 27 
February, a day after meeting with Testa, Parsons received Mauricio Nabuco, the 
Brazilian ambassador to the Holy See, who admitted that should the Colombian 
resolution pass, and the partition plan were re-submitted to a vote, Brazil would reverse 
its position and vote against partition.
9
 He continued that voting for partition in 
November 1947 was a “Brazilian mistake”, and that Brazil had supported it in solidarity 
with the United States, that “the real act of friendship was not to vote with the United 
States in this instance.” He informed Parsons that should the partition plan be submitted 
                                                                                                                                                                             
outlined American public opinion leaning increasingly in favour of partition, a position that the American 
government was finding increasingly difficult to oppose.  
8
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9
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to another vote, Brazil would carry other South American states in voting against it, 
providing the necessary majority. Nabuco coyly denied that the Vatican was instructing 
South American states on the matter, but hinted at the quasi-theological wellsprings of his 
position. “As a good Catholic”, he exclaimed to Parsons, “[I adhere] to the biblical 
prophesy that the Jews will be dispersed and not return to the land of Palestine.”10 
 Vatican and wider Roman Catholic scepticism of the feasibility of partition was, 
in fact, shared by segments of the State Department and the American delegation to the 
UN, including its head, Warren Austin. This led to Austin‟s March resolution to reverse 
the US position on the partition plan, favouring instead an international trusteeship for the 
territory, a development applauded by Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟, as it represented a 
position long advocated by both the Vatican and by representative organizations of the 
American Catholic church.
11
 Ultimately, Austin‟s proposal did not pass, a result 
considered a setback in Roman Catholic circles. Complicating Austin‟s motion was 
Truman‟s growing support of Zionism in the spring of 1948. Though the president had 
been only recently „converted‟ to the Zionist cause, expressing disdain for Zionist 
pressure tactics into the winter of 1947-1948, and while he had endorsed Austin‟s 
February speech to the General Assembly which detailed American concerns as to the 
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feasibility of the partition plan, he was, by late March, convinced that the partition plan 
would go ahead as devised in November 1947. Recent scholarship has explored a number 
of factors in Truman‟s fairly rapid „conversion‟: the influence of Jewish political and 
industrial advisors, the successes of American Zionist lobby groups (particularly the 
ACPC), the importance of courting the „Jewish vote‟ in the 1948 federal elections, and 
Truman‟s own Baptist millenarianism, which envisioned the return of the Jews to 
Palestine.
12
 
 The success of the American Zionist lobby, it was known, was bolstered by a 
widely circulated and read press, which galvanized Jewish support for American Zionist 
organizations.
13
 Zionist successes impressed upon Catholic editors the need to counter 
this with a specifically Catholic viewpoint, particularly as it appeared that Zionist 
sympathies had spread among the American public and policymaking establishment, 
extending to Truman himself. The „Confidential Survey of American Opinion‟ which 
Parsons had discussed with Testa only confirmed the importance of public opinion on the 
Palestine question. That 1948 was an election year made the issue all the more pressing, 
as the Catholic vote could be tied to a Palestine solution acceptable to the Vatican and 
American Catholics. On several occasions in 1948, Montini expressed the Vatican‟s 
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hopes that American Catholics, given their institutional strength and political 
organization, might exercise their power in gaining a resolution for the territory amenable 
to the Vatican and to the international Church.
14
 In January Montini also expressed, 
through the apostolic delegate, the hope that American Catholic press organs would raise 
the issue of Palestine clearly and consistently in order to shape Catholic opinion for the 
ongoing struggle for the territory.
15
 
In short order, Catholic editorials in the United States began to reflect the 
Vatican‟s growing dissatisfaction with the partition plan. Though Catholic journals had 
issued a tentative endorsement of the partition late in 1947, subsequent violence had 
quashed any remaining optimism, sparking renewed calls for an international trusteeship 
for Palestine. America, one journal that had considered partition “the best of many 
unsatisfactory alternatives”, denounced the plan from February 1948 onward, observing 
that the violence it had prophesied for months had indeed come to pass.
16
 While 
American Zionist groups continued to advocate for the implementation of the partition 
plan at all costs, including the use of American troops to secure it, America warned of the 
security risks of armed American intervention. Highlighting the State Department‟s own 
reservations on the partition plan, the journal chastised the Zionists and the UN for 
rushing to support a solution that was “too much wishful thinking.”17 The journal also 
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flayed the Truman administration for “acting against its better judgement” and, in an 
ironic allusion to the American Zionist lobby, “bending to the will of a strong domestic 
pressure.”18 
 The diocesan press largely echoed America’s stern disapproval of the partition 
plan, characterizing it as an un-principled and un-workable scheme, implemented mainly 
to pander to American Zionist demands. In the spring of 1948, Catholic papers gave wide 
circulation to a series of declarations by the Christian Union, a semi-official group of 
Christian leaders in the Middle East who denounced the partition plan in the strongest 
terms.
19
 Issuing their statements directly to national governments and to the UN (directly 
through Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟), the Christian Union expressed “deep sorrow and strong 
indignation at the lamentable situation in which the Holy Land, cradle of peace, has been 
placed as a direct result of the erroneous policy which has been imposed on the country 
and which has culminated in the partition plan.”20 In June, just weeks after the formal 
establishment of the Israeli state, the Brooklyn Tablet published a „manifesto‟ issued by 
the Christian Union which excoriated Jewish forces for damage to Christian churches and 
sites, particularly in Jerusalem. Hardly a neutral statement, it proclaimed that “the largest 
                                                                                                                                                                             
world can hardly be blamed for conceiving a low opinion of the capacity of the United Nations to reach 
sound decisions, in view of the supposedly objective and mature consideration that went into the 
partition decision.” 
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part of the shells falling on the Holy Sepulchre and on churches, convents and Christian 
institutions are of Jewish origin. To declare the truth and an objective fact as well: The 
Arabs have stated they respected the Holy Places the convents and the Red Cross 
institutions. In fact they have respected them up to the present time.”21 Diocesan papers 
such as the Brooklyn Tablet, the Boston Pilot and the Michigan Catholic continued to 
give wide circulation to Christian Union statements, despite the fact that the Vatican did 
not officially endorse the group, and regardless that Israeli officials at the UN had 
accurately identified the Christian Union as “a group of Arab clergymen with 
predominantly Arab congregations which has completely identified itself with the Arab 
Higher Committee.”22 The New York Times, which also published the Christian Union‟s 
„manifesto‟ of 31 May, juxtaposed the group‟s claims with reports that Jewish shrines 
had, in fact, suffered a majority of the damage, and that “only a couple of bullet holes” 
had pierced the dome of the Holy Sepulchre.
23
 Verity on all sides, it appeared, was 
secondary in the larger battle for public opinion.  
 These reports coincided with the emergence in May 1948 of a public Vatican 
stance on the question of Palestine, a development indicative of the Pope‟s desire to air 
the Vatican‟s views to the world on the very eve of Jewish statehood. The encyclical 
Auspicia Quaedam, issued on 1 May, lamented the ongoing war in the territory, and 
called upon Catholics worldwide to pray for an end to the conflict. While not offering 
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specific policy prescriptions, the document still emphasized the precedence which the 
Holy See accorded the situation in Palestine. The Pope followed this with an allocution, 
several weeks later, to the College of Cardinals in Rome, when he issued a plea to Roman 
Catholics worldwide. “How could the Christian world look on unconcernedly,” he 
exhorted, “or in fruitless indignation, as that sacred ground which everyone approached 
with reverence most profound to kiss it with warmest affection, was being trampled by 
troops of war and bombed from the air? Reduce the „Great Sepulchre‟ of Christ to a mass 
of rubble? God grant that the danger of so terrible a scourge may be finally dispelled!”24 
The allocution, forwarded to the NCWC in June, amounted to another call to action, both 
to the American bishops and the diocesan press, to raise the issue of Palestine clearly and 
consistently.
25
 
 The apprehension felt by both the Vatican and American Catholics on the 
expiration of the British mandate for Palestine, set for 15 May, was expressed succinctly 
by John J. O‟Rourke, S.J., the American director of the Pontifical Biblical Institute in 
Jerusalem, who described that date as the “dies fatalis”, (the „fateful hour‟). “What is 
coming next, God only knows” he intoned in a letter to the editorial board of America 
magazine.
26
 His sentiments were reflected by Spellman just a week before the expiration 
of the mandate, when he asserted that “War must not bloody the soil nor desecrate the 
scene of the sacrifice of the Prince of Peace, for if men and nations who profess to 
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believe in God defile His Holy Homeland, how can they condemn godless barbarism in 
others?”27 The archbishop‟s words, carried in an America article, were a clear allusion to 
Truman‟s commitment to Jewish statehood, despite the risks, and to the Roman Catholic 
imperative to protect the Holy Sites of Jerusalem.  
 In a private meeting on 20 April with the B‟nai B‟rith‟s Ben Epstein and Rabbi 
Bernard Lander, Mgr. Thomas McMahon was even more succinct. In a meeting he 
described to Spellman as “rather violent”, he spiritedly defended Roman Catholic claims 
to an internationalized zone for Jerusalem, and denied his guests‟ assertions that the 
Vatican was “pro-Arab”, or that the Pope had “asked Catholics to play politics” in the 
encyclical Auspecia Quaedam.
28
 On the question of Jerusalem, McMahon excoriated his 
guests for their suggestion that Roman Catholic rights could be negotiated in a Jewish-
controlled territory. “There is nothing to talk over,” McMahon snapped. “The Jews have 
stolen what is not theirs. Talking things over is like taking my coat and leaving me the 
sleeve.”29 
 America published a series of editorials in the late spring which reflected Vatican 
and American Catholic anxieties regarding the expiration of the British mandate, casting 
doubt on both Zionist and Arab commitments to a peaceable transfer of power.
30
 The 
journal yet again emphasized that Jerusalem was “not merely a historical city”, but a 
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centre of vital importance to global Christianity. The journal offered an endorsement of 
the Garreau Plan, which proposed an international police force for Jerusalem (a scheme 
which was coolly received by the Israeli provisional government). America also endorsed 
the proposal of the American Episcopalian Bishop Charles Gilbert, who in an April letter 
to the New York Times called for a “Truce of God” for Jerusalem, harkening the medieval 
notion that halted wars as they reached their most acrimonious points.
31
  
 The establishment of the Israeli state in May and Washington‟s immediate 
diplomatic recognition of the fledgling state drew a predictably terse response from a 
wide cross-section of the American Catholic press. The Catholic World‟s editorial for 
July, penned by McMahon, was particularly acerbic. McMahon criticized the “unseemly 
haste” with which the United States recognized Israel, abandoning political precedent and 
acting with “a cold-blooded disregard of ethical principle” in establishing relations with 
Tel Aviv before the cessation of conflict.
32
 He further drew parallels between American 
and Soviet statecraft, suggesting that Washington had abandoned its cherished neutrality 
in the region in hastily recognizing Israel. “What Stalin had done in Czechoslovakia we 
did in Palestine”, he charged. “We had blamed him for interference in the internal affairs 
of another nation, but when our turn came for trickery, we proved ourselves quicker and 
slicker than the master criminal.”33 In concluding, McMahon intimated that the 
“breakneck speed” with which Tel Aviv was recognized could be traced to Truman‟s 
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courting of the Jewish vote in the November elections, and he expressed doubts that 
either Zionist groups or the Truman administration, both of which purported to act in the 
interests of humanitarian concern, would extend the same treatment to other groups. 
“Will they love humanity in December, after the elections, as they did in May?” he 
observed acidly. “We shall see.”34 That it was McMahon who acted as the de facto 
Vatican minister to Tel Aviv in this period spoke volumes on the tensions of the Israeli-
Vatican relationship. Though his words were meant to galvanize American Catholic 
opinion, they also hinted at a growing frustration with Truman, whose growing support 
for Israel created challenges for the American Catholic lobby.  
 Following the establishment of Israel, and the summer of bitter struggle between 
the new state and its Arab neighbours, who invaded almost immediately, the American 
Catholic press shone a bright light on the desecration of Roman Catholic property in the 
territory, often laying blame for these transgressions at the feet of the nascent Israeli 
Defence Force (IDF).
35
 A majority of these reports were penned by Anthony Bruya, the 
NCWC‟s Jerusalem correspondent, and were channelled to the diocesan press by the 
NCWC‟s press office, which often relied on Bruya‟s reports as a sole source from the 
region. The articles detailed a host of atrocities perpetrated by the IDF in and around 
Jerusalem, which included the destruction and looting of churches, convents and 
monasteries, as well as the desecration of relics, religious artworks, vestments and 
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books.
36
 In September, Bruya quoted from a Vatican commissioned report by Mgr. 
Antonio Vergani, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, who, in detailing damage to the Terra 
Sancta Hospice in Haifa, reported the discovery of broken crucifixes, an overturned altar, 
torn missals and a smashed tabernacle. In the same report, Vergani expressed shock at 
“acts of profanation in the chapel”, where he “surprised soldiers of both sexes dancing to 
the tune of the harmonium.” “We have seen mattresses in the main chapel”, he added. 
“Jewish soldiers must have slept there.”37 Bruya‟s articles were intended to refute Israeli 
claims that acts against Catholic properties were merely “isolated transgressions by 
irresponsible individuals” who had already been brought to justice.38 The articles were 
also intended to highlight, through lurid and scandalous reportage, Jewish complicity in 
the ongoing delay to fully internationalize Jerusalem and its environs.
39
 
 Concrete action complemented press coverage. Charges of Jewish complicity in 
the desecration of Catholic property and violence against Catholic religious in and around 
Jerusalem reached an apex late in August, when McMahon, acting as national secretary 
of the CNEWA, put forward a request to the UN that alleged mistreatment of Catholics 
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by Jews in Palestine, and the desecration of Catholic holy sites in the territory, be 
formally investigated by the world body. In a letter to Trygve Lie, Secretary General of 
the UN, McMahon highlighted “documented accusations” against the IDF in Jerusalem, 
citing Vergani‟s report and the numerous articles in the Catholic and secular press as 
proof of Jewish violations.
40
 McMahon lamented the lack of progress on the 
internationalization of Jerusalem since the partition plan of November 1947, and cited 
“authoritative sources” of apprising him of “the criminal acts of Jewish forces against 
twelve Roman Catholic institutions in northern Palestine.” In expressing the Vatican‟s 
anxiety on Jewish hegemony over Jerusalem (again highlighting his role as a primary 
Vatican emissary to the world body), McMahon expressed the fear that “the Jews might 
start a continued expropriation of ecclesiastical properties which may have no small 
repercussions in the Christian world.”41 In concluding, he warned that sustained Jewish 
transgressions would not be accepted by Christian leaders. “It is our considered opinion 
that if these overt acts continue or are explained by ascribing them constantly to 
irresponsible forces,” he explained, “then the entire Christian world is justified in its 
apprehension over the disregard of Christian spiritual and material interests in the new 
born State of Israel.” The letter, carried widely in the mainstream press, drew a terse 
response from American Zionist groups. Eliahu Ben-Horin of the American Zionist 
Emergency Council (AZEC) accused McMahon of “atavistic anti-Semitism”, though he 
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pledged to emphasize the CNEWA‟s concerns directly the Israeli Foreign Minister, 
Moshe Sharett.
42
  
 In the same month the Vatican, through the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 
requested the assistance of the American Knights of the Holy Sepulchre to contribute 
funds to the repair of Catholic property damaged in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This was 
another sign of Rome‟s cognizance of the leadership, and financial might, of the various 
organs of the American Church.
43
 The Order, which included Spellman in its 
membership, represented a cross-section of prominent American Catholics, including 
academics, jurists, industrialists, publishers and politicians. The statement produced by 
the order, issued through New York financier Luigi Criscuolo, not only appealed to its 
membership to assist the Church in Palestine, but called upon American Jewish groups to 
shoulder a significant burden for the damage, clearly implying Jewish culpability in the 
molestation of Catholic sites. In appealing, in general terms, to the “friendly relations” 
between Catholic prelates and Jewish rabbis in the United States, it called upon Jewish 
groups to “cut the Gordian knot of diplomatic procedure and make a large donation out of 
Jewish relief funds to the to the restoration of Catholic Church properties which were 
destroyed.” The statement, which appeared in both the secular and Catholic press, was 
also forwarded to the heads of a number of prominent Jewish organizations, including 
Henry Morgenthau, chairman of the Jewish Appeal. 
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 In October, Amleto Cicognani, the apostolic delegate to Washington, again urged 
the NCWC to do all it could, through the diocesan press and its network of organizations, 
such as the National Council of Catholic Men (NCCM), the NCCW and the CAIP, to 
promote the desire of the Vatican for a “just settlement on the Palestine conflict and for 
the internationalization of Jerusalem and the Holy Places.”44 Cicognani‟s letter was sent 
in conjunction with the 24 October release of Pius XII‟s encyclical In Multiplicibus 
Curis, his second encyclical of 1948 which spoke directly to the conflict in the Holy 
Land. As Silvio Ferrari has observed, the encyclical marked a decisive evolution in the 
papal stance on the Holy Land. Firstly, it announced, publically and explicitly, the Pope‟s 
own position on the future of the territory (in line with the policies already advocated by 
the CNEWA). Secondly, it signalled the expansion of Vatican demands for Jerusalem, 
replacing previous requests for legal guarantees for the Holy Places (as expressed 
privately by a number of Vatican figures), with demands for the complete 
internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs.
45
 The encyclical also constituted an 
explicit call to action to the Roman Catholics of the world. “We do not believe that the 
Christian world could contemplate indifferently, or in sterile indignation,” it proclaimed, 
“the spectacle of the sacred land (which everyone approached with the deepest respect to 
kiss with most ardent love) trampled over again by troops and stricken by aerial 
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bombardments. We do not believe that it could permit the devastation of the Holy Places, 
the destruction of the great sepulchre of Christ.”46 
That the Vatican shared the view of the American Catholic press that Jewish 
elements bore the burden of guilt for damage to Catholic property in Palestine was made 
evident in September. Montini, in explaining to Taylor‟s office why the Vatican would 
not recognize Israel diplomatically, offered that the decision was, in part, based on the 
fact that “unwarranted attacks on Catholic institutions and members of religious orders by 
irresponsible Jewish elements have caused a painful impression.”47 “Arabs”, he 
continued, “have not attacked or molested Catholics, and have generally shown 
consideration and tolerance.” While he expressed that the Vatican did not hold the Israeli 
government responsible for ordering the attacks, he concluded that it did expect Tel Aviv 
to exercise greater control over the IDF and other Jewish factions.
48
 
In the same month, Spellman announced that McMahon, as national secretary of 
the CNEWA, would be leaving in November to confer with the Pope at the Vatican. 
McMahon would then journey on to the Holy Land, where he was to assess the state of 
the Roman Catholic community there, and to coordinate relief efforts for refugees with 
Dr. Bernard Joseph, the Military Governor of Israel. Though the trip was officially 
deemed an aid mission, Israeli and American officials quickly deigned its larger 
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significance, as McMahon would, in a mission lasting nearly five months, discuss all the 
main issues of contention between Tel Aviv and the Vatican, acting as the Pope‟s envoy 
to the Israeli government. James McDonald, the American special advisor to the Israeli 
government, recalled in his memoir that although McMahon arrived as an aid envoy, he 
was certain that he “held wider powers as unofficial representative of the Holy See on 
political matters”, an impression that was confirmed during McDonald‟s audience with 
Pius XII early in 1949.
49
 McMahon‟s mission, in fact, spoke volumes on the critical role 
of the American Church in the Vatican‟s struggle for influence on Palestine.  
 Throughout October and November, the diocesan press continued to detail IDF 
transgressions, giving prominence to Bruya‟s steady stream of dispatches from 
Jerusalem.
50
 In addition to Vergani‟s report, Catholic papers also gave wide coverage to 
the report of two American Franciscan priests stationed in Jerusalem, Patrick J. Coyle and 
Theophane Carroll, who had both served as wartime chaplains in Europe. Their 
statement, which was also broadcast on Palestine Radio on 22 October, highlighted 
Israeli attempts to downplay damage to Catholic sites, and theorized more ominously of 
Tel Aviv‟s plans to supplant Christianity in the Holy Land altogether.51 In stoking fears 
of Israeli plans to erase Catholicism‟s institutional presence on the Holy Land, it stated 
that “a further consideration causing anxiety to Christians in Jerusalem is that there seems 
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to be an overall plan to gradually replace Christian institutions. Of various Catholic 
schools in the Jewish section of Jerusalem, four have been filled so far, one way or 
another, with Jews. At the time of this report, Jewish authorities are ready to move into 
the Terra Sancta College to make it a part of the Hebrew University.” In underscoring the 
validity of Catholic reportage on Jerusalem, and the emptiness of Tel Aviv‟s claims to be 
acting to curtail it, it continued that “The desecrations that have happened, [the Israeli 
government] wants to minimize, especially in the press. The well-founded suspicions of 
Christians must remain: that these acts reveal only too well the mentality of a section of 
the Jewish people.”52 As in Vergani‟s report, it also detailed Jewish expropriations of 
Catholic properties, the harassment of Catholics by the IDF and other Jewish groups, and 
specific vandalizations of Christian relics, including a crucifix in the Benedictine Church 
of the Dormition, which had been shorn of its arms as well as its head. Undoubtedly, such 
details were intended to shock and to galvanize American Catholic support for the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. 
 In November, the American Catholic press gave wide circulation to the public 
appeal of British Archbishop Arthur Hughes, the apostolic inter-nuncio to Egypt, who 
charged that continued delays to the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the 
prolongation of the growing refugee crisis in the region, were the result of “deliberate 
Jewish efforts to decimate the Arabs and destroy Christianity in Palestine.”53 Hughes 
declared himself “appalled by the callousness with which the world accepts the intention 
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to expose to death and hardships the Arab refugees, in order to make room for 600,000 
Jews.” In citing the “particular hatred” that Jews had demonstrated against Catholic 
institutions, he urged Catholics worldwide to support relief efforts for Palestinian 
Christians, and to urge their governments to press for an imminent cessation to the 
violence. This was followed by the wide press circulation, in December, of a petition sent 
by the leaders of Iraq‟s Catholic community to Spellman, which decried the “ravages 
caused by the war in Palestine on the part of a pitiless enemy devoid of respect for the 
Holy Places or for religious and charitable foundations.”54 It further lamented the 
“flagrant injustice and barbarous treatment meted out to the Christian and Moslem Arabs 
of Palestine”, and it expressed “alarm at the fate in store for Christians and Moslems in 
danger of becoming prey of intolerant and materialist Zionism.” In closing, it urged 
Spellman to use his “great influence” to inform public opinion and shape Washington‟s 
views before the entrenched establishment of “a Zionist government which will be a 
permanent source of discord and trouble among the peoples of the Middle East.”55 
Spellman, receptive to the concerns of Iraqi Catholics would, in short order, be taking this 
message directly to Truman himself.  
 The Catholic press also drew increasing attention to the Palestinian refugee crisis 
that was becoming progressively grave in the latter half of 1948. Esther Feldblum has 
observed that Catholic papers, from the end of the war onward, had consistently decried 
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the success of American Jewish organizations in linking the postwar Jewish refugee 
problem to the imperative of a Jewish homeland.
56
 This was highlighted by 1947 report 
presented by the State Department to Congress, that stated that of a total of 794,735 
confirmed European refugees, only 193, 332 (roughly one quarter) were Jewish.
57
 
According to estimates presented in the Catholic press, more than half of these refugees 
were Roman Catholics, yet American Catholic demands for „open door‟ immigration 
policies appeared to be consistently upstaged by American Jewish groups, and their 
success in linking the Jewish refugee question to the need for a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine.
58
 By the summer of 1948, the Catholic press attempted to tie the Arab Christian 
refugee crisis into its general critique of Israeli incursions, and to use it as another 
argument in favour of the immediate internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs. 
Fed by a steady stream of reports from Schaefer and the NCWC‟s „UN Office‟, the 
diocesan press gave wide coverage to the unfolding crisis.
59
 True to form, the articles 
generally traced the spread of the refugee problem to the “revised” Jewish state, which 
had expanded through war to encompass a larger territory than it had been allotted in the 
1947 partition plan.
60
 As a result of “Jewish imperialism”, several Catholic papers noted, 
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the number of Christian refugees in the Holy Land had risen to over 100,000 by October, 
“the vast majority”, the papers claimed, “of whom were Roman Catholic.”61  
In connection to the crisis, the CNEWA, designated by the Vatican as the official 
relief organization for Palestinian refugees (both Arab and Christian), established the 
„American Appeal for Holy Land Refugees‟. Offertory collections at masses raised nearly 
one million dollars for the initiative by the fall of 1949, further proof of the financial 
power wielded by the American faithful. The initiative, while providing essential aid to 
refugees, also placed the CNEWA at the forefront of the Vatican‟s efforts to press its 
demands on the Jewish state, which included guarantees for the survival of Catholic 
institutions in Israel, and the full and effective internationalization of Jerusalem. Given 
the growing importance of the refugee question in the Palestine equation, the initiative 
also ceded more clout to both Spellman and McMahon in advocating the Roman Catholic 
position in Washington and at the UN. America reminded its readers of the connection 
between refugee aid and the Catholic stake in the territory. 
Long before governments began to assist in the present emergency, our Catholic  
parishes were feeding and sheltering many thousands of refugees in their parish  
halls, in their churchyards and their schools. The Catholic Church has been  
associated with all the problems of the Near East since the birth of Christ. The   
purposes of our Catholic personnel, native and missionary, are non-political. That  
Catholic missionaries remained through the fighting, that Catholic institutions   
continued to care for the homeless and helpless, is proof of their non-political  
purpose. It is proof, too, that they expect their rights to be protected and, where 
infringed, restored.
62
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“There is scarcely a religious house in Palestine that is not sheltering refugees,” it 
concluded. “The officials at Tel Aviv know this.”63 
Israeli and American Zionist Groups Respond to the Catholic Threat 
 Though a furor among American Catholics against IDF actions in Jerusalem 
might have seemed relatively inconsequential, considering Israeli successes in both 
establishing a state and indeed expanding it during the 1948 war, archival evidence 
suggests that the nascent state indeed considered negative publicity, particularly from 
American Catholic circles, as detrimental to Tel Aviv‟s larger ambitions. This was 
particularly so as Israeli officials and American Zionist organizations such as the 
American Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC) lobbied the UN and the Truman 
administration for Israel‟s admission to the world body in the summer of 1948.64 Wide 
publicity of IDF transgressions posed a clear danger to Israel‟s candidacy, raising 
legitimate questions on the legitimacy of its application. A continued delay in the 
functional internationalization of Jerusalem, moreover, prolonged Tel Aviv‟s strained 
relationship with the Vatican, bringing international Catholic pressure to bear against the 
ambitions of the new state. David Ben-Gurion, Israel‟s first Prime Minister, greatly 
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feared the negative impact of such publicity, and in July issued explicit instructions to 
Israeli officers: “It is your duty that the special force in charge of defending the Old City 
makes merciless use of machine guns against any Jews, and in particular Jewish soldiers, 
who tries to defile a Christian or Muslim Holy Place.” He further instructed local Jewish 
leaders in Jerusalem to send a cable to the Pope reporting that “all is well with the 
Christian communities, and the Holy Places have not been damaged.”65 Despite these 
precautions, damages ensued, prompting the discussed plethora of reportage in the 
Catholic press, which an Israeli official described as “a wave of poisonous propaganda 
directed against us in the Catholic world, based on stories of a campaign of desecration of 
churches allegedly conducted by the IDF...They are inflating each incident of damage- 
however slight- caused by a handful of uncultured and irresponsible people.”66 Jacob 
Herzog, an attaché to the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, deigned the significance of 
Catholic reportage on Jerusalem when he observed that “these incidents sowed seeds of 
suspicion in influential Vatican circles,” piquing “the anxieties of Vatican policymakers”, 
and generally creating challenges for Israeli statecraft vis-a-vis the United States, the UN 
and the larger Catholic world.
67
 
 The Israeli provisional government considered the unfolding Catholic furor over 
fighting in Jerusalem and the wider territory sufficiently dangerous enough to dispatch a 
secret mission to the Holy See to discuss guarantees for Roman Catholic faithful, 
Catholic institutions and the Holy Sites. In late September, Herzog and Dr. Chaim 
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Wardie, a director in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, journeyed to Rome to discuss 
such guarantees directly with leading members of the Vatican secretariat. The mission 
was facilitated by James McDonald, Washington‟s Special Representative to Israel, 
Gustavo Testa, the apostolic delegate to Palestine, and Vergani, the Latin Patriarch of 
Jerusalem, whose damning reports on IDF damages in the city had been so widely 
covered in the Catholic press. The mission represented an attempt by Israeli officials to 
blunt the severe criticisms launched against Tel Aviv which were clearly regarded as 
detrimental to the new state.
68
 Herzog was under no illusion that the mission would be 
considered a formal diplomatic visit, but he expressed that such a meeting “[could] help 
materially in preventing misunderstanding in a field in which the Catholic Church takes 
so keen an interest.”69 While Montini himself assented to the meetings, neither he, nor 
Tardini or the Pope, men who were clearly the most influential figures in the Vatican, met 
with Herzog and Wardie. Instead, meetings were granted with Enrico Galeazzi, a close 
advisor to Pius XII, Mgr. Pietro Sigismondi of the Secretariat of State, and Archbishop 
Valerio Valeri, former apostolic nuncio to France.
70
 Herzog described the mandate of the 
three week mission to “pay our respects to the Holy See, and to seek informal counsel on 
the manner in which the Catholic Church would wish Israel to define, in its legal and 
administrative machinery, the religious rights of the Catholic communities in its midst.”71 
Given the “unique place which the Holy Land occupies in the religious sentiments of 
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mankind,” he assured Vatican representatives that “the question would be given the most 
careful consideration on the highest level.”72  
Though Pius XII was encouraged by Israeli efforts to bring forth proposals 
directly to the Vatican itself, a stumbling block remained the full and effective 
internationalization of Jerusalem, upon which the Vatican secretariat continued to insist. 
Just weeks after the departure of the Israeli delegates from Rome, Tardini forwarded to 
Taylor‟s office the Pope‟s detailed position on Jerusalem, which continued to insist upon 
full internationalization as outlined in the 1947 partition plan.
73
 The Vatican rejected, 
however, proposals put forth by the UN that would give civil judicial authorities the right 
to decide disputes pertaining to religious tribunals, as well as rights to determine cases at 
issue between religious groups and the civil courts. The Vatican was further concerned by 
the UN proposal‟s insistence that residency in Jerusalem would have to be proven for 
three uninterrupted years, meaning that Roman Catholics who had fled to the Holy City 
since the outbreak of Arab-Jewish conflict would not be granted resident status. Such a 
regulation would clearly have limited the Roman Catholic presence in the city, and 
hindered future Vatican claims for jurisdiction there. Only full and effective 
internationalization, the document concluded, would protect the Roman Catholic 
presence in Palestine. Privately, moreover, Vatican officials expressed that the purpose of 
the Israeli mission had been to offset the international Catholic clamour over fighting in 
Jerusalem, which they maintained was legitimate, and which they agreed was detrimental 
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to the prospect of Israeli admission to the UN.
74
 Nonetheless, the Vatican agreed to study 
the Israeli proposals for a period of three months, despite the Pope‟s confidential 
memorandum on demands for full internationalization of Jerusalem just weeks later. 
Herzog and Wardie, by all indications, departed Rome in early October confident that 
their mission had at least begun to thaw the relationship between the Holy See and Tel 
Aviv, and even expressed the hope that it had laid the groundwork for the Vatican‟s 
future diplomatic recognition of Israel.
75
 In alluding to the importance of blunting 
American Catholic criticisms of Israel, Wardie “hoped that Catholics in the United States 
might perhaps learn of this visit and thereby be reassured of Israel‟s feelings of respect 
and friendliness for the Holy See.”76 
 Wardie correctly surmised that American Catholic criticisms had the most 
damaging potential to Israeli objectives. American Jewish organizations and 
representatives of the Israeli provisional government in Washington, therefore, were 
anxious to quell Catholic anti-Israeli sentiment in the United States, cognizant of the 
threat it posed to Tel Aviv‟s strengthening relationship with the American government. 
This initiative began in the summer of 1948, with a concerted effort in the Jewish press to 
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emphasize Arab culpability in the destruction of Christian sites, in order to counter, as an 
AZEC press release described, “the propaganda from Arab and pro-Arab sources on the 
question of the holy places in Jerusalem, which tends to present a distorted picture of the 
situation.”77 By August, a number of mainstream national papers such as the New York 
Times, the New York Herald Tribune and the Boston Globe were also increasingly 
emphasizing Arab transgressions in the Holy Land.  
Jewish editors also rebuked Catholic journals directly for what they regarded as 
an ongoing campaign of misrepresentation on the fighting in Jerusalem. Philip 
Slomowitz, for example, editor of the influential Detroit Jewish News, reproached the 
editorial board of the Commonweal, stating that as a reader and a former contributor to 
the journal, he had been “shocked in the past few months to read some of the biased and 
unfair comments you have made on the Jewish position in the State of Israel.”78 
Slomowitz detailed a host of Arab damages to Christian sites, citing reports both from the 
Jewish and mainstream press, and raised examples of Jewish-Catholic cooperation in the 
territory, which included Jewish troops providing access to Christians into the Tomb of 
David, a practice which had been forbidden under Ottoman rule. In concluding, he 
maintained that there was “a mass of evidence not only to disprove the charges of Jewish 
abuses, but to point on the contrary that while Arabs have destroyed Jewish and Christian 
holy places the Israeli have protected them. Surely Christians ought to be the first to 
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challenge libels against our people. And I am personally deeply grieved that the liberal 
Commonweal magazine should have fallen prey to the rumours instead of disproving 
falsehoods.” Slomowitz forwarded copies of his correspondences with Catholic journals 
to officials in the Israeli provisional government in Washington and New York.
79
 
 As discussed above, Catholic editors were scarcely deterred by the disproving of 
American Jewry, and relentlessly highlighted Israeli misdeeds in Jerusalem throughout 
the summer and fall. Commonweal‟s response to Slomowitz was indicative of the 
editorial resoluteness of the Catholic press. Penned by Anne Fremantle, the British-born 
author, essayist and noted convert to Catholicism, it defended, chapter and verse, the 
assertions made in the journal, and insisted that Catholic sources in the Holy Land were 
sound and un-biased.
80
 Catholic responses also included the direct refutation of their 
positions in the mainstream press itself. In November, the New York Herald Tribune 
carried an article by Howard Carroll, General Secretary of the NCWC, which challenged 
a series in articles in the same paper by Ruth Gruber, who claimed that the situation in 
Palestine was “idyllic”.81 Carroll sternly took Gruber‟s views to task and, in quoting 
Vergani‟s report liberally, he laid out the full extent of Jewish abuses in the large 
circulation daily. 
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 Attempts to quell American Catholic opinion extended beyond the press. Eliahu 
Epstein, the special representative of the Israeli government to the United States, took 
pains to assure the NCWC that Tel Aviv took seriously the charges against Jewish 
elements in and around Jerusalem, and he drew attention to formal Israeli investigations 
into these misdemeanours.
82
 In quoting the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, Rabbi 
I.L. Fishman (who in August had ordered a formal investigation into charges against 
Jewish transgressions in Jerusalem), Epstein assured the NCWC that “the suggestion that 
our state has or ever had any intention of expropriating Church property is wholly 
without foundation”, and labelled coverage of the situation in Jerusalem as “fantastic 
slander typical of anti-Israeli propaganda.”83 Epstein, further, assured the NCWC that he 
would seek immediate clarification from Tel Aviv of any future charges against Israeli 
elements in the territory. Similar assurances were forwarded to the NCWC and the 
apostolic delegate, Amleto Cicognani, by AZEC, in an attempt to mitigate the negative 
coverage so prevalent in the Catholic press.
84
 Despite these pledges, Catholic coverage 
remained harshly critical of alleged Israeli transgressions, spurred by the Vatican‟s 
consistent message, issued through the apostolic delegate, to “raise the issue of Palestine 
clearly and consistently” in the American Catholic press.85 The Vatican and American 
Catholic leaders, increasingly aware of the power of public opinion on the issue of 
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Palestine, were not about to allow the disproving of American Zionists groups, or 
representatives of the Israeli provisional government, to derail a potentially successful 
campaign. Just weeks after the Israeli and AZEC assurances of accountability, in fact, the 
diocesan press ran a series of damning articles by Father Raimond Naveau, renewing 
charges of grave atrocities committed by Israeli forces in and around the Holy City.
86
  
Digging In: Israeli Consolidation and a Renewed American Catholic Offensive 
 Criticisms of Israeli transgressions in the American Catholic press were intended 
to underscore the need to create a genuine territorial internationalization for Jerusalem (a 
corpus separatum) as opposed to the various schemes for protecting only the Holy Places 
themselves, as suggested by the Israeli government. The establishment of a corpus 
separatum, as outlined in the 1947 partition plan, and the repatriation of Christian Arab 
refugees to Palestine, had become the clear focal points of Vatican efforts from the spring 
of 1948 onward, a policy that the Vatican had again communicated to Myron Taylor‟s 
office in November.
87
 On these fronts, however, the Vatican was gradually losing the 
support of Washington. The Truman administration increasingly favoured a modified 
condominium for Jerusalem, under which Israel, Jordan (which controlled West 
Jerusalem) and the UN would share the administration of the city under a rotating 
chairmanship.
88
 American plans would also have required a limited UN 
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internationalization of the Holy Sites themselves, guaranteeing physical protection to the 
sites, and guaranteeing access evenly to Christians, Jews and Muslims.  
American designs for the city were largely reflected in the September 1948 report 
submitted by Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator on Palestine. Bernadotte‟s 
murder in Jerusalem on 17 September by Irgun terrorists disguised as IDF soldiers, 
however, highlighted the increasing intractability of the „Jerusalem question‟, and 
necessitated a deeper and more comprehensive consultation process to determine the fate 
of the ancient city. On 11 December, the UN established the Palestine Conciliation 
Commission (PCC), a body charged with mediating, inter alia, between the disputants in 
the Israeli-Arab conflict in order to reach a final settlement. The status of Jerusalem, and 
the question of the refugees, were the central issues in the PCC mandate. The General 
Assembly specifically instructed the PCC to present to its Fourth Session in the fall of 
1949 “detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area.”89 
The establishment of the PCC signalled to the Vatican another chance to shape a 
favourable solution on the fate of Jerusalem and its environs, despite flagging American 
support for full internationalization. 
 Throughout 1949, the Vatican remained unmoved in its insistence on full 
territorial internationalization for Jerusalem, the „corpus separatum‟ promised in 
November 1947. The October 1948 encyclical In Multiplicibus, in terms more stark than 
April‟s Auspicia Quaedam, called for a genuine territorial internationalization for the 
city. In a key paragraph, Pope Pius XII implored those “in high quarters, where the 
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problems of peace are discussed” to “give Jerusalem and its outskirts, where are found so 
many and such precious memories of the life and death of the Saviour, an international 
character which, in present circumstances, seems to offer a better guarantee for the 
protection of the sanctuaries.”90 The pontiff further called for “international guarantees 
for Holy Places throughout Palestine”, and called for the repatriation of Christian 
refugees to the Holy Land. The Vatican maintained a cautious optimism that the UN 
could still secure such an outcome. As Tardini explained in March 1949, the Pope had 
frequently expressed approval of the UN, even though he had never been invited to 
submit his views, and his “attitude toward the UN has always been one of outspoken 
sympathy and encouragement.”91 The Vatican, however, specifically identified the 
internationalization of Jerusalem as a policy priority for 1949, along with the diplomatic 
recognition of several Arab states, objectives clearly intended to strengthen its hand on 
the future of Palestine.
92
 
 Faith in the UN did not preclude Vatican efforts to continue discussions directly 
with the Israeli government. Once again, the Vatican relied on the American Church as 
an intermediary with Israel and Washington. The first official approach to Tel Aviv after 
the creation of the PCC was made by the CNEWA‟s Mgr. Thomas McMahon. His 
mission, which lasted almost four months, was ostensibly to manage Catholic aid efforts 
in Egypt and Palestine, given his chairmanship of the „American Appeal for Holy Land 
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Refugees.‟ McMahon‟s agenda had a diplomatic assignment attached as well, however, 
namely to advocate for the repatriation of Christian Arab refugees, and to campaign for 
the territorial internationalization of Jerusalem. Though McMahon had not been 
designated as an official Vatican envoy, his private audiences with the Pope both at the 
beginning and the end of his mission suggested such a role. James McDonald, the 
American Special Representative to Israel, noted that though McMahon “received his 
orders from his immediate supervisor, Cardinal Spellman, he is in fact so close to the 
Vatican in his work here that in reality, if not in form, he is a Papal representative.”93 
Officials in the Israeli government, including Herzog, concurred with this assessment.
94
  
 Once in Palestine, McMahon wasted little time in seeking out the power brokers 
on the Jerusalem question, despite an official and frenetic agenda of coordinating the 
distribution of CNEWA relief aid in the entire region. On the evening of 11 December 
1948, McMahon had a lengthy discussion with Jacob Herzog, the Israeli Minister of 
Religious Affairs (who dealt with the question of Jerusalem for Tel Aviv). McMahon 
described the affable Herzog as “a young man, endowed with an Irish accent owing to his 
youth in Dublin,” and “a pleasure to speak with.”95 On the question of the Holy City, 
Herzog actually suggested that McMahon‟s August memo to the UN “hadn‟t gone far 
enough” in insisting that Church property, religious education and Catholic marriages be 
protected. Herzog, in fact, expressed full agreement on the principle of corpus separatum, 
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but lamented “that he could not [speak] officially, especially since there were elections 
coming up here, and the matter of a constitution.”96 Herzog further hinted at a division 
between the civilian and military leadership in Israel complicating the Jerusalem 
question. “There is a definitive division of the victorious army from the political leaders, 
and the former has its way,” McMahon reported to Spellman, little assured by the Herzog 
meeting.  On the Catholic course going forward, the monsignor was unequivocal. “I think 
the party line in New York should be to press always for internationalization, including 
everything, for some of the shrines in the New City,” he opined. “Acceptance of partition 
is enough, but the UN will have to devise some formidable way of implementing the 
internationality of the Holy Places, or all is lost.”97 
 Two weeks later, McMahon took the Vatican‟s concerns to the Jordanians, who 
occupied a section of the Holy City, and who also rejected the corpus separatum. On the 
evening of 20 December, he was received at the winter home of King Abdullah in 
Shureh, where he chatted for nearly two hours with Abdullah and Dr. Musa Husseini, a 
liaison officer for the monarchy.
98
 McMahon remarked that Abdullah was “very cordial 
and paternal,” growing “eloquent in his affirmations that Christians and Moslems are 
equal in his regime.” On the subject of internationalization, however, the King was 
reticent, “especially since his soldiers had shed their blood to defend the Holy Places.”99 
Upon the King‟s departure, McMahon continued on with Husseini, who assured him that 
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although Abdullah didn‟t understand the Jerusalem question fully, he would take it up 
with him further. The monsignor reminded his host that Roman Catholics “had no more 
assurances from the Arabs than from the Jews that Christians could live [in Palestine] in 
peace,” emphasizing that “the internationalization of Jerusalem would be proof from both 
sides that they respected Christian feelings.” Though Husseini offered vague pledges to 
study the question in more depth, McMahon remained pessimistic. In his report to 
Spellman, he again urged a firm line on Jerusalem, and alluded to the fragility of peace in 
the region, which underscored the need for action. “The present „armistice‟ seems to be a 
prelude, but let us pray otherwise. This little world is not much further ahead- in fact, it 
has gone back. We must be loud on rightful claims.”100 
On 11 January 1949, McMahon held a two hour meeting with McDonald, in 
which he laid out the Vatican‟s demands for a Palestine solution. While the protection of 
the Holy Places was important, he insisted that the “maintenance of the status quo” 
(meaning the corpus separatum promised in 1947), was the only solution acceptable to 
the Vatican. Significantly, McMahon stressed the supreme importance of the repatriation 
of Christian Arabs to Palestine, suggesting that the establishment of Jerusalem as a 
corpus separatum would facilitate the return of displaced Christians. The Vatican had 
long considered the maintenance of a Roman Catholic population in Palestine as central 
to the legitimacy of its presence there. As such, McMahon informed McDonald that the 
Roman Catholic Church would prefer “that all of the [Holy Sites] be destroyed rather 
than the Christian population be eliminated,” alluding to the importance with which the 
                                                          
100
 Ibid. 
247 
 
Vatican considered the territory a base of influence.
101
 He further suggested a benefit to 
Israel in the repatriation of Christians to Palestine: namely as a buffer population between 
Jewish “liberals” and “excessive Rabbinical control or any tendency toward a 
theocracy.”102  
In February, McMahon presented similar points in a second meeting with Herzog, 
who could only offer his guest assurances that Israel, which was eager to negotiate a 
solution amenable to the Vatican, supported an international regime for the Holy Places, 
and not a corpus separatum. Herzog‟s tone was decidedly less conciliatory than in early 
December, evidence that he was acting on instructions from Tel Aviv. Growing Israeli 
obstinacy on the issue could be traced to plans for Jerusalem, which had always been 
considered the natural capital of Israel by the founding fathers of Zionism. Clearly 
sensing a growing upper-hand in the struggle for Palestine, the Israeli cabinet had decided 
in January to terminate the military governorship of Jerusalem and replace it with a 
civilian government- an arrangement which would affect the application of Israel‟s 
national civil law. Israel further declared that it would conduct municipal elections in the 
city in March, and made it known that it intended to hold the opening meeting of the First 
Knesset (Constituent Assembly) in Jerusalem on 14 February.
103
 Though Tel Aviv 
claimed that these measures were “administrative and not annexation of Jerusalem”, the 
demands put forth by the Vatican through McMahon were clearly incompatible with 
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Israel‟s longer-term plans. The Jesuit journal America, which was kept apprised of 
McMahon‟s mission, observed accurately that “despite protestations by Israeli officials 
that the [February Knesset meeting] was held in Jerusalem purely because of Israel‟s 
historical association with the Holy City, we have little doubt that they hoped to use the 
location of the Constituent Assembly as a weapon to strengthen their annexation 
plans.”104  
 In early March, a frustrated McMahon discussed his Israeli meetings in a private 
audience with Pope Pius XII, where it was determined that a renewed pressure had to be 
applied both at the UN and in Washington. Clearly dissatisfied with his rebuff in 
Palestine, McMahon, upon his return to New York later in the month, penned his third 
open letter to UN General Secretary Trygve Lie.
105
 In stating that Roman Catholics “most 
understandably could not agree” with recent Israeli statements opposing the 
internationalization of Jerusalem (a clear reference to his recent meetings), he 
emphasized that “the Christian world has complete justification in requesting 
international status for the Holy City.” He further seethed at “certain officials” in the 
Israeli government that denied the repatriation of Catholic Arab refugees to their 
“ancestral homes.” “Who shall have the right”, he offered, “to say they cannot or may 
not?” In closing, McMahon again raised the supranational character of the Jerusalem 
question, and urged the PCC directly to find an amenable solution. “Jerusalem and the 
Holy Places engage not only the sentiments but the sacred interests of the great mass of 
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mankind,” he instructed. “We insist that your Conciliation Commission (PCC) be 
motivated by these considerations of elementary justice.”106 
 McMahon made a second impassioned plea for Palestine during an address at his 
alma mater, New York‟s Fordham University, on 2 April. In a speech entitled „Rites and 
Rights in the Homeland of Our Saviour‟, he referred to Jerusalem as a “capital of 
Christianity”, clearly challenging Israel‟s own designs for the city as a national capital.107 
While he credited Israeli sincerity in dealing with the 1948 attacks on Roman Catholic 
sites, he expressed dismay at the plight of displaced Arab Christians. “While I, for one,” 
he stated, “wish the State of Israel well, because the footsteps of returning Jews bear 
traces of bloody persecution, I have come back here with my eyes full of the misery of 
homeless human beings, and my heart even more sensitive to the rights of 
Christendom.”As in his UN letter, McMahon again referred to the supranational character 
of Jerusalem, calling it “a microcosm, the crossroads of the world and the capital of three 
religions, whose rights make it imperative that the land can never be exclusionist and that 
no solution will be lasting that will obscure these indigenous rights.” McMahon linked 
outstanding Roman Catholic grievances to the debate on Israeli UN membership, which 
had begun in April, warning Washington that American Catholics would be watching 
these talks closely. “During the next week the admission of the State of Israel to the UN 
will be discussed and voted on. During the same time, the Conciliation Commission 
(PCC) will be discussing the internationalization of Jerusalem and the repatriation of 
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refugees. Millions of Christians in this country will be wondering and will have a right to 
wonder what will be the policy of our government in the face of the assertion of Christian 
rights.”108 The speech, carried widely in the diocesan press, was a clear signal to Truman 
and the Democrats that American Catholics would be closely monitoring developments 
on Jerusalem, accepting nothing less than the corpus separatum promised in 1947. 
McMahon‟s Fordham address initiated a more vocal and public Catholic lobby on 
Palestine that extended through the spring and summer of 1949. Vatican demands were 
again laid out in the 15 April encyclical Redemptoris Nostri, Pope Pius XII‟s third 
consecutive encyclical on the Palestine question, a clear sign of the priority with which 
the Vatican viewed the Jerusalem question. The document again called for the 
internationalization of the Holy City, citing the damages to ancient sites, “not a few 
[which have] suffered serious loss and damage owing to the upheaval of war.”109 The 
encyclical also urged global Catholics to action. “Let [Catholics], wherever they are 
living, use every legitimate means to persuade rulers of nations and those whose duty it is 
to settle this important question.” It instructed religious to “encourage the faithful 
committed to your charge to be ever more concerned about the conditions in Palestine 
and have them make their lawful requests known, positively and unequivocally.”  
The Vatican took pains to assure that the American Church would lead the charge 
for Jerusalem. Shortly following the release of the encyclical, Montini issued a direct 
appeal, though the apostolic delegation in Washington, imploring the American bishops 
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to advocate heartily for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The letter, forwarded by 
Cicognani to the entire American episcopate, underscored “the indispensable and urgent 
necessity to make known among Catholics and the general public, in a truly effective 
manner, the desire and the will of the Catholic Church to defend and protect the sacred 
and century-old rights which She has had in Palestine.”110 The letter urged specific 
political advocacy by the American Church, stating that the question “be made known 
and emphatically stressed with the public authorities who are taking part in the 
negotiations to determine the permanent status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and the 
surrounding sacred shrines.” It exhorted bishops to encourage their faithful to “make their 
voices heard by the responsible government authorities” and to further “do whatever may 
be in your power...to create a strong movement of your faithful and to undertake the 
necessary steps with the civil authorities for the purpose of obtaining the desired goal.”111 
It was an appeal of uncommon directness, speaking both to the immediacy with which the 
Vatican regarded the issue, and to the credence it placed in the potential political clout of 
the American Church. 
On 27 April a pastoral letter, composed by the most influential figures in the 
American episcopate, was issued after the spring meeting of the NCWC in Washington. 
Signatories included Spellman, Mooney, Stritch, McNicholas and Richard Cushing, 
Archbishop of Boston. Titled „The Internationalization of Jerusalem and its Environs‟, 
the letter, carried widely by the Catholic and mainstream press, and read from thousands 
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of pulpits nationwide, characterized the urgency with which the American bishops 
regarded the future of Jerusalem.
112
 The statement mirrored the demands made in the 
papal encyclical (in demanding full territorial internationalization), and emphasized that 
American Catholics “had the right to expect that these sentiments, firmly rooted in the 
decisions of the United Nations, will now be respected by those whom we should all 
appeal for their continuous affirmation.” Like McMahon‟s address, it sought to politicize 
the Jerusalem issue among American Catholics, in “[exhorting] our people to use their 
democratic privileges in this free nation to obtain from these in our government and in the 
United Nations continued assurances that the original commitments as to Christian rights 
in Palestine will be carried out.”113  
While McMahon and the American bishops sought to raise the issue of Palestine 
at the UN and among the American Catholic public, Spellman communicated Catholic 
concerns directly with the White House. In correspondence with Truman that extended 
throughout the spring and summer of 1949, Spellman apprised the President of the 
urgency with which American Catholics viewed the Palestine question, and specifically 
the fate of Jerusalem. In doing so, Spellman also commuted the Vatican‟s own policy 
demands to the Oval Office. The care with which Truman responded to Spellman, and the 
breadth of his letters suggests the extent to which he sought to assuage American 
Catholic concerns. 
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Spellman initiated the correspondence on 29 April, when he expressed concerns 
that the PCC appeared to be favouring a watered-down solution for Jerusalem, which 
would guarantee universal access to the Holy Sites, but would cede political jurisdiction 
of the city to the Israelis and the Jordanians.
114
 He reminded Truman that neither was this 
acceptable to the Vatican, nor was it the original UN scheme of November 1947, 
“advanced by the friends of Israel to fend off opposition to obtain the support and the 
votes of the Christian nations for partition in the General Assembly of 1947.” Spellman 
also expressed frustration that the Israeli provisional government did not support the 
repatriation of Catholic Arab refugees to Palestine (another of the Vatican‟s key 
concerns.) In closing, he urged Truman to take a stronger tack against the “fait accompli 
policies of Israel, which disregards United Nations decrees”, and to honour the “Christian 
stake” in the Palestine question.115 
Truman‟s response, which was reiterated in various forms throughout the 
summer, did not fill the Archbishop of New York with tremendous optimism. He assured 
Spellman that he considered the repatriation of Arab refugees “essential to a lasting peace 
in Palestine.”116 On Jerusalem and its environs, however, the President appeared to favour 
a modified compact, “whereby Israel and Transjordan could accept a large share of 
governmental responsibility in the Jerusalem area under the overall supervision of some 
representation of the United Nations.” Though Truman assured Spellman that he didn‟t 
consider the solution optimal, he did regard it as practicable, taking into account the 
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realities in the territory. He reminded Spellman, however, that “the United States 
government has not reached a final decision on the question, and its attitude...will be 
determined by the proposals to be made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission 
(PCC), upon which the responsibility for this task has been placed by the General 
Assembly.”117 
This was cold comfort to Spellman, as the 19 April release of the PCC „Progress 
Report‟ to the UN strongly suggested a diluted international regime for Jerusalem, one 
acceptable to both Israel and Jordan, in place of the full corpus separatum sought by the 
Vatican and the American Church (and proffered by the UN in 1947 and 1948).
118
 In 
response, the NCWC produced an eight page memorandum titled „The Christian Factor in 
the Palestine Equation‟ which sought, with legal precision, to outline the demands made 
by the Vatican and the American bishops on the status of Jerusalem.
119
 The memo traced 
the question from the Balfour declaration forward, and focused specifically on the form 
of internationalization ensconced by the General Assembly in November 1947 (which 
was a corpus separatum). The memo expressed concern over Israel‟s “gradual 
annexation” of Jerusalem, asserting that “military or civil conquest does not liquidate or 
neutralize the previous decisions of the General Assembly,” and that “if „force majeur‟ is 
thus recognized and legitimated, there can be little effectiveness attributed to United 
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Nations activities.” It further warned that there remained a significant gulf between the 
form of internationalization acceptable to Israel (protection of the Holy Places only), and 
that insisted upon by the Vatican, despite the “chatter” in UN circles that suggested 
otherwise. In closing, it admonished the “mitigated internationalization” favoured by Tel 
Aviv, suggesting that diplomatic tact and malleability could only achieve so much, and 
urged a firmer hand on Israel. “The necessity of good will is unquestionable,” it 
concluded, “but something else is also necessary. Clear understandings make good 
friends.”120 The memo was clearly intended as a short handbook for legislators and UN 
delegates on the question. On 5 May, Schaefer forwarded translations to Latin American, 
Arab and “various other delegates” at the UN. The following day, copies were also 
distributed widely among members of the American, Canadian and Australian 
delegations, as well as to a number of American legislators.
121
 
Though the Vatican had long valued the role of the American diocesan press in 
shaping Catholic opinion, it made pointed appeals to Catholic editors in the spring of 
1949 to highlight papal and wider Roman Catholic demands for the Holy Land. Requests 
for intensified Catholic coverage were often issued through the apostolic delegation to the 
NCWC News Service.
122
 Though the Vatican also began to forward reports of damage to 
Roman Catholic shrines to the NCWC News Service “to offset the false statements made 
in recent months by the representatives of Israel,” the apostolic delegate urged the 
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diocesan papers “not to mention the Holy See as a source”, cognizant of the challenges 
this might create for dialogue with Tel Aviv.
123
 Diocesan papers, hardly needing the 
prodding of Rome, gave unprecedentedly wide coverage to a number of issues salient to 
the Vatican and the wider Church. Brother Anthony Bruya, who remained as the 
NCWC‟s correspondent in the territory, penned a long series of articles that amplified 
familiar themes: the desperate plight of displaced Arab refugees, Arab-Christian strife at 
the hand of the IDF and other Jewish elements, Catholic aid in the refugee camps, and 
continued Jewish agitations against Christian rights in Palestine.
124
 To this was added a 
list of Roman Catholicism‟s primary demands for the territory: namely an 
internationalized Jerusalem and the repatriation of Arab refugees. The emphasis of these 
themes was not limited to the diocesan press. Catholic journals such as the Jesuit weekly 
America, the Paulist weekly Catholic World, the independent lay Commonweal and Sign, 
among others, echoed these demands, producing a largely unitary and coherent public 
voice on these questions.
125
 On several occasions the Vatican also requested that 
American Catholic journals reprint relevant articles from official papal organs such as the 
L’Osservatore Romano and the Civilta Cattolicà, in order both to harmonize demands put 
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forth by Catholics, and to clearly inform American Catholic laity of the Vatican‟s 
desires.
126
 
So anxious was the Vatican to cultivate this chorus that it monitored the American 
Catholic press closely, calling attention to articles that did not accord with papal views on 
Palestine. The Vatican secretariat was anxious to avoid a repeat of Bishop Rummel 
incident, where the New Orleans prelate was rebuked for views on Palestine that did not 
accord with those of Rome. In May, for example, Cicognani wrote the NCWC News 
Service, calling attention to a March article which quoted a British Labour MP, Dr. 
Samuel Segal, who had cast doubt on the feasibility on internationalizing Jerusalem. 
Cicognani continued that Tardini himself had “expressed wonderment at the fact that the 
NCWC News Service had given prominence to such remarks”, and the apostolic delegate 
implored Frank Hall, director of the service, to prevent such articles from appearing 
again.
127
 In his response, Hall explained that the piece had appeared in the diocesan press 
“before the intensive Catholic campaign for internationalization had started”, but assured 
that the NCWC would “be alert to prevent a recurrence.”128 
Intensified American Catholic critiques of Israeli policies and actions drew a terse 
response from American Zionist groups and from the Jewish press, a situation the NCWC 
appeared to have anticipated. In January, the NCWC News Service produced a series of 
form letters, to be used by editors of the Catholic diocesan weeklies, to refute the 
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potential criticisms that might be levelled against the Catholic press over its coverage of 
events in Israel and the wider region.
129
 In response to what was becoming “a 
considerable number of communications and visits from Israeli, Zionist, and Jewish 
agencies, organizations and individuals expressing much concern over [NCWC] 
dispatches from the Holy Land,” the letters were intended to present a unitary American 
Catholic response to inevitable Jewish critiques.
130
 
Despite this preparedness, Jewish critiques were indeed forthcoming, as Zionist 
agencies continued to grasp the potential dangers of an ongoing American Catholic 
propaganda campaign against Israel. In a February memorandum, the AZEC encouraged 
its members to counter negative Catholic reporting whenever possible, observing that 
reports in the press “had an unfavourable effect on Jewish-Catholic relations in the 
United States and the world over. If left unchecked, this development could have the 
most undesirable results both for the State of Israel and for Jewish communities in many 
lands.”131 Leading Jewish American commentators surmised the fairly direct links 
between Vatican policy on Palestine and American Catholic activism. Eliahu Ben-Horin, 
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journalist and advisor to the AZEC on Middle Eastern affairs, observed in July that “the 
Catholic propaganda machine is at the moment engaged in a campaign directed against 
Israel. The campaign derives its inspiration from the Vatican, and its main slogan is the 
internationalization of Jerusalem.”132 J.L. Teller, director of the Office of Information for 
the American Jewish Congress, observed that his “familiarity with the religio-imperialist 
designs of the Vatican in the Middle East” had apprised him of the wider Roman Catholic 
campaign to undermine Israel.
133
 This extended to the American Catholic press, where he 
deemed that a “Catholic campaign of intimidation has gone to the length of attempting to 
intimidate American Jews into siding with the Vatican against Israel.”134 Criticisms of 
Catholic press coverage, in fact, extended to the Israeli government itself, when Foreign 
Minister Moshe Sharett condemned what he called “the growing propaganda with regard 
to the holy places” and urged that “His Holiness, the Pope, whose prayers for peace in 
this country found an echo in the hearts of all of us, will deem it good to examine the 
facts and inform everyone concerned of the truth in order that religious matters and the 
question of holy places should not serve as a source of libellous propaganda against 
us.”135 
Throughout the spring and summer, Jewish papers such as American Hebrew, 
Congress Bulletin, Congress Weekly, Detroit Jewish News, National Jewish Monthly, 
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Reconstructionist, The Rubicon, and others consistently defended Israel‟s right to 
Jerusalem, and its right to regulate the entry of dispossessed Arab refugees, articles 
clearly refuting the Vatican and American Catholicism‟s own claims for the territory.136 
In August, an American Hebrew editorial identified a clear hardening in American 
Catholic attitudes towards Israel in May, just weeks after the Vatican had asked 
American bishops to intensify their campaign for Jerusalem and the refugees. 
A further worsening of the crisis occurred during the second half of May, when  
distinguished Catholic prelates and numerous Catholic periodicals began to  direct 
particular vigorous criticism at Israel. Prior to that time, it was understood  that 
the Catholic Church was interested in securing certain Catholic interests in  the 
Holy Land, especially in the Jerusalem area. Negotiations with the Israeli  
government regarding these interests were proceeding apace, and there was good  
ground to believe that an agreement would be reached. In the course of May,  
Catholic spokesmen appeared to have changed their attitude: they were no longer  
negotiating for limited objectives, they indulged in attacks upon Israel which were  
immoderate, and [they] seemed permeated with a feeling of hostility to the very  
existence of the new State.
137
  
The editorial rhetorically asked why it appeared that leading figures in 
Washington, including Acheson and Truman himself, appeared to be gradually aligning 
with Rome on the Palestine question, suggesting a Vatican-Washington axis at play. “Is it 
the newly strengthened opposition of Catholic circles to Israel that provides an 
explanation,” it concluded, “or has the Catholic Church itself been persuaded by the old 
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opponents of Israel in Washington and London to join the opposition?”138 No such axis 
existed, of course, and the Truman administration, in fact, lent increasing support to Tel 
Aviv‟s ambitions, but such reportage was successful in fomenting sympathy and political 
support from American Jewry. 
The Jewish press buttressed the strident and largely successful American Zionist 
lobby, where groups such as the AZEC, the AJC and the Zionist Organization of America 
(ZOA), along with Truman‟s strong personal relations with a clutch of leading Jewish 
industrialists and political figures, were able to steer Washington‟s „Israel policy‟ in 
directions amenable to Tel Aviv‟s interests.139 Added to this was the support and 
lobbying of the ACPC, the largely Protestant proponent of Israel which had played, as 
recent scholarship contends, a significant role in Washington‟s recognition of Israel in 
1948, and which continued to advocate for the nascent state.
140
 The existence of a vocal 
Christian Zionist lobby (primarily Protestant), in addition to robust Jewish Zionist 
advocacy, underscored the unique demands of American Catholics for Palestine, which 
set Catholics apart from the growing American consensus on the issue, and highlighted 
the link between Vatican policies and the political demands of its faithful in the United 
States.  
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In spite of the intensive and growing American Zionist lobby, or perhaps in part 
because of it, Catholic activism on Palestine continued to broaden throughout the summer 
of 1949. Catholic discontent with American and UN positions on Jerusalem and the 
refugee question were further piqued in June, when it became apparent that the PCC, 
which had relocated to Lausanne, had reached an effective stalemate, decreasing the 
likelihood of a settlement agreeable to the Vatican.
141
 International Catholic ire was also 
aroused by ongoing tensions between Jewish authorities and Catholics in Jerusalem, 
where ongoing disputes over the return of property to the Church served to perpetuate 
fragile relations.  
The barring of Catholics from praying in the Cenacle (the building which 
purportedly contained the room in which the Last Supper was held) in April struck a 
particularly raw nerve. On the evening of 6 June, nearly 40,000 faithful attended a rally 
for the Holy Land at Boston‟s Fenway Park, where Archbishop Richard Cushing led a 
dramatic ceremony from “a majestic high altar, bedecked in white gold and decorated 
with palms, rhododendrons and tall white lilies.” The Brooklyn Tablet described the 
spectacle in detail, which was “heightened by the rich robes of the prelates, the 
Monsignori, and the contrasting colours of the various religious communities.”142 
Referring specifically to the Cenacle incident, Cushing led an impassioned plea for the 
internationalization of city. “How can Christendom, how can universal Catholicism”, he 
thundered, “fail to take a prayerful but passionate interest in the future fate of these 
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sacred places? We pray that those who determine the permanent status of Jerusalem and 
the sacred shrines of Palestine will be conscious that they are not merely the agents of 
men, but they are also instruments in the hands of God.”143 In emphasizing the spiritual, 
rather than political, imperatives for internationalization, Cushing delivered a barely 
concealed censure of Washington‟s growing alignment with Israel. “Please God will they 
put aside the cynicism and the callous indifference to spiritual values shamelessly 
revealed in some recent declarations by political spokesmen of so-called „Christian 
nations‟.” Cushing also invoked ancestral Roman Catholic tenets in demanding action on 
Palestine. “I make this plea as we seek the blessing of the God of Abraham and Isaac and 
Jacob through the sacrament which Christ left us the night before he died when his 
disciples gathered in Jerusalem to receive his testament of love, the charter of his peace,” 
he intoned. “Surely the sublime events of that night have given Jerusalem an international 
character which no political convention should attempt to annul.” At the conclusion of 
Cushing‟s stirring address, the lights of the park were turned off, and there appeared on 
the playing surface “a great crucifix and a heart-shaped rosary chain which spread over 
most of the field.” The men who formed this human rosary carried torches and coloured 
flashlights, “illuminating the crucifix and the Our Father beads in red, the Hail Mary 
beads in green, and the links between in gold”, leading a solemn rendition of the Lord‟s 
Prayer, as the mysteries were enacted on the tableaux. The Fenway rally represented only 
the most stirring of a number of demands from Catholic laity for an international 
Jerusalem. In August, the Queens County chapter of the Catholic War Veterans of 
America presented a petition outlining similar demands to Truman, Trygvie Lie, George 
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Marshall, the American delegation to the UN, and representatives of all of the UN 
member states, bringing the war veteran‟s unique clout to bear on the Palestine 
question.
144
 
The Cenacle incident also prompted another exchange of letters between Truman 
and Spellman, when the Archbishop again pressed the President for guarantees on 
Jerusalem. On 10 June, Spellman expressed disappointment that the admission of Israel 
into the UN, “due in no small degree to the attitude and influence of the United States 
delegation,” was passed without a resolution on Jerusalem, to be determined “at a later 
date” by the PCC in Lausanne.145 In imploring the President to defend “the spiritual 
heritage of millions and millions of American Christians,” he reminded Truman that “the 
„later date‟ and, in fact, the last date that will affect the Christians of this country and of 
the world is now, and the place is Lausanne.” The Roman Catholic Church, Spellman 
continued, sought full territorial internationalization “to prevent ...the sacred scenes of 
Christ‟s life from becoming secularized, confiscated, taxed out of existence and rendered 
inaccessible.” To the point that such concerns might be “alarmist,” Spellman referred 
specifically to “recent, authentic reports received from Jerusalem which showed an 
adverse Israelistic attitude, based on alleged provisions of security, which denied 
Christians- several of them Americans- access to the scene of the Last Supper in the 
Jewish „New City‟ during Holy Week...while Jews were permitted to visit the tomb of 
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David in the same area.”146 Given the precariousness of Catholic interests in Jerusalem, 
Spellman urged action from Truman. “The traditions and interests of millions of 
Christians in the United States and of the entire world, who look to Palestine also as their 
Holy Land, must be articulated at Lausanne by your representative, if the United States is 
not to be regarded by the whole Christian community as having failed them by default.” 
Truman‟s response, penned on 22 June, sought to assuage Spellman‟s concerns by 
assuring the Archbishop that he “firmly believe[d] in the necessity for the international 
guarantee of free access and protection of the Holy Places.”147 It was clear, however, that 
Truman‟s interpretation of the evolving debate leaned decidedly towards a guarantee of 
access to the sacred sites themselves, and not the territorial internationalization sought by 
the Vatican. On this score, Truman reiterated the potential cost of policing such an 
international city, with a figure “in excess of thirty million dollars” estimated by 
“competent officials in this government.”148 Truman concluded that he was in complete 
agreement with Spellman that “it is essential that Christians of the whole world be 
permitted freely to visit the Holy Places in Jerusalem, as soon as normal conditions are 
restored in Palestine. The United States government, through the PCC and the UN, will 
work for the establishment of a regime in Jerusalem which will assure this right.” 
Truman‟s ambiguous response was more cold comfort for New York‟s Archbishop, who 
sought more definitive guarantees of support for the corpus separatum. 
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Truman‟s circumspection, in fact, underscored the need to raise the awareness of 
Catholic laity on the issue. Throughout the summer, a number of eminent American 
bishops rallied to the cause, bolstering their public calls for an international Jerusalem, 
with appeals to their faithful to make their voices heard. The Archbishop of Philadelphia, 
Denis Cardinal Dougherty, implored every adult Catholic in the United States to write to 
their political representatives on Capitol Hill and urge them to support “the points 
proposed by our Holy Father.”149 Dougherty‟s call was echoed by Mooney, Cushing, 
McNicholas, O‟Boyle and a number of other bishops in dioceses nationwide. The 
episcopate‟s call for action resulted in legislators and congressmen being “flooded with 
letters from Catholic citizens.”150  
The deluge of correspondence appeared to pay some dividends. On 22 June, New 
York congressman Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., who had recently completed a tour of 
Palestine, arranged a meeting between the NCWC‟s Mgr. James Griffiths and a group of 
New York congressmen “to discuss the real issues of the Palestine problem.”151 Clearly 
sensing an ally in Roosevelt and the gathered legislators, Griffiths reported to the 
apostolic delegation his “success in supplementing Mr. Roosevelt‟s impressions at [our] 
off the record discussions this afternoon.” By early July, Myron Taylor had added his 
name to those openly advocating for the full internationalization of Jerusalem. In a letter 
to Truman, he advised strenuously that the city “not be divided but placed in international 
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control under the United Nations.”152 Stressing the purely strategic and political 
advantages of such a move, and echoing the views of the French and Italian ambassadors 
to the Holy See, he counselled Truman that “any further segregation of populations not 
friendly within the sacred sections of Palestine will lead to unending strife and constant 
problems for the nations to wrestle with.”153 It was clear that by the late summer of 1949, 
the question of Jerusalem, far from subsiding, was emerging as an increasing problematic 
issue, dividing American and world opinion upon defined lines. 
The International „Catholic Orbit‟ and the Palestine Question 
American Catholic activism came at the head of a growing international Catholic 
campaign for Palestine, sparked in part by the Pope‟s call to action outlined in 
Redemptoris Nostri. On 24 March, the Hague based International Union of Catholic 
Women (IUCW), through its New York secretariat, issued a detailed memorandum to the 
PCC which demanded an international Jerusalem and the repatriation of Arab refugees.
154
 
Speaking for “36 million women and girls in 65 countries and 5 continents,” the petition 
raised specifically female concerns on the Palestine question, connecting demands for the 
repatriation of the refugees to the abuse of women and children languishing in the refugee 
camps of Egypt and southern Palestine. On Jerusalem, IUCW demands echoed a familiar 
refrain: that the city was a uniquely historical crossroads of three faiths, a city in which 
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Roman Catholics held “imprescriptible rights.” The demands of Christian in the Holy 
Land, it concluded, “the states cannot ignore without impairing democratic principles in 
all civilized countries.”155 In May, the Lebanese, French, Brazilian and Argentinian 
episcopates followed the American lead in issuing formal requests, both to their own 
governments and to the UN, for a Palestine settlement amenable to Roman Catholic 
interests.
156
 In June, similar demands were expressed to the British government by the 
Catholic hierarchies of England and Wales. British Catholic demands for Palestine were 
echoed in the same month by the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem, Rev. Weston Henry 
Stewart, whose open letter to Trygve Lie and the PCC was co-signed by the Catholic 
auxiliary bishop of Jerusalem
157
 
In August, in an address before the Irish parliament (the Dáil), Irish Foreign 
Minister Sean MacBride made a “special appeal to the government of Israel” for the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. He invoked the history of persecution endured by both 
Irish and Jews, declaring that “our common suffering from persecution and certain 
similarities in the history of the two races create a special bond of sympathy and 
understanding between the Irish and the Jewish peoples.”158 To MacBride, this historical 
parallel lent particular gravitas to Ireland‟s request. “Speaking from that point of view”, 
he continued, “I venture to make a special appeal to the government of Israel to meet the 
just claims of the Christian world for an international regime guaranteeing the safety of 
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the Holy Places and freedom of access to them.” He later confirmed that Irish diplomats 
in London and Washington were pursuing this end, and assured that his plea was shared 
by the Irish government, which “strongly supported” demands for the 
“internationalization of the whole area of Jerusalem.”159 
In the same month, the official organ of Spanish Catholic Action, Ecclesia, 
announced that the Spanish episcopate, on an appeal directly from the Vatican, would be 
applying pressure on Madrid over the Holy Places. Spanish bishops also implored the 
American and Canadian bishops to “interpose [their] good offices with [their] own 
governments” so that “all of the nations of the Christian orbit could carry out the will of 
Rome.”160 This international “Christian orbit”, conspicuously Roman Catholic in 
composition, had already functioned to curtail Tel Aviv‟s ambitions, when Israel‟s May 
bid for UN membership was accepted only with conditions attached by a clutch of Latin 
and South American states.
161
 Key among their demands was the strict Israeli adherence 
to the principles outlined in the 1947 partition plan, as well as the repatriation of refugees 
displaced by the subsequent conflict, both conditions conforming to the Vatican‟s own 
demands. The Chilean delegation insisted that the resolution to admit Israel explicitly 
mention its obligations to the November 1947 resolution, and an Argentinian motion 
suggested that Israel and the PCC formally “take into account the views of the Holy See” 
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when deciding on the form and extent of an internationalized Jerusalem.
162
 Argentinian 
delegates, in fact, pressed Israeli representative Aubrey Eban over his assurances that the 
papal encyclicals would be used as a guide for Israeli policymakers, taking “careful note” 
of all of Eban‟s pledges.163 On the importance, and imperative, of Israel‟s and the UN‟s 
fulfillment of all of these vows, Catholic representatives were unequivocal. The Lebanese 
ambassador to the UN, Dr. Charles Malik, expressed Catholic sentiment succinctly. 
“What is at stake is not Jerusalem, not the Arabs, not the Jews,” he declared on 18 May, 
“but the quality of Western statesmanship itself.”164  
The mounting international Catholic pressure faced by Israel precipitated a 
concentrated effort by Tel Aviv, in the spring and summer of 1949, to establish direct 
diplomatic relations with the Holy See, in attempts to mitigate the effects of the Catholic 
„orbit‟ ranged against it by negotiating directly with the Vatican secretariat. In early 
August Moshe Sharett, clearly bending to the pressure applied to Israel, forwarded 
Taylor‟s office a range of proposals for Jerusalem.165 If the Vatican was only interested in 
the full internationalization negotiated in 1947, it was not possible, claimed Sharett, as 
this would place 100,000 Jews under an ambiguous international regime, and at risk of 
Arab attacks. He did, however, offer some conciliatory positions: international control 
and supervision of the Holy Places both in Jerusalem and in the rest of the territory 
(including sites in Jewish-dominated „new Jerusalem‟), and the internationalization of the 
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„Old City‟, with Israel providing for its economic and political stability.166 The Vatican, 
obviously sensing a growing upper hand in the dispute, rejected Sharett‟s proposals. 
Tardini explained to James Dunn (American ambassador to Italy) that the Vatican “was 
always cautious and slow in all matters involving recognition of any newly created state,” 
calling the immediate exchange of ambassadors “quite premature”, but he suggested a 
deeper rationale in rejecting both Sharett‟s proposals and the diplomatic recognition of 
Israel.
167
 He stressed that the position of the Vatican remained unchanged from that 
revealed in the encyclicals of 1948 and 1949, which proposed full corpus separatum, an 
“international buffer” for the city “which neither Jew nor Arab could violate.” Tardini 
asserted that “no other solution could be considered adequate by the Holy See,” since the 
present status of Jerusalem teetered on the edge of a renewed Jewish-Arab war.
168
 He 
suggested that as a pretext to serious negotiations, Israel would “do well to settle grave 
unwarranted war damages suffered by Catholic institutions in the Holy Land.”  
On 12 August, Tardini forwarded to Taylor a six-page memo, „The Present 
Situation in Jerusalem‟, which was a “compendium of de facto and de jure considerations 
which according to the Holy See were essential in the just resolution of the Palestine 
question.”169 Its proposals, in short, dismissed any possibility of a compromise on the 
Vatican‟s part, amounting to a loquacious restatement of long-held positions. The memo 
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outlined factors beyond Catholic interests for the internationalization of Jerusalem. These 
included the notion that Jerusalem was a crucial dividing line between Arabs and Jews, 
and that international control for the city would greatly reduce the chances of a war 
sparked by either for absolute control of the city. Tardini also surmised that an 
internationalized Jerusalem would be more economically self-sufficient, not least because 
its stability would draw Catholic pilgrims from around the world, generating significant 
revenues.
170
 On the question of recognizing Israel and entertaining Israeli proposals for 
Jerusalem, Tardini insisted on the establishment of a corpus separatum as a precondition 
to any exchange of ministers. The Vatican clearly preferred allowing Tel Aviv to twist in 
the wind of international Catholic pressure than to provide a direct line of communication 
for resolving disputes.  
Though the Vatican refused to extend formal recognition to Israel, it continued to 
use Mgr. Thomas McMahon as an unofficial envoy in the territory. The American prelate 
had returned to the territory in June, after being named president of the Pontifical Mission 
for Palestine by Pope Pius XII, a position that placed him in charge of Catholic relief 
efforts in the entire region. Though the Vatican refused to confirm or deny rumours that 
McMahon‟s aid mission had a political agenda attached, his meetings with high-ranking 
Israeli officials suggested that he indeed functioned as a papal envoy. At any rate, the 
Israeli government considered him the pope‟s de facto representative. McMahon‟s 
August meetings with Jacob Herzog and Chain Wardie, of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, revealed a growing entrenchment of both Vatican and Israeli positions. In early 
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August, Herzog asked McMahon how Israel could effectively open dialogue with the 
Vatican on Jerusalem and the refugees, particularly in advance of the UN debate on the 
PCC‟s resolutions, set to begin in September. Herzog also discussed with McMahon the 
Israeli „reading‟ of the encyclicals of 1948 and 1949, claiming that he “did not read in 
them the UN partition plan of 1947.”171 McMahon, again revealing the decisive 
American Catholic leadership on the issue, replied that “the Vatican is not a member of 
the UN, but the United States bishops and our own CNEWA have been demanding 
implementation of the 1947 plan, and have never been told by our Holy Father to do 
otherwise.”172 Clearly sensing the upper hand in the debate, he yielded to none of the 
suggestions, already floated by earlier by Sharett, put forward by his Israeli hosts. “I 
gather that the Jews are anxious to get to the Vatican before the September troubles, and 
to present some compromise...all of which will naturally be in their favour,” he reported 
back to the NCWC. “My own idea is that we should not be taken in, for it is certainly a 
policy of „divide et impera.‟ However it is good to know what they are up to. I already 
indicated that they have promised nothing, and that the most critical moment in the whole 
period comes in the September Assembly.” 
The Ostensible Triumph of the „Catholic International‟: The Revival of Corpus 
Separatum 
 
 The PCC‟s proposals for the city, which were contained in the twenty-five article 
„Jerusalem Statute‟, were completed by the committee on 29 August, and were forwarded 
to the UN to be debated in the General Assembly‟s Fourth Session, set to open on 20 
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September. Its recommendations amounted to a compromise between proponents and 
opponents of a corpus separatum for the city, shaped by American desires to offend 
neither camp too severely. Though French PCC delegates were claiming that Vatican and 
French Catholic pressure was making it difficult to agree to anything less than full 
internationalization, they were eventually persuaded to adopt a middle-of-the-road 
approach that still appeared to fulfill the spirit and letter of the 1947 partition plan.
173
 The 
PCC statute called for the establishment of a “permanent international zone” for Greater 
Jerusalem (the territory that was to be a corpus separatum). Though it recognized the city 
as one entity, it delegated civic jurisdiction to the “responsible authorities of the two 
zones”, essentially recognizing Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty in the city. It forbade, 
however, the establishment of national and governmental institutions there, a clear 
challenge to Israel, which had already established branches of government services in the 
city, including the Supreme Court. Immigration quotas were also imposed on the city, in 
an effort to preserve the “demographic equilibrium of the area of Jerusalem.”174 On the 
Holy Places, the statute proposed the appointment of a neutral (neither Israeli nor Arab) 
commissioner, who would ensure free access to sites sacred to Christians, Jews and 
Muslims, and who was authorized to station guards outside of these sites.
175
 It amounted 
to a hybrid scheme intended both to establish a quasi-international character for the city, 
reflective of the 1947 partition plan, and to recognize the reality on the ground, where the 
Israeli and Jordanian presence had become well entrenched.  
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 Though the State Department, whose guidelines constituted the essence of the 
PCC recommendations, believed that the statute represented “a last chance to achieve any 
degree of internationalization”, the plan was not well received either by the Vatican or by 
Israel. Advance copies of the PCC statute were forwarded to the Vatican and the 
American hierarchy, under strict confidence, by Schaefer‟s NCWC UN Office on 10 
September. Tardini immediately surmised that the PCC formula amounted to a significant 
watering down of previous pledges. A day after receiving the report, he requested that 
Schaefer‟s office re-distribute the IUCW pamphlet, „The Rights of Christians in the Holy 
Land‟, to delegates at the General Assembly.176 In her reply to Tardini, Schaefer agreed 
that the pamphlet made a powerful case for the Roman Catholic position, adding that the 
“historical aspects of the pamphlet will be particularly valuable, since the long story of 
the vicissitudes of the Holy Places is proof that their control by single nations has never 
insured either their real freedom or protection.”177  
Within the week, the Vatican again turned to the assistance of the NCWC UN 
Office. On 16 September, Tardini forwarded Schaefer a memo outlining the Vatican‟s 
questions and concerns on a large number of the twenty-five points in the PCC‟s 
„Jerusalem Statute‟.178 Tardini again instructed Schaefer to distribute these Vatican 
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observations to the UN “to make known the mind of the Holy See on this delicate and 
complex problem.” He emphasized the need to target those whose views were amenable 
to the Vatican‟s, “delegates likely to make their own contributions toward an equitable 
solution of the question.”179 To this end, he suggested Roman Catholic delegates such as 
Father Anand Souza of India, Charles Malik of Lebanon, and Dr. Emil Castro of El 
Salvador. 
 Tardini‟s urgency was motivated by a growing apprehension, both in Vatican and 
American Catholic circles, that various interests were conspiring against papal designs, 
and that some Roman allies in the struggle for Palestine were wavering. In early 
September, Tardini informed the NCWC of his concern about certain PCC members 
whom he suspected of harbouring hardened anti-Catholic sentiments. He specifically 
identified Dr. Pablo de Azcárate, principal secretary of the PCC, who he deemed “an 
active Red in the Spanish Civil War,” with “an anti-Catholic record.”180 He requested that 
the NCWC UN Office keep tabs on PCC members, and to forward relevant information 
to Rome. Catholic apprehensions were heightened further on 16 September, when, during 
an off-the-record UN luncheon for press correspondents, Secretary General Trygve Lie 
expressed to Schaefer little hope that “the obstacles in the Jerusalem question would be 
overcome or bypassed by the General Assembly”, hinting at the difficulty in imposing an 
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international regime in a city already controlled by Israel and Jordan.
181
 Lie further 
suggested that the Arab refugee problem would likely be “settled by dollars”, suggesting 
monetary incentives for neighbouring Arab states taking in refugees, in lieu of 
resettlement in Palestine.  
In the same week, Schaefer also surmised that several Latin and South American 
delegates were warming to the PCC‟s compromise statute for Jerusalem, in addition to 
the American and British delegations, which were prepared to support PCC proposals “as 
a basis of discussion.” She reported to Carroll that the Dutch delegation, which “included 
several Catholic members”, and which had supported the corpus separatum concept since 
its inception, was now considering “introducing a resolution which would in effect scrap 
the whole idea of true and proper internationalization, leaving Jerusalem partitioned as it 
is now, merely providing for some sort of mixed commission” to guarantee protection of 
and access to the Holy Places.
182
 She considered the Dutch position particularly important 
for its effect on the positions of Belgium and Luxembourg, both majority Catholic states. 
As “the Benelux countries have a habit of consulting on these matters”, she stated to 
Carroll, she would provide him with “urgent clarification” of the Dutch position.183 
 Roman Catholic efforts to shape UN developments on Palestine in the fall of 1949 
were countered by a robust, vocal and international pro-Israeli lobby, which included the 
largest and most powerful American Zionist groups, such as the AZEC, the AJC and the 
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ZOA.  It also included American Protestant groups such as the ACPC, which favoured 
Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, and which generally supported Israeli positions vis-a-vis 
the Arab world and the UN. These groups largely mirrored the positions of the Israeli 
government itself, which had formally announced to the UN General Assembly on 27 
September that it rejected the PCC‟s „Jerusalem Statute‟. Like the Vatican and American 
Catholics, pro-Israel groups also rejected the PCC‟s proposals for Palestine, but for the 
reason that the proposals demanded unjustified concessions from Tel Aviv.  
The diocesan press, on its part, continued to shine a bright light on the matter, 
pointing up not only Israeli transgressions in the territory, but also the powerful Zionist 
lobby at work in the United States. Throughout September and early October, the 
Brooklyn Tablet reported on an American Zionist pressure campaign, co-ordinated “by 
several thousand orthodox rabbis”, which resulted in a flood of telegrams, letters and 
cards being dispatched to Truman and to American UN delegates from synagogues and 
Jewish organizations.
184
 On 15 October, the paper further reported that a “crusade” was 
about to be organized, calling on American Jewry to take a biblical oath, the 137
th
 psalm 
(„If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem‟), whereby they would “bind themselves in relentless 
opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem.”185 “In 1947”, the paper observed 
wryly, “we found no Zionists calling on American Jewry or on world Jewry for a 
„Biblical Oath‟ to repudiate the internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs. At that 
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time, when the viability of a Jewish state hung in the balance, there was no mystical 
invocation of the phrase, „If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her skill, 
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth...”186 
At the same time, the AZEC issued an appeal to Truman demanding the right of 
Israel to use Jerusalem as its rightful capital. Palestine, the AZEC‟s bulletin, voiced the 
opinion of a majority of Jewish organizations in stating that “the Jews of Jerusalem and 
their political life are not the concern of religious mankind; the Holy Places and their 
security are”, a position which clearly refuted the Vatican‟s stand.187 On 3 November, the 
AZEC and smaller Zionist groups staged a large „Save Jerusalem‟ rally at New York‟s 
Manhattan Center, with leaders unanimously going on record to call for the rejection of 
the PCC plan for Jerusalem, and to “accord the Jews of the Holy City the right to 
participate in the government of Israel and share in its problems and responsibilities.”188 
Speakers included Republican congressman Jacob K. Javits, Democrat congressman 
Emanuel Celler, and prominent Zionist leaders such as Nahum Goldman and Louis 
Lipsky. In turn, speakers emphasized the feasibility of protecting holy sites within a 
Jewish Jerusalem, echoing Tel Aviv‟s rationale. Passionate evocations of Israel‟s historic 
claims to the city, however, echoing the 137
th
 psalm, were also invoked. As Lipsky, 
chairman of the American Zionist Council asserted, “without Jerusalem, Israel would be 
deprived of its spiritual significance.”189 Virtually the whole spectrum of American Jewry 
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was mobilized in the „Save Jerusalem‟ campaign, as Zionist leaders, encouraged by a 
powerful grassroots support among the faithful, organized a focused campaign aimed at 
convincing the American UN delegation to “reject any plan which would sever the New 
City of Jerusalem from Israel.”190 
 To this was added the support of mainline Protestant groups, such as the ACPC, 
represented by influential theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl Voss. In a letter 
to Truman on 19 October, 101 members of the ACPC attacked the PCC proposals as 
“neither desirable nor practicable.” The letter specifically recognized the New City of 
Jerusalem (the section controlled by Israel) as “the natural capital of the State of Israel,” 
adding that “the realization of the universal interest in Jerusalem and the fulfillment of 
the national aspirations of the people of Israel are in no way incompatible.”191 On 3 
November, the same day as the ACPC rally in New York, fifteen prominent Protestant 
and labour leaders forwarded a letter to General Carlos P. Romulo, president of the UN 
General Assembly, and Secretary General Trygve Lie, demanding an “international 
curatorship” for the Holy Places, with an administering commission composed of 
representatives from the Protestant, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Jewish and 
Moslem faiths, and responsible to the UN Security Council. The letter advocated strongly 
for a Jewish Jerusalem, echoing the demands of American Zionist groups, and was 
clearly intended to downplay the Vatican‟s stake in the Holy City, by making a Catholic 
representative only one of five representatives on the commission. Among the 
signatories, which included no Roman Catholics, were Niebuhr, G. Bromley Oxnam, 
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Methodist bishop of New York, Norman B. Nash, Episcopalian bishop of Massachusetts, 
James Patton, president of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union, and Walter 
P. Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers of America.
192
 
 Various elements in the American Catholic Church were well aware of the threat 
that the vociferous and focused „Save Jerusalem‟ lobby presented to the Vatican‟s 
interests in the Holy Land. The Brooklyn Tablet mused openly on the potential of 
American Zionism‟s campaign to “mislead officials of the United States and the United 
Nations into thinking that there was only one point of view on the future of Jerusalem.”193 
“It is possible that officials will get that impression,” it warned, “if the position of 
Catholics is not expressed with comparable vigour and volume.” It reminded readers that 
psalm 137, „If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem‟, was “as much a challenge to the multiple 
millions of Christians throughout the world as it is to Jewry and Islam” and it implored 
Catholics not to “forget Jerusalem, even in this latest hour of struggle between Isaac and 
Ishmael.”194 
 In early November, Catherine Schaefer expressed similar, if less grandiloquent, 
sentiments to Howard Carroll, urging that the NCWC make the struggle for Jerusalem its 
highest priority until the matter was settled at the UN. In alluding to the powerful Zionist 
lobby active in the United States, she observed that “the present position of the United 
States is in favour of the PCC report, but is subject to constructive influence. You will 
remember that the United States position showed itself to be quite susceptible to strong 
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representations of public opinion on previous occasions when the Palestine question was 
discussed.”195 Observing that the American position “would be influential, if not decisive 
to the outcome”, she advised Carroll that a high level representation from the American 
hierarchy to the American government was imperative. “A personal visit to President 
Truman by one of these officials,” she added, “would also help tremendously.” She also 
urged representations from lay Catholic organizations, in line with the Pope Pius XII‟s 
„call to action‟ in Redemptoris Nostri. She cited the recent examples of the French 
Women‟s Catholic Action, which had submitted a petition to the Quai D‟Orsay 
demanding internationalization, and the Catholic Women‟s League of Canada, which had 
passed and published a resolution on the question. In closing, she emphasized to Carroll 
the urgency of the matter. In early November, she added, the National Council of 
Catholic Women of Cuba had wired the Cuban UN delegation making similar requests.
196
 
“If anything is to be done by Catholics,” she stressed, “it is imperative it be done soon. 
The Delegation of Israel is cultivating and consulting with members of various 
delegations, including those from Catholic countries, and giving the impression that its 
plan, which would not provide for the internationalization of Jerusalem, has the support 
and tacit approval of the Vatican. A clear and unequivocal statement of Catholic aims and 
desires in the matter is needed.”197 
 Indeed, the NCWC wasted little time in intensifying its own campaign for as 
international Jerusalem. The day after receiving Schaefer‟s letter, Carroll wrote to Dean 
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Acheson, reminding the Secretary of State of the American bishop‟s statement of 27 
April, which contended that only the creation of a genuine corpus separatum “could 
guarantee the security and preservation of the Holy City, which is venerated by the whole 
civilized world, and which has been contested in blood by Jews and Arabs.”198 The letter, 
which was also forwarded to Warren Austin and other key members of the American UN 
delegation, was clearly intended to highlight American Catholicism‟s continued 
insistence on full corpus separatum, and to counter impressions that the PCC‟s proposals 
were acceptable to the Vatican, as some American Zionist groups had inferred. The next 
week, Carroll cabled the letter directly to the White House.
199
  On 20 November, 
Archbishop Timothy McNicholas of Cincinnati, Chairman of the Administrative Board 
of the NCWC, made his own representation to Truman, asking the President for 
American intervention at this crucial juncture.
200
 Stating that he spoke “for the vast 
majority of American citizens”, he expressed hope that the United States “would remain 
true to its glorious traditions of deep respect for religion and decency, and exercise its 
powerful influence in this matter.” On the lay Catholic front, the NCCM and the NCCW 
also sent telegrams to Truman, Acheson and Austin urging American support for true 
internationalization.
201
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 The role that Schaefer‟s NCWC „UN Office‟ played in the crucial weeks leading 
to the UN decision on the PCC‟s proposals deserve special mention. In early November, 
Schafer and her assistant, Alba Zizzamia, were asked by Carroll, on instructions directly 
from the Vatican, to “draft a memorandum or statement on the Catholic position on 
Jerusalem”, which was to be used by the bishops at their upcoming annual meeting for 
1949.
202
 Domenico Tardini, in fact, suggested that Schaefer‟s eventual memorandum, 
which would be formulated from the principles gleaned from confidential Vatican 
memoranda on Jerusalem and the papal encyclicals, be used as a guide for UN delegates 
from Catholic states. Tardini was concerned that there was “a good deal of confusion 
among UN delegates as to the precise position of the Church on the question”, a situation 
exacerbated by Israeli delegates who claimed that Tel Aviv‟s proposals were amenable to 
the Pope.
203
 To this end, Carroll forwarded Schaefer a confidential Vatican memorandum 
on 5 November, which outlined Pope Pius XII‟s continued insistence on nothing short of 
genuine internationalization.
204
 Schaefer and Zizzamia‟s familiarity with both papal 
positions and the PCC proposals made them ideal, in Carroll‟s view, to draft “an accurate 
statement of our position in the present stage of negotiations.” Just five days later, 
Schaefer returned a pithy yet comprehensive statement, which she admitted both 
Zizzamia and herself had “torn their hair out over, separately and collectively.”205 Schafer 
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also included, for the “strictly confidential information of the bishops”, a copy of the 
Israeli draft proposal for Jerusalem, allowing the NCWC to anticipate Tel Aviv‟s position 
before formulating their own statement. The bishop‟s annual statement for 1949, issued 
on 21 November, bore the indelible mark of both the Vatican‟s memoranda and of 
Schafer and Zizzamia‟s draft.206 The statement, carried widely in the diocesan press, was 
also forwarded to Truman, Austin and members of the American UN delegation. 
 Schaefer‟s office was similarly crucial in surmising where support for the 
„Catholic position‟ did and did not exist among UN delegates, and for the dissemination 
of a range of memoranda and position papers from the NCWC and Vatican sources to 
these delegates. As discussed previously, this included a monitoring of South American 
and European voting intentions on the PCC proposals. By mid-November, with a vote 
just weeks away, Schaefer deigned support from the Brazilian, Peruvian, Cuban, 
Lebanese and Russian delegations, along with the support of a clutch of Arab states (who 
supported a corpus separatum in part to curb Jordanian ambitions).
207
 On 15 November, 
however, she reported that a number of delegations, “even those sympathetic to the 
Catholic point of view”, were warming to the compromise solution proposed by the PCC. 
“Some have said they are starting on the basis of the PCC plan without much enthusiasm 
for it”, she reported to Carroll, “in the hope that by insisting on as much as possible, some 
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form of satisfactory compromise can be restored.”208 Schafer was referring to former 
stalwarts Mexico, Venezuela and Chile, whose positions had modified gradually since the 
late summer. Their positions were likely shaped by the growing scepticism on the 
feasibility of a corpus separatum, and their desire to remain on-side with the United 
States, Britain and Russia on such a key vote. Axel Serup, Legal Advisor for the PCC, 
confirmed Schaefer‟s growing apprehension during an off-the-record luncheon on 15 
November, when he announced that UN priorities were focused squarely on the 
protection of the Holy Sites themselves, and peace between Arab and Jewish factions. 
The UN “had no interest”, he intoned, “in the exercise of sovereignty of civil 
administration.”209 
 In the midst of sagging support, and with just weeks left before a UN decision on 
Jerusalem, the efforts of the Vatican and the American Church reached a new pitch. On 
14 November, the Vatican issued an apostolic exhortation by Pope Pius XII calling upon 
Catholics worldwide to pray for a just settlement for Jerusalem, “a status in accordance 
with the norms of true justice that will remove the dangers of war and will preserve the 
sacred character of those places which are venerated and loved by the followers of Jesus 
Christ.”210 The following day, Cicognani urged the American bishops “to call upon your 
pastors, priests, religious and laity to organize and to participate in public and solemn 
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prayers for this intention.” “I am sure that your Excellency”, he continued, “will find for 
your diocese the means best calculated to acquaint your priests and people with the 
purpose and meaning of this crusade, and to carry out the ardent desire of the Holy 
Father”, a clear attempt to rouse American Catholics on the eve of the UN vote.211 From 
mid-November until the UN vote, various archdiocesan and diocesan associations, 
including those in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Buffalo, engaged in letter-writing 
campaigns urging federal representatives adopt a solution amenable to the Vatican and to 
global Catholicism.
212
 
 Further evidence of the leadership of American Catholics on the question of 
Palestine was highlighted by a request made in October by Vittorio Veronese, president 
of Italian Catholic Action to Carroll, when he requested that the NCWC present his 
organization‟s petition, demanding the full internationalization of Jerusalem and its 
environs, to the UN.
213
 “It is my personal conviction,” Veronese stated, “that at this time 
American Catholics (being closest to the high international assembly and, as free citizens 
of a great country, able to make themselves heard) can do so much so that the rights of 
Christendom may be neither ignored nor go unrecognized. I take leave, therefore , in the 
name of Italian Catholic Action, to ask you, as General Secretary of the NCWC, to be the 
authoritative interpreter of our ardent desire to see the problem of the Land of Jesus 
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solved according to justice.”214 In alluding to the fact that Italy was not a UN member 
state, and again to the singular position of American Catholics in the „Catholic 
international‟, he concluded that “Since Italy is not allowed to express, together with 
other free nations, its opinion on the Palestinian problem, may the American Catholics be 
our spokesmen in this cause, which is common to us all.” On 14 November, Schaefer 
presented the petition to the UN General Assembly. On 5 December, just days before the 
UN vote on Jerusalem, Carroll forwarded copies of the letter to Truman, Acheson and 
Austin, and forwarded dozens more copies to Schaefer for distribution to UN 
delegates.
215
 The statement was also given wide exposure in the diocesan press. In his 
letter to Truman, Carroll informed the president that he spoke “for the Catholics of Italy, 
as well as of the rest of the world.” To Veronese, Carroll expressed that the “joint efforts 
of the Catholics throughout the world may result in a decision which will satisfy our 
collective aspirations.”216  
 The initial six-day debate on the PCC report began on 24 November. Three views 
quickly emerged on the future of Jerusalem: the first, evident in an Australian draft 
resolution which favoured a full corpus separatum, as originally proposed by the 
November 1947 General Assembly resolution; the second, supported by the United 
States, which advocated for the PCC‟s „limited internationalization‟; and a third view, 
proposed by Israel, which pledged the protection of the Holy Places themselves, in line 
with similar proposals that Herzog had earlier presented to the Vatican directly. Yossi 
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Feintuch has noted a growing American ambivalence at this stage of the negotiations, a 
hesitation he traced to two factors. The first was the charting of a course designed to 
offend neither supporters nor detractors of corpus separatum, namely Jews and most 
Protestants groups on one side, and American Catholics (who had mounted an intensive 
pressure campaign of their own since October) on the other.  The second factor in 
Washington‟s vacillation was American underestimation of the Vatican‟s ability to 
coordinate Catholic states into nearly unanimous support for internationalization.
217
 The 
first signs of wavering came on 29 November, when the American delegation chose not 
to participate in a seventeen nation sub-committee formed to study the various proposals. 
This committee, comprised of a large number of Arab states, and also including the 
Soviet Union, adopted the Australian draft resolution on 2 December, thus inviting the 
General Assembly to restate its intention to see a permanent international regime 
established in Jerusalem as a corpus separatum.
218
 On 9 December, the committee‟s 
resolution for a full corpus separatum was placed back on the agenda of the General 
Assembly.  
 Schaefer, who had monitored voting intentions closely for both the American 
Church and the Vatican, expressed concern over the expected votes of several Latin 
American states on the final ballot. On 7 December, Tardini wired a number of these 
delegations, urging them to support a resolution that was in line with the papal 
encyclicals. Spellman, from New York, also called papal nuncios in Latin American 
capitals to make vigorous representations to their governments to stand in line with the 
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Vatican on the Jerusalem vote.
219
 The cardinal‟s intervention appeared to account for a 
shift in the voting intentions of at least four members (Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti and 
Chile), states that had either voted against the Australian resolution, or had abstained 
during a 7 December preliminary ballot. Spellman similarly wired the head of the 
Philippine delegation, Carlos Romulo, upon learning that he was about to cast a „no‟ vote 
on 9 December. Spellman was, in the end, able to secure the support of Romulo in the 
final vote.  
 On 9 December, after ten hours of debate marked by tensions and disagreements, 
the committee voted 35 to 13 to internationalize the Jerusalem area as outlined in the 
1947 partition plan, with support coming from what the NCWC described as “an unusual 
alignment of Latin American, Arab and Soviet bloc states.”220 Notable supporters 
included the Philippines (which Spellman had aggressively courted), the Soviet Union, 
Brazil, Belgium and Luxembourg (which had wavered to the final hours), and a clutch of 
Latin American and Arab states.
221
 Though the United States, Britain and Canada 
opposed the resolution, the outcome was a clear victory for the Vatican and the American 
Church, which had coordinated and cultivated the „Catholic vote‟ at the UN until the final 
hours.
222
 An amendment introduced by El Salvador (which had assured Schaefer of 
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support), defined the internationalized area as Jerusalem and its environs, including 
Bethlehem and other towns, while another amendment, sponsored by the Soviets and 
Lebanon, urged” immediate implementation.”223 Though the outcome was everything the 
Vatican could have realistically hoped for, a Colombian delegate to the PCC, who had 
cited the solidarity of Catholic states as crucial to the outcome, presciently observed that 
“now [was] not the time to stop praying”, an allusion to the difficulties of implementing 
the plan.
224
 
 Just days after the vote, Schaefer composed a short memo outlining the factors 
that had contributed to the success of the Vatican and the international Church in securing 
a corpus separatum for Jerusalem.
225
 The prime factor, she noted, was the solidarity of 
the „Catholic vote‟ in the final tally. Though the chatter at Lake Success and reportage in 
the American mainstream press focused on “Vatican pressure and Roman Catholic 
opinion on Latin American governments”, she observed, less noted was the support of 
„Catholic‟ European states in the final vote. France, Belgium and Luxembourg, “none of 
which were openly committed to full internationalization at the outset”, voted in the 
affirmative, with the Netherlands, another state with a large Catholic population, 
abstaining. European „no‟ votes were registered by predominantly Protestant states, 
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including Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Schaefer also credited the solidarity of 
Arab states, citing Charles Malik‟s efforts, whom she credited with “spearheading” the 
Arab vote, and who was “insistent and articulate in stressing the religious interests and in 
presenting the views of religious leaders, twice referring to the papal encyclicals and 
reading into the record the statement of the Catholic hierarchy of the United States.” His 
“exposition of the thesis of Israel‟s expansionist aims to encompass all of Jerusalem, and 
of the United States‟ consistent support of Israel,” she observed, “had its effect.”226 Israeli 
intransigence had indeed, she opined, contributed to the results of the final vote, in raising 
fears that the General Assembly could be coerced into bending to the will of one member, 
and into accepting “the dangerous precedent of recognizing de facto situations achieved 
by force of arms, or be led by fait accompli tactics.”227 Schaefer‟s reflection on the vote 
shed an interesting light on Spellman‟s role, when she noted that Manila‟s UN 
representative voted in the affirmative, even though Elpidio Quirino, president of the 
Philippines, was “known to be opposed to the full internationalization resolution.” 
Finally, Schaefer credited Soviet bloc votes, which came from the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Czecholsovakia and Byelorussia, as also having carried the day. 
 Schaefer also traced the reactions of various delegations to the vote. On 16 
December, at a UN post-General Assembly meeting for observers and NGO‟s, she noted 
that most attendees shared “a marked reluctance to comment on the internationalization 
vote,” despite attempts by American officials to draw out reactions.228 She observed, 
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however, that there was “less sympathy for the Israeli stand than the [secular] American 
and Jewish press would imply.” Indeed, reactions from Tel Aviv and in Israeli-friendly 
press organs were severely critical of the UN verdict. The New York Post, which had 
been an opponent of internationalization, opined that “In moral terms, the UN decision is 
shabby beyond belief...its religious mask shows through, its legal garments are skimpy, 
its moral grounds non-existent, it unsettles rather than settles the peace, and it lacks any 
method of enforcement.”229 Moshe Sharett called 9 December a “dark day” for the UN, 
and stormed that “Israel [was] aligned against the whole world,” and charged that “three 
powerful forces have joined hands against us- the Arab world, the Communist world and 
the Catholic world.”230 “The „Catholic attitude‟ manifested,” in Sharett‟s view, “a 
fanatical religious dogma, the desire to seek revenge for a nation‟s sin and to settle an 
account of 1900 years standing.”231 Protestant groups such as the ACPC, which had also 
warned against a corpus separatum, joined the chorus of denunciation, criticizing the 
plan as “dangerous and unnecessary.”232 The Nation, a Protestant journal, expressed its 
own hypothesis on Israel‟s defeat. On 17 December, Lillie Schultz, secretary of the 
American Christian Committee for Palestine, and a UN observer, penned an article 
tracing the voting patterns on 9 December to the Vatican‟s pervasive influence. “The 
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immediate problem the UN faces,” she concluded, “is to destroy the Vatican‟s power of 
coercion.”233 
 The full internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs, delivered in no small 
part by the activism of the Vatican and particularly the American Catholic Church, was 
evidence of the vitality of Roman Catholic trans-nationalism on the Palestine question. 
The failure to enlist American support, however, spoke volumes on the inherent limits of 
papal and wider Roman Catholic power. The American position, of course, was based on 
a range of domestic and international considerations, but it also revealed a moderating 
relationship between Truman and the Vatican of Pope Pius XII. And though the vote was 
indeed a symbolic victory for the Roman Catholic „international‟, it would be chimerical, 
as subsequent events would vividly illustrate. 
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Chapter 5 
Final Struggles: Defeat and Retreat of the „Catholic Orbit‟, 1950-1958 
In the immediate aftermath of the December 1949 vote, congratulations abounded 
in the Catholic „orbit‟. The NCWC‟s Howard Carroll praised the “masterful and effective 
championing of Christian interests” of Dr Charles Malik, head of the Lebanese legation 
to the UN, who had read sections of the American bishops statement for 1949 into his 
speech to the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 26 November.
1
 Malik was assured that his 
efforts had “elicited widespread admiration and was a source of deep gratification.” On 3 
January 1950, the Vatican, through Cicognani, expressed its thanks for the activism of the 
American Catholic Church. “I am directed to express the sentiments of profound 
gratitude of the Secretariat of State”, he wrote, “for the cooperation which the entire 
Episcopate of the United States gave in courageously making known and repeating the 
words of the Supreme Pontiff for the defence of the rights of the Church in the land of 
Our Blessed Saviour.”2 In closing, the Vatican reserved special praise for the NCWC and 
the advocacy of Schaefer‟s „UN Office‟. “In a special manner I have been asked to 
express appreciation for the cooperation of the staff of the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference in supplying timely information to the Secretariat of State regarding this 
question, and for the success they attained in their contacts with persons useful in the task 
of making known the point of view of the Holy See.”3 
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The success of international Roman Catholic efforts in gaining a favourable 
resolution on Jerusalem, however, was quickly overshadowed by realities on the ground. 
Israel and Trans-Jordan, in short order, unequivocally rejected a plan that would 
eliminate their sovereignty in the Holy City. Israel quickly moved to establish a more 
permanent national presence in the city, clearly intended to demonstrate its rejection of 
the UN‟s Jerusalem statute. In December of 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had 
already driven home the point that Israel would refuse to comply with the UN‟s 
resolution for an internationalized Jerusalem when he declared that a “Jewish Jerusalem 
[was] an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel,” and if forced to, Jews would 
“sacrifice themselves for [it] no less than Englishmen for London, Russians for Moscow 
or Americans for Washington.”4 An Israeli government memorandum later explained its 
position in more sober tones. “The suggestion that Israel is nothing to Jerusalem and 
Jerusalem is nothing to Israel may appear fantastic, yet this bewildering thesis is 
explicitly held up by the [corpus separatum]. One cannot have it both ways. It is an 
axiom that Israel cannot be regarded as a factor in the implementation of a regime based 
on the disappearance of its own authority.”5 As such, Tel Aviv wasted little time in 
preparing to make Ben-Gurion‟s sentiments a concrete reality. On 16 December, just 
days after the vote, he set 1 January 1950 as the deadline to transfer Israel‟s government 
ministries to Jerusalem, effectively establishing the city as the national capital, despite its 
uncertain legal status. Trans-Jordan‟s King „Abdullah similarly flouted calls to 
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internationalize the city, and he ordered permanent Friday prayers to be held in the city, 
which he attended personally. 
Israeli and Jordanian intractability came at the head of a long list of factors that 
soon militated against Vatican and American Catholic designs for Jerusalem. These 
included the effective end of the Myron Taylor mission in January 1950, the ambiguity of 
Washington‟s Jerusalem policy at the UN, American Protestant support for a Jewish 
Jerusalem, and the withdrawal of Soviet bloc support for the corpus separatum (which 
had been key to securing the December 1949 agreement). Added to this were signs of a 
breakdown in international Catholic solidarity on the Jerusalem question, where some 
states regarded the pursuit of territorial internationalization as just, but ultimately 
unfeasible. 
Throughout 1950, the Vatican could continue to count on the support of American 
Catholics on the issue. The Jerusalem question was re-examined by the Trusteeship 
Council in January, when a committee was convened at Geneva to hammer out a 
functioning resolution, given Israeli and Jordanian reticence. On 5 January, the NCWC‟s 
General Secretary, Howard Carroll, pressed the American delegation at Geneva on its 
Jerusalem policy, anxious to secure assurances that the United States would seek to 
uphold the majority decision of December 1949.
6
 The delegation‟s response confirmed 
Carroll‟s concerns that American support for the status quo at Geneva (ie: corpus 
separatum) would not be forthcoming. The delegation would confirm only that the 
United States would seek a “workable resolution” which would guarantee the protection 
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of the Holy Places, would be acceptable to Israel and Jordan, and satisfy the international 
community‟s desire for peace and stability in the region.7 
Miss Zizzamia Goes to Geneva 
As it became evident that American support for the December 1949 resolution 
could not be counted upon, the importance of making known the „Catholic‟ viewpoint at 
Geneva, and of fomenting support among the various delegations there, became 
increasingly essential. On this score, the NCWC‟s „UN Office‟ dispatched Alba 
Zizzamia, Catherine Schaefer‟s assistant, to the Trusteeship Council‟s Geneva session in 
January 1950. Her mandate was threefold: to keep the American bishops and the Vatican 
apprised of developments on the Jerusalem question, to supply the diocesan press with 
reports, and, where possible, to disseminate the Roman Catholic position among the 
various delegations. Before arriving in Geneva, Zizzamia was received in a private 
audience by Pope Pius XII, where she informed him of her mandate in Geneva. The 
Pope, on his part, thanked the NCWC for its efforts on Jerusalem, an issue which 
remained “a most serious question” both to him personally and to the international 
Church, a sentiment the Pope repeated to his guest throughout the short audience.
8
 
At Geneva, Zizzamia soon discovered that corpus separatum scheme for 
Jerusalem, which had been passed by a UN majority resolution just a month previous, 
was under attack from a number of quarters. Most notably, she sensed the willingness of 
American delegates to support a revised and diminished statute, consistent with the 
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response that Carroll had received earlier in the month. Though the United States had not 
supported the December 1949 agreement, the NCWC had hoped that American delegates, 
in following their own precedent, would support the majority decision. Francis Sayre, 
head of the United States delegation, however, expressed the “unrealizable” nature of the 
corpus separatum, a solution that could not be imposed without force. “It will not mean 
peace,” said Sayre, “and it is not Christian,” a clear challenge to the Roman Catholic 
Church, which remained the most powerful advocate of full internationalization in the 
Christian world.
9
 Sayre also informed Zizzamia that the United States could not support 
any action on Jerusalem that might require the deployment of American troops to the city, 
a concern that Truman had previously communicated to Spellman.
10
 By late January, 
Zizzamia reported to Carroll that American support on maintaining the status quo, or 
even on remaining benign on initiatives to water-down the corpus separatum, was 
unlikely. From this point forward, it was evident that Washington sought a compromise 
solution for Jerusalem, amenable to Israel, despite the milquetoast assurances that 
Truman and officials in the American government had offered Catholic leaders the 
previous year.  
In another report, Zizzamia noted the “unwholesome” atmosphere at Geneva, 
where “the preponderance of sentiment is not favourable to the Catholic viewpoint, which 
is regarded as unrealistic if not unjust.”11 She noted several Latin and South American 
delegates who appeared to favour a revised statute on Jerusalem. The Philippines, which 
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Spellman had notably swayed in the final hours of the December vote, also appeared to 
be shading toward support for a compromise solution. She further noted that Pierre 
Ryckmans, head of the Belgian delegation, “made no attempt to hide his irritation” at 
Catholic attempts to maintain the corpus separatum against all evidence that it could 
succeed. “Why stick to the Assembly resolution of 9 December,” he intoned to Zizzamia, 
“when there is no way at all to implement it?”12 In confidence, a French delegate echoed 
Ryckmans, informing Zizzamia that “if it were not for religious fanaticisms in Jerusalem, 
the question could be settled. The Catholic Church and Catholic organizations are very 
stupid, because if a [compromise solution] is not accepted, there will be nothing.”13 Only 
among Arab delegations did she find unanimous support in maintaining the corpus 
separatum. Iraq‟s Dr. Faizal Jamali assured her that Arab states would not accept a 
watered-down solution. “If the Arabs and the Catholics stick together,” he observed, “we 
can block any other plan,” though he admitted that such a statute “would probably remain 
a dead letter.”14  
 The revised statute that emerged from the Trusteeship Council‟s Geneva session 
did reflect the prevailing spirit among delegates there, namely a compromise statute 
reflective of the realities „on the ground‟. It was a plan inimical to that sought by the 
Vatican and American Catholics, and a revision of a UN majority decision reached just 
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weeks previous. The „Garreau Plan‟, tabled by French representative Roger Garreau, 
proposed that as the area defined by the General Assembly resolution was too extensive 
to be administered by the UN, extraterritoriality be applied only in the area regarded as 
“absolutely essential” to the “protection of the Holy Places and freedom of movement for 
pilgrims.”15 In essence, the Garreau Plan called for the division of the territory of 
Jerusalem into three parts: an Israeli zone under the authority and administration of Israel, 
a Jordanian zone under the authority and administration of Jordan, and an „International 
City‟, under the sole authority and responsibility of a UN appointed „Governor of the 
Holy Places‟.16 
 The Garreau Plan appeared to garner the support of a majority of the delegations 
which opposed the December 1949 resolution, including the United States, and who 
generally favoured a revised scheme acceptable to both Israel and Jordan. The plan also 
received the endorsement of the powerful American Christian Palestine Committee 
(ACPC), the prominent Christian Zionist organization, which had dispatched a „fact 
finding‟ mission to Jerusalem in December and January. At a 19 January press 
conference in New York, the ACPC discussed its “findings on the feasibility of the 
internationalization plan for Jerusalem,” concluding that the corpus separatum idea was 
“dangerous and unnecessary.”17 The statement closely mirrored Sayre‟s position at 
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Geneva in recommending a UN commissioner for the Holy Places, but not territorial 
internationalization, which might necessitate the deployment of American troops. That 
the report was forwarded specifically to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Trusteeship 
Council president Roger Garreau, and Sayre suggests that it was clearly intended to 
influence American policy at Geneva. 
 The ACPC report posed a direct challenge to the Roman Catholic position, which 
continued to advocate for full territorial internationalization. A concerned Zizzamia noted 
to Carroll that not only were ACPC observers active in Geneva, but that they also 
“seemed to be on very good terms with members of the U.S. delegation.”18 Its observers, 
her report continued, were creating the impression among delegates that Roman Catholic 
groups, both in Palestine and abroad, accepted the Garreau Plan as a realistic 
compromise. In private conversation, Garreau himself noted that Cardinal Spellman “had 
been shown the plan,” suggesting that the de facto head of the American Catholic Church 
was not opposed to it. Garreau further suggested that he had received no protest from the 
Vatican, despite Zizzamia‟s insistence that papal policy remained unchanged.19 The 
inclusion of the ACPC report as an enclosure to the Garreau Plan, submitted on 13 
January, and the reading of the report to a session of the Trusteeship Council by Samuel 
Guy Inman, a member of the ACPC‟s „fact finding‟ mission, was evidence of the 
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influence the organization wielded at Geneva.
20
 Inman‟s authority was buttressed by his 
background as an academic and consultant to the State Department, where he was 
credited with shaping Washington‟s “Good Neighbor” policy with Latin and South 
American states. During his address before the Council on 11 February, Inman intimated 
that his organization‟s view was representative of global Christian interests generally, and 
he mentioned “two or three times that the ACPC includes in its membership Catholic 
laymen.”21 “Mr. Inman seems to be creating the impression,” Zizzamia reported to 
Carroll, “that he is speaking for Catholic opinion.” Though Iraq‟s delegate, Faizal Jamali, 
questioned the political slant of the ACPC, charging that it “wore Zionist glasses”, the 
organization was nonetheless successful in shaping the view that Christians, including 
Roman Catholics, were accepting of revisions to the 1949 corpus separatum agreement.
22
 
 The task of correcting that impression at Geneva fell largely to Zizzamia, given 
that the Vatican did not have its own representative at the Trusteeship Council‟s session. 
On 11 February, a draft resolution by the delegate of the Dominican Republic, Max 
Henriquez Urena, to invite a Vatican representative to present his views, was 
withdrawn.
23
 The Council decided, without a vote, that communications with the Holy 
See could be made through regular diplomatic channels, since “some members had 
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accredited diplomats posted there.”24 Waning enthusiasm for full internationalization, 
however, even among „Catholic‟ delegates, meant that Zizzamia would play a heightened 
role in registering papal dissatisfaction with the Garreau Plan.  
 The Vatican did reject the plan, a position based on drafts of it forwarded to Rome 
by Zizzamia. On 30 January, on the very eve of Garreau‟s tabling of the plan, the Vatican 
issued a memorandum outlining its unequivocal position on Jerusalem “as clearly set 
forth in the papal encyclicals.”25 It made clear that the Holy See “had expressed its 
position, and did not accept or approve any compromises,” a statement clearly intended to 
scuttle the idea that Rome was softening its stand. It demanded adherence to the status 
quo, fearing that a plan such as Garreau‟s would create more turmoil than it would 
resolve.
26
 This was followed by a pro memoria of 6 February, which more strenuously 
outlined Vatican objections to the plan. It specifically criticized Garreau‟s notion of 
creating „zones‟ in Jerusalem, charging that it “was not clear how a boundary can be 
viable which crosses the narrow streets and alleys of the Old City, nor how these little 
international islands can escape damage in case of an armed conflict.”27 It concluded that 
the Holy See, in rejecting the plan, “could not share in the responsibility for its 
acceptance on the part of the Trusteeship Council.” In early February, as the Council 
prepared to debate the Garreau Plan, Zizzamia actively disseminated the Vatican‟s stand 
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among various delegations, making clear that any suggestion of a moderated Roman 
Catholic stance was categorically false. 
 Archival evidence suggests that, in the crucial days of debate on the Garreau Plan 
before the Trusteeship Council, Roman Catholic reticence to accept a compromise 
continued to shape the responses of a number of delegations, including that of the United 
States. Yossi Feintuch has observed that the American delegation‟s position on the 
Garreau Plan became increasingly ambiguous and incoherent in late January and early 
February, reflective of a desire to alienate neither opponents nor proponents of a revised 
Jerusalem statute.
28
 In confidence, delegates revealed to Zizzamia that domestic politics 
continued to play a role in American policy. American Catholic and Jewish pressure, 
specifically, appeared to play a role in Washington‟s indeterminate stance. This was 
expressed by France‟s Pierre de Leusse, who intoned that despite “the formidable 
propaganda campaign sponsored by Israel, the money used on the press (and some say 
among the delegates), and the pressure put on the American government, attention will 
have to be paid to Catholic strength in the U.S. Mr. Truman will have to take into account 
the Catholic votes, which are far more numerous than the Jewish votes, although the Jews 
have more money.”29 As such, he predicted that Sayre‟s eventual stance would be one of 
“passing the buck” to avoid political entanglement in the United States.30 Australia‟s John 
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Hood offered similar sentiments, citing “opposing parties” as being central to the UN‟s 
lack of resolve on the Jerusalem question. “This was notably true for the United States,” 
he offered, “which is, after all, „the kingpin‟ in this.”31 
 De Leusse‟s prediction that the American delegation would “pass the buck” on 
the Garreau Plan became a reality on 10 February, when the Trusteeship Council shelved 
the proposal in favour of a Chinese draft resolution calling for the immediate 
consideration of the 1948 Jerusalem Statute, which had called for the complete territorial 
internationalization of the city. A Belgian amendment, introduced by Pierre Ryckmans, 
provided for the implementation of the statute at a date to be determined later, and made 
its enactment subject to the approval of Israel and Trans-Jordan. Secretary of State 
Acheson instructed Sayre to vote for the Statute, provided the Belgian amendments were 
carried, but to follow up his vote with a statement affirming to the Council that it would 
have to pass muster with Israel and Jordan before implementation. It was a stance 
perfectly crafted to offend neither camp of the corpus separatum debate, and bore clear 
signs of being influenced, at least in part, by American domestic politics. That Sayre was 
instructed to abstain on the final vote, for fear of creating an impression that the United 
States had reversed its position against internationalization, epitomized Washington‟s 
sensitivity to the Jerusalem question. 
 Though the defeat of the Garreau Plan could most logically be traced to the 
resolute stand of Arab delegations at Geneva, most notably those of Iraq and Syria, the 
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influence wielded by the Vatican through Catholic delegates and observers was noted in a 
number of quarters. The ACPC‟s Samuel Guy Inman, who had presented the Trusteeship 
Council his organization‟s „report‟ on the feasibility of internationalization, held a late 
February press conference at Lake Success where he bemoaned the revival of the corpus 
separatum, charging that it would “make Jerusalem a centre of international intrigue and 
disorder.”32 Though Inman claimed that American public opinion was solidly behind his 
conclusions, he suggested larger forces were at play in Geneva. “It is no secret,” he 
exclaimed, “that the Vatican wants to create a sub-capital at Jerusalem.”33 Similar 
sentiments were expressed to Zizzamia earlier in the month, when an Israeli 
correspondent, whose wife was attached to the Israeli embassy in Washington, provided 
to her his own interpretation of Vatican policy. “It is no secret the Vatican wants a 
Vatican city in Jerusalem. Since it did not get control as it wished when the commission 
under the old mandate failed to be set up, it hopes to get Catholic control there now 
through the Catholic countries at the UN.”34 He further stated, with some intensity, that 
“the Jerusalem question is a bone in our throat.” The next week, a correspondent for the 
London Observer and the Manchester Guardian, “a Jew,” as Zizzamia indentified him, 
assured her that Belgium‟s Ryckmans “was [representing] the Vatican‟s point of view” at 
Geneva.
35
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 The Trusteeship Council‟s adoption of the Jerusalem Statute on 4 April, therefore, 
barely altered from the December 1949 resolution, appeared to be another example of 
Roman Catholic interests snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. It was again, 
however, a largely illusory triumph, as its practical implementation proved much more 
difficult than its adoption. The Trans-Jordanian election of 11 April created further 
barriers, as its results confirmed the unity of the Eastern and Western banks of the Jordan 
and their merging into one unified state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter 
Jordan). The following day, Jordan notified the UN that it had formally annexed central 
Palestine and eastern Jerusalem (which it had already occupied).
36
 Just five days after the 
incorporation of eastern Jerusalem into Jordan, the Soviet envoy to the UN informed 
Secretary General Trygve Lie that, in light of developments in Jerusalem, Moscow 
considered the Jerusalem Statute unfeasible, and would not continue to support it. It was 
a development that marked the end of the curious Catholic-Arab-Soviet consensus on the 
corpus separatum, placing greater pressure on „Catholic‟ delegations to deliver a 
Jerusalem solution amenable to the Vatican.  
 From April onward, however, given the rapid evolution of circumstances in the 
Holy City, Zizzamia noted a definitive waning of support for carrying out the Jerusalem 
Statute. Though the United States had remained theoretically neutral on the 4 April vote, 
abstaining along with the United Kingdom, evidence suggests that the American 
delegation‟s impatience with the old formula was growing. “It is increasingly evident that 
the U.S. delegation,” noted Zizzamia, “has no interest whatsoever with the total 
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internationalization plan.”37 Sayre, head of the mission, noted privately that he “would be 
willing to cooperate if anyone will show us how internationalization can be put into 
effect, but we feel it is turning back history.” 
 Flagging enthusiasm for internationalization extended beyond the American 
delegation, as Zizzamia reported from Geneva the growing sense of its ultimate futility. 
“Many delegates, in private conversation, admit that internationalization was the best, 
long-run solution,” she noted to Carroll in May, “but they professed utter helplessness as 
to the possibility of realizing it.”38 She also noted that Australia‟s John Hood, who had 
introduced his country‟s favourable resolution regarding internationalization at the 
December 1949 General Assembly session, and who “upheld it with a skilled 
diplomacy”, was to become Australian ambassador to Indonesia. “His successor on the 
Trusteeship Council could, without embarrassment,” she explained, “express a change in 
the Australian position.”39 In addition, she revealed uncertainty on the part of a number of 
South American delegations who could not be counted on if the question, as it appeared it 
would, was returned to the General Assembly. In late April, in a moment of candour, she 
bluntly assessed the situation for Carroll. “The fact that there is a diminishing interest in 
the internationalization of Jerusalem, even among the nations that originally voted for it, 
should be recognized. If the Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council is not 
implemented, which does not at the moment seem at all likely, it should be decided 
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whether it is advisable from the viewpoint of Catholic interests to keep the question open 
and before the United Nations.”40  
Jerusalem Calling: Zionist Parry and Roman Catholic Riposte 
 From the early spring of 1950 onward, the notion of corpus separatum was also 
countered by a slick and well-orchestrated propaganda campaign by the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry, an effort Uri Bialer considers unique in the history of the Ministry.
41
 A special 
division, established in April 1950, was allocated considerable funds, recruited leading 
experts, and was active on the international scene. Its objective was to present Jewish 
Jerusalem to the world as a vital, modern city and an inseparable part of the State of 
Israel. It was also intended to emphasize the historic stake of Judaism in the city, and to 
emphasize the justice and practicality of Israel‟s proposals for solution.42 To this end, the 
division commissioned numerous pamphlets and books for wide distribution to buttress 
Tel Aviv‟s position. Special emissaries were also sent to the capitals of several Latin 
American states to disseminate the Israeli position among nominally pro-Vatican UN 
members, an initiative clearly intended to break up Catholic pro-internationalization 
„bloc‟ which had functioned to keep the corpus separatum alive. Bialer notes, however, 
that Israeli efforts were careful not to engage in open polemics against the Vatican “so as 
not to provoke the other side to launch a vocal attack on us,” evidence that Tel Aviv 
continued to regard the Vatican, and its international allies, as a viable threat. 
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 Israeli efforts to forge a compromise on Jerusalem were outlined in a 
memorandum detailing new proposals for the city, submitted on 26 May to the 
Trusteeship Council by Abba Eban, head of the Israeli mission to the UN.
43
 The 16-page 
document outlined Tel Aviv‟s flexible new proposals for the city, which would have seen 
the internationalization of the immediate zone surrounding the Old City‟s sacred sites, 
and would allow for the establishment of a UN commissioner for the zone, who “would 
be wholly separate” from Israeli and Jordanian control, and who would enjoy “a certain 
degree of extraterritoriality so far as the Holy Places were concerned...[while] the 
authority of the occupying governments would be more or less withdrawn.”44 It was an 
arrangement giving the UN full territorial control of the Holy Sites. While not the corpus 
separatum agreed upon in 1949, the proposals were evidence of Israeli attempts to 
negotiate a conciliatory, yet favourable, resolution. In Garreau‟s view, the proposals 
showed “an understanding and benevolent attitude towards the legitimate demands of all 
parties concerned,” and represented “a considerable advance towards a settlement.”45 
 In the United States, public opinion appeared to be growing in favour of a 
compromise solution along the lines of that proposed by Israel. The ACPC, on its part, 
offered its endorsement of Eban‟s proposal on 28 May. Just days before, Truman and 
Acheson received petitions, signed by almost 300 prominent Americans, which urged the 
United States to back the recent Israeli proposals. Signatories included a cross-section of 
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Protestant leaders, including bishops of the Episcopal Church (led by New York‟s 
Episcopalian bishop, Charles K. Gilbert), as well as Methodist, Unitarian and United 
Brethren leaders. Other signatories included college presidents, academics, Nobel Prize 
laureates and other notable figures. On 2 June, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt added her own 
support to the petition, a symbolic endorsement given President Roosevelt‟s close 
relationship with American Catholic leaders.
46
 Also in support were several leading 
newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, which provided 
supportive editorials on the Israeli proposals. The following week, Carroll assured 
Cicognani that the NCWC was preparing to counter the statement, but his response 
indicated a growing pessimism in American Catholic circles. “The NCWC is, of course, 
preparing a critique of the statement for the press,” he informed the apostolic delegate, 
“but it is too much to expect, even with our best efforts, that the attitude of the United 
States government will change radically. From our point of view it seems that only the 
steadfast and continuing support of Catholic nations which are members of the UN can 
assure the acceptance of the position of the Holy See.”47 
 Carroll‟s dour appraisal, however, did little to modify the Vatican line on 
Jerusalem. Nor did the growing consensus on a compromise to the corpus separatum, 
bolstered by Eban‟s articulate proposal, alter the Vatican‟s insistence on the original 
formula. To underscore this, Cicognani re-issued the pro memoria of 6 February to the 
NCWC the day after Eban‟s proposal was circulated at Geneva. On 31 May, the 
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Vatican‟s insistence on the original plan was outlined in the New York Times.48 Quoting 
“well informed Vatican circles”, the article outlined papal opposition to the notion of 
Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty in Jerusalem which, given the existing proposal “could be 
broken in the event that hostilities were resumed,” an event the Vatican considered likely. 
In essence, the Vatican considered the problem juridical, and not political, given that the 
corpus separatum would create an international zone in a space that was not legitimately 
Israeli or Jordanian to begin with. The December 1949 agreement, it concluded, “did not 
affect the principle of the nationality of Jerusalem, since no one disputes that principle. 
The question is one of administration and not of nationality.”49 
 On 12 June, the Trusteeship Council began its seventh session in an effort to 
formulate a report to the General Assembly recommending a solution to the Jerusalem 
question. Zizzamia noted that the session was held “in an atmosphere created by an 
extremely skilful Israeli propaganda and pressure campaign.”50 In light of this, Zizzamia 
suggested a two-pronged strategy in defence of the Vatican‟s interests. She advised 
“concerted action in on the part of the Catholic press in UN member states before the 
(December) General Assembly to counteract Israeli propaganda. One tactic might be a 
critical attitude, based on reasoned judgement however, of the compromise plans.” She 
also advised, despite flagging support for the corpus separatum, “political pressure in the 
various countries, and especially in the United States.” Within days of the session 
opening, it appeared that Zizzamia‟s suggested strategies would have some time to 
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germinate. On 14 June, just two days after convening, the Trusteeship Council resolved 
unanimously to inform the General Assembly of its inability to ensure the 
implementation of the Jerusalem Statute “either by force” or by “moral authority.”51 
Garreau, as the Council president, admitted that “the results of his mission had proved 
disappointing and that the implementation of the statute would seem to be seriously 
compromised under present conditions.”52 “In other words”, Zizzamia‟s report for the 
diocesan press noted wryly, “the Trusteeship Council has accomplished virtually 
nothing.”53 
 The failure of the Trusteeship Council to resolve the Jerusalem conundrum did, 
however, allow time for the American Church to shape Catholic and wider opinion on the 
question, as well as to mount a more coherent pressure campaign in advance of the 
December meeting of the General Assembly. Optimism at the NCWC, however, was not 
running particularly high in the summer of 1950. In June, at Cicognani‟s behest, Carroll 
ordered a critique of the ACPC statement in support of a Jewish Jerusalem, though he 
cautioned the apostolic delegate that “it is too much to expect, even with our best efforts, 
that the attitude of the United States government will change radically.”54 Carroll place 
greater hope in Roman Catholic delegates at the UN, advising Cicognani that “from our 
point of view, it seems that only the steadfast and continuing support of Catholic nations 
which are members of the UN can assure the acceptance of the position of the Holy 
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See.”55 On this score, the Holy See requested regular appraisals of developments both at 
the UN and in the United States, which the NCWC forwarded throughout the summer.
56
 
 On the issue of shaping public discourse, the NCWC continued to defend the 
integrity of the corpus separatum, despite the deferral of debate on the question at the 
UN. Throughout the summer, the diocesan press, fed by reports from Schaefer and 
Zizzamia, highlighted the merits of full internationalization as well as the potential 
pitfalls of the various compromise schemes that surfaced in the first half of 1950.
57
 In 
June, Carroll assured that the views of the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem (bishop Tiran 
Nersoyan), who had penned an eloquent and persuasive defence of the Vatican‟s position 
on Jerusalem, were given ample coverage in the diocesan papers. In order to balance 
what Catholics perceived as one-sided coverage in the mainstream secular press (and 
which generally favoured a compromise solution), Carroll also advocated for Catholic 
views to be aired in mainstream papers. On 4 June, the New York Herald Tribune carried 
the statement of Jerusalem‟s bishop Nersoyan, which had been forwarded to the paper by 
Carroll.
58
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In a bid to shape elite opinion, Catholic academic journals also highlighted the 
imperative for an internationalized Jerusalem. The March 1950 issue of Thought, a 
quarterly published by Fordham University, featured an article by Constantine 
Rauckaskas, a professor of international law at the school, which carefully outlined the 
historical evolution of the Jerusalem question.
59
 Rauckaskas argued that the purpose of 
internationalization was not merely to protect the Holy Places from destruction and to 
guarantee access to them, as compromise solutions had suggested, but to “preserve the 
future peace in granting such places an administration which would be above the interest 
of any church or religion and above the particular interest of any nation or state.”60 
Rauckaskas opined that the preservation of the corpus separatum was essential to the 
maintenance of regional peace which, he concluded, should be the UN‟s primary motive. 
In July The Jurist, published the Catholic University of America‟s Faculty of Law, 
carried an article by law professor Peter Berger which argued for the maintenance of the 
corpus separatum.
61
 In a stark and juridical analysis, Berger delineated the case for an 
internationalized Jerusalem, arguing its justice in legal, historical, moral and practical 
terms. The piece was clearly intended to re-assert the case for corpus separatum amid the 
muddying waters of the various compromise solutions floated in the spring of 1950. It 
was also intended to confirm that the Vatican and American Catholics accepted nothing 
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less than what was pledged in December 1949, despite chatter that a practical 
compromise was acceptable in Roman Catholic circles. At Carroll‟s behest, Schaefer 
distributed Berger‟s article to all the UN delegations as a reiteration of the Vatican‟s 
stand.
62
 
As the December General Assembly session drew nearer, however, American 
Catholic optimism on securing a favourable Jerusalem resolution was clearly waning, 
battered by a number of headwinds. The first of these was Israeli intransigence in 
claiming the city for the new state, despite its indeterminate legal status. In September, 
Schaefer noted the “fait accompli” attitude of Israeli delegates and officials at the UN, 
who “assumed that Jerusalem will be, and for all practical purposes was, a part of 
Israel.”63 Abba Eban, Israel‟s ambassador to the UN, confirmed Schaefer‟s sentiment in 
the September issue of United Nations World, the body‟s semi-official journal.64 In it, 
Eban outlined the inherent historic and moral righteousness of a Jewish Jerusalem, the 
negation of which would be anti-democratic and against the wishes of the city‟s own 
residents. The corpus separatum, which he charged was “conceived in disregard of the 
wishes and interests of Jerusalem‟s population,” was “courageously discarded by the 
Trusteeship Council and returned to the General Assembly unimplemented.” Eban 
concluded that “democratic principles, which had a compulsion of their own, could least 
of all be set aside in the city of Jerusalem, in which the ideal of government by consent is 
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expressed in the daily practice of a proud and constructive national life.”65 That Eban‟s 
notions were steadily garnering acceptance among UN delegates was, by September, 
clear to leading figures in the NCWC. 
A second headwind faced by the American Catholic lobby were the pointed 
critiques of that lobby itself by figures in the American liberal and academic 
establishment. The appearance of Paul Blanshard‟s American Freedom and Catholic 
Power late in 1949 sparked a growing critique of the American Catholic political lobby, 
and of the Vatican‟s attempts to shape Washington‟s policies through its American 
faithful.
66
 In the book Blanshard, a lawyer and assistant editor of the left-leaning weekly 
The Nation, asserted that the United States had a “Catholic problem” in that the American 
Catholic Church represented “an undemocratic system of alien control.” The critiques 
levelled by Blanshard appeared to pose a direct challenge to the growing political 
stridency of the American bishops and various organs of the Church. Though the work 
often barely concealed its nativist and anti-Catholic leanings, it received acclaim from a 
number of leading liberal intellectuals, including John Dewey, Albert Einstein and 
Bertrand Russell. Far from an obscure polemic, the work sold nearly 300,000 copies in its 
first year, remaining on the New York Times bestseller list for seven months, making it, as 
John T. McGreevy has noted, “one of the most unusual bestsellers of 1949-1950.”67 
Though several leading Catholic figures, including John Courtney Murray, Robert C. 
Hartnett and James M. O‟Neill, offered rebuttals to Blanshard‟s charges, none of these 
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responses could undo the disrepute and sense of suspicion which had been draped over 
American Catholic political activism.
68
  
Blanshard‟s notions were buttressed later in 1950 by Pierre Van Paassen, a 
journalist and Unitarian minister whose book Jerusalem Calling levelled specific charges 
against the Vatican and the American Catholic lobby on the Holy City.
69
 Apart from 
surveying the history of Catholic anti-Semitism, Van Paassen “illuminate[d]” American 
Catholicism‟s attempts to “subvert the triumph of Zionism through international political 
activism.”70 He charged that “the struggle of Rome against Israel goes on, and will be 
intensified as papal nuncios negotiate with Arab princes, and General Franco, to devise 
ways and means to prevent the new community of Israel from assuming a position and 
playing a role of importance in the international concert.”71 Van Paassen also claimed to 
unveil the “machinations” of the American Catholic political lobby. “That the Vatican is 
out to gain control of the Holy Places,” he charged, 
...became evident during the debates on the internationalization of Jerusalem at  
the UN, when Cardinal Spellman of New York, throwing all restraint to the  wind, 
telegraphed papal nuncios in various South American republics to insist  to the 
governments to which they are accredited that they must take an   
uncompromising stand at Lake Success for the internationalization of the Holy  
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City. Internationalization in these circumstances would have been implemented   
by an international commission made up chiefly of Catholic South Americans,  
probably with a Monsignor at the head.”72 
 
Though a number of Van Paassen‟s claims bordered on the fantastical, Catherine 
Schaefer warned the NCWC that the book would likely “stir up considerable anti-
Catholic sentiment, particularly among the Jews.
73
 The charge of official anti-Semitism 
by the Church will be thrown around alot, I imagine. We should be prepared to meet the 
attacks that will come.”74 American Catholic attempts to negate criticisms, however, 
couldn‟t erase suspicions aroused by works such as Blanshard‟s and Van Paassen‟s. 
 The third headwind faced by American Catholic efforts to secure a Jerusalem 
Statute amenable to the Vatican was the growing convergence between American Jews, 
Protestants and liberals for a Jewish Jerusalem. It was a development which essentially 
ranged Catholics against a majority of their fellow citizens on the corpus separatum, 
underscoring the Roman inspiration of the American Catholic position. Added to this 
convergence was Washington‟s growing desire for an “implementable” or “workable” 
solution for Jerusalem, consistent with Truman‟s position as outlined to Spellman the 
previous summer. The president‟s growing personal commitment to Israel and its 
interests, moreover, also boded ill for Catholic interests. In October, in a confidential 
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memorandum to the NCWC, Schaefer noted this confluence of forces ranged against 
Vatican and American Catholic policy for Jerusalem. Chief among these oppositional 
forces, she noted, was Washington‟s insistence on a compromise solution amenable to 
Israel and Jordan, a policy which produced “the weak and vacillating positions of other 
countries” on the Jerusalem question.75 She highlighted the domestic factor in 
Washington‟s position, stating that “American policy on this question is undoubtedly 
made at the White House- that is, it is strictly political in a domestic sense,” and noting 
Truman‟s “responsiveness to the cohesive vote and pressure of five million Jews.”76 
“This policy,” she continued, “is helped along by the constant lobbying of Israeli and 
American Jews, and by the attitude of the (Protestant) World Council of Churches, and 
by the press in the United States which constantly infers that the Vatican has changed its 
point of view and is willing to „settle‟ for less than full internationalization.” To correct 
this impression, she concluded to Carroll, “the first responsibility lies on Catholics in the 
United States.”77 
Schaefer‟s UN Office Orchestrates a Final Push 
 Schaefer‟s memo amounted to a call to action prior to the upcoming General 
Assembly session, preparing the American Catholic lobby for yet another push to secure 
the Vatican‟s positions at the UN. On 22 October, she suggested an immediate and 
national program of action, given that the Jerusalem question was weeks away from 
appearing on the General Assembly‟s agenda. To this end, she suggested a concentrated 
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program of political and popular pressure by the American Catholic Church. Schaefer 
continued to believe that pressure on Washington, which was a lynch-pin on the 
Jerusalem question, could yield results if American Catholics mounted a concentrated 
campaign. Even down to this late stage, she intimated that pressure on Washington and 
the American delegation to the UN might yet bear fruit. “If, through United States 
pressure Israel could still be made willing to yield that portion of the Jerusalem area it 
now occupies, the task of persuading Jordan...to yield the Old City to international 
control would be simplified.”78 To Schaefer, the key to exerting pressure on Israel was to 
exert pressure on Washington, which exercised more financial and diplomatic clout in Tel 
Aviv than any other power.  
 In terms of concrete plans, Schaefer urged a multi-pronged pressure campaign. 
She recommended that organizations such as the National Council for Catholic Women 
(NCCW) and the National Council for Catholic Men (NCCM) pass resolutions 
demanding that the Truman administration defend the corpus separatum “as was 
promised in the Democratic Party platform of 1948.”79 She suggested that such 
resolutions “should be utilized on the local and state scale, as well as nationally, by 
means of group and individual letter writing to political figures, newspapers, etc.” On 
mobilizing parishioners, she lamented that “the Catholic public remains somewhat 
ignorant of the Palestine problem and the problem of Jerusalem. Could there not be some 
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sermons very soon in every diocese followed by prayers particularly for Jerusalem? The 
question will come up in the General Assembly in two weeks. Time is of the essence.”80 
 Within days of Schaefer‟s call to action, and just weeks before the General 
Assembly session to determine the fate of Jerusalem, the various organs of the American 
Church again began to mobilize. The NCCW, at its annual convention in October, 
produced a resolution again calling for the full internationalization of Jerusalem. The 
statement demanded that the UN honour its pledge on the Holy City which had, until 
then, been “flouted and ignored.”81 It urged the world body to implement its 1949 
resolution “so that history may not accuse it of using its pledge to further special political 
and territorial aims.” It specifically called on Washington to “respect not only the deep 
convictions and desires which so many of its citizens hold in common with peoples 
throughout the world, but also to respect the decisions and honour the UN and cooperate 
actively in the UN to this end.”82 The NCCW, founded specifically to “give Catholic 
women of the country a common voice and an instrument for collective action,” also 
heeded Schaefer‟s call to write to local and state representatives to press for a favourable 
resolution. On 6 November, copies of the NCCW resolution were forwarded to President 
Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Warren Austin, head of the American 
delegation at the UN.
83
 On the same day, the diocesan press reported on the urgent appeal 
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of the Paris-based Comité de Sauvegarde des Lieux Saints (Committee for the 
Safeguarding of the Holy Places) for the immediate implementation of the corpus 
separatum, reportage intended to highlight the international scope of Catholic appeals for 
Jerusalem.
84
 The next week, Schaefer ordered translations of the French statement made 
for distribution to every delegation at the UN.
85
 In thanking Schaefer for her efforts, the 
Committee‟s president, Comte de la Baume, assured her that the NCWC‟s efforts “were 
in perfect harmony with the appeal of the Catholics of France.”86 
 The American bishops, through the coordination of the NCWC, also stepped up 
their campaign in the fall of 1950. In October, the NCWC augmented its tack on 
internationalization by demanding that any loan from Washington to Tel Aviv be 
contingent upon Israel‟s acquiescence on the Jerusalem question. Based on information 
from Alexander Mombelli, the NCWC‟s correspondent in Jerusalem, that the Israeli state 
was “near bankruptcy”, and that the American government was about to release a “multi-
million dollar loan” to Tel Aviv, the bishops demanded that “the UN‟s plan for 
internationalization be a condition of American financial aid to the Israeli government.”87 
The statement continued that “American Catholics do not want to be a party to an 
agreement which would thwart their deep interests in safeguarding the holiest Christian 
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sites.” On 11 October, the statement was forwarded to Truman and to the American 
delegation at the UN.
88
 
 The American bishops also sought to raise the issue as widely as possible 
throughout the dioceses as the General Assembly session drew near. In early November, 
the NCWC ordered the immediate distribution of a memo, composed by Schaefer, to the 
entire episcopate.
89
 The document outlined the history of the Jerusalem question at the 
UN, emphasizing the Holy See‟s unchanged position on internationalization, and was 
intended to serve as a template for sermons on the issue for the remaining Sundays of the 
month. On 17 November, Domenico Tardini thanked Schaefer for her efforts, confident 
that “the memo will serve to enlighten North American Catholics regarding the present 
state of the question, and the grave motives for which the Holy See has pronounced itself 
in favour of the true and proper internationalization of the City as the only means to save 
Jerusalem and the Holy Places in the present violent conflict between Arabs and Jews.”90 
This was augmented the same week by the translation and distribution, at the 
behest of Chicago‟s Cardinal Samuel Stritch, of an Osservatore Romano editorial which 
re-stated the Holy See‟s resolute position on the issue. Stritch wanted “the mind of the 
Holy See to be known in as many quarters as possible”, and urged the bishops to forward 
copies to all diocesan priests.
91
 He also requested that the NCWC “forward the piece to 
the secular press at the earliest moment” in an effort to make known “the authentic 
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position of the Vatican with regard to the internationalization of the Jerusalem area.”92 In 
forwarding the editorial (which appeared in the Osservatore Romano on 29 November), 
Carroll further urged “their Excellencies to use whatever resources available to them to 
have the position of the Holy See widely and accurately understood.”93 
At the UN, Schaefer was tasked with keeping the NCWC, and by extension the 
Holy See, apprised of developments on the Jerusalem question. An off-the-record 
conversation with John Ross, the American representative on the Ad Hoc political 
committee that would consider the Jerusalem question, however, confirmed some of 
Schaefer‟s longstanding apprehensions.94 Ross reiterated to Schaefer the notion that the 
United States could only back a solution acceptable to Israel and Jordan. Though he 
favoured a scheme that would protect Christian, Jewish and Muslim shrines, he asserted 
that “it would be idle to think of any scheme of internationalization involving a corpus 
separatum.” “That is absolutely out of the question,” he emphasized, adding that he “had 
never trusted that scheme anyway” as it contained “that fancy Latin phrase.”95 
Given the diminishing hope that the American delegation would back a Jerusalem 
solution amenable to the Vatican and American Catholics, Schaefer attempted to 
determine where pockets of support for the corpus separatum did lie. On 13 November, 
she was informed by Iraq‟s Dr. Faizal Jamali that the Arab nations which had firmly 
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backed the scheme in 1949 would remain in support. On the same day, Cuba‟s Francisco 
Ichaso confirmed that the Latin American delegations which had supported the plan 
remained firm in their support. He added, confidentially, that “even Uruguay, which had 
campaigned violently against the resolution last year, would stand for territorial 
internationalization this year.”96 Specifically, Ichaso assured Schaefer that the Holy See 
could expect the support of Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador. Though 
the Soviet-Arab-Catholic bloc that had delivered the corpus separatum in 1949 was no 
longer, it appeared that core support among Arab and Catholic states remained firm. On 
15 November, Schaefer apprised Carroll of these developments, which were forwarded to 
the apostolic delegate the following day.
97
 
On 7 December 1950, the General Assembly‟s Ad Hoc political committee began 
its review of the Jerusalem question. Central to the committee‟s objective was to devise a 
functioning agreement which reflected the realities in the city, and was acceptable to the 
world community. In short order, Sweden‟s Erik Boheman introduced a Swedish-Dutch 
proposal which amounted to a repudiation of the corpus separatum, proposing provisions 
to “ensure the international protection of the spiritual and religious interests of the world 
community.”98 In addition, it proposed a UN appointed commissioner to administer the 
Holy Places, though one who would be under the authority of the Israeli and Jordanian 
governments. In effect, the resolution amounted to a severe watering-down, if not recall, 
of the December 1949 General Assembly resolution, and represented a rejection of the 
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Vatican‟s designs for the city, which American Catholics had so faithfully advocated for 
nearly three years.  
In the desperate days leading to a vote, American Catholic efforts to secure a 
corpus separatum reached a nadir. Catholic efforts in this crucial stretch were spurred 
further by the submission, on 29 November, of a petition from over one thousand 
American educators and Protestant seminary professors “instructing” the Truman 
administration, and the American delegation at the UN, to “take the initiative in settling 
the problem by international supervision of the Holy Places, leaving political sovereignty 
in the hands of the Israeli and Jordanian governments.”99 In the same week, Schaefer 
ordered the translation and distribution of a pro-internationalization statement of Italian 
Catholic Action to UN delegations, both as a means of countering the „Protestant 
statement‟ and of reiterating the Roman Catholic position on the question. She further 
assured the association‟s president, Vittorio Veronese, that the statement would receive 
“maximum exposure” in the American diocesan press, which carried the statement 
widely during the week of 11 December.
100
 The statement, along with that of the French 
Committee for the Safeguarding of the Holy Places, was also carried on NCWC radio 
broadcasts in the first weeks of December, in a bid to emphasize the international 
character of Roman Catholic demands for Jerusalem. In the same week Martin Work, 
national secretary of the NCCM, forwarded his organization‟s petition to preserve the 
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territorial internationalization of Jerusalem to Dean Acheson and Warren Austin.
101
 In 
speaking for the “deepest interests and sentiment for the Holy Places shared by millions 
of co-religionists in the United States,” the brief statement clearly, if implicitly, linked the 
potential voting power of twenty million American Catholics with demands to preserve 
the corpus separatum for Jerusalem.
102
  
By 11 December, as the General Assembly entered the crucial week in deciding 
the fate of Jerusalem, open disproval of the Swedish-Dutch resolution quickly emerged. 
Arab and „Catholic‟ delegations, in particular, rightly regarded the plan as the death knell 
of the December 1949 agreement. Lebanon‟s Dr. Charles Malik, who had carried the 
torch for Catholic interests on the floor of the General Assembly in 1949, again 
advocated for the preservation past resolutions on Jerusalem. On that Monday, Malik, at 
the request of his delegation, made two interventions against the Swedish-Dutch 
proposal, arguing that it essentially discarded the majority resolutions passed by the same 
assembly in 1947, 1948 and 1949. He was refuted by Israel‟s Abba Eban, who urged 
delegates to accept the Swedish-Dutch proposal lest “the opportunity for any form of 
internationalization might pass.”103 The following day Malik, who had assured Schaefer 
that he had a strategy “up his sleeve” for the General Assembly session, read into the 
record a number of statements which Schaefer had previously distributed to delegates 
through her office. These included the statements of the French Committee of the 
Safeguarding of the Holy Places as well as the Osservatore Romano editorial of 29 
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November.
104
 He further requested that the French statement be distributed as an official 
document of the General Assembly. In addition, Malik read into the record the America 
editorial of 17 June 1950 which had forcefully argued for a corpus separatum as the only 
means to preserve peace and stability in the region. In stressing that “religious interests 
had been overlooked in the political and national rivalries” in the city, he lamented the 
resulting “uneasy peace prevailing in Jerusalem and the whole of Palestine.”105 Israel‟s 
Eban, who had emerged as Malik‟s adversary in these final days, offered a stern rebuttal, 
highlighting a multitude of Christian leaders who backed a “realistic approach” on 
Jerusalem. Eban specifically read into the record a statement of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch of Jerusalem, who favoured the Swedish-Dutch proposal, as well as the 
American „Protestant statement‟ of 30 November, which represented Episcopal, 
Methodist and Evangelical leaders.
106
 He stated that “those who were interested in 
religious peace might well consider that [full internationalization] might well lead to 
religious schism and division.” He further deemed Malik‟s position “wishful thinking,” 
and unreflective of “a general shift of opinion since 1948 and 1949.” “Let it be forever 
recorded that a practical solution (Sweden‟s) came before the General Assembly in 1950 
and Israel gave it support,” he concluded. “Historians will regard it as a turning point in 
history.”107 
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Though the Swedish-Dutch resolution would, in short order, be relegated to the 
dustbin of history, the debate surrounding it did produce a Belgian resolution that sought 
to appease both supporters and detractors of the corpus separatum. Submitted on 12 
December, the resolution called for the appointment of a four-person panel to consult 
with Israel, Jordan and other interested parties to ascertain “the conditions of settlement 
capable of ensuring the effective protection...of the Holy Places.”108 The committee was 
to report its findings at the General Assembly‟s Sixth Session the following year. 
Belgium also accepted, at the insistence of Malik and other members of the Lebanese 
delegation, an amendment which urged the committee to keep in mind the UN‟s three 
successive resolutions on Jerusalem (all of which preserved territorial 
internationalization).Though the Belgian proposal didn‟t assure the survival of the corpus 
separatum, it kept alive the possibility of its implementation at a later date, enough to 
give it support from Catholic quarters. On 13 December, the Ad Hoc Political Committee 
voted to adopt the Belgian proposal. As State Department files have revealed, Cardinal 
Spellman again played a role in last minute negotiations, urging a number of delegations 
to back the Belgian scheme, and “exerting a decisive influence against the Swedish draft 
resolution.”109  
The General Assembly voted on the Belgian resolution on 15 December. The 
results of the vote, which failed to produce the two-thirds majority required for adoption, 
revealed the entrenched clefts between those supporting and those opposing the corpus 
separatum. In the end, a large clutch of South American states (Chile, Colombia, 
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Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) supported the proposal, evidence of the 
persistence of the „Catholic bloc‟ on the Jerusalem question. France, which appeared non-
committal in the final days, also supported the Belgian proposal. Though the American 
delegation voted against the resolution, Yossi Feintuch contends that the delegation‟s 
position was strongly tempered by passions aroused by the question in the United States. 
As a result, the American delegation was reluctant to overtly back any plan “on a matter 
of such religious and emotional value,” fearing the domestic repercussions of any such 
stand. Acheson himself instructed John Ross to make no efforts to persuade other 
members to follow the American course “or to discourage a possible shift in the voting 
for the Belgian resolution.”110 If American Catholic pressure had not succeeded in 
securing American support for the Belgian proposal, it did appear to have dissuaded an 
activist stand by the delegation in support of the Swedish-Dutch proposal. Given the clout 
that the Americans wielded at the UN, such a clear stand might well have assured the 
victory of the Swedish-Dutch plan, ending any hope of a future implementation of the 
corpus separatum.  
The defeat of the Belgian resolution produced a longstanding stalemate on the 
Jerusalem question at the UN. It also, in effect, marked the end of the active Roman 
Catholic lobby to secure territorial internationalization for the city. As Elihu Lauterpacht 
has observed, after the December 1950 vote, “the question of Jerusalem was conspicuous 
only by its absence from discussion at the UN.”111 The status quo appeared acceptable to 
a majority of states if only because the corpus separatum had proved to be not practically 
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implementable. As the deadlock dragged on, Israel moved to consolidate its official 
presence in the city. Following the 1950 decision to make the Holy City its capital, Israel 
announced plans to transfer its Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 
1952. In July, an Israeli spokesman confirmed Tel Aviv‟s designs for the city, stating that 
Jerusalem “was, is and always will be the capital of Israel,” calling the corpus separatum 
“impractical and unrealistic” and, for all intents and purposes, a “dead issue.”112 In 
November, upon the death of President Chaim Weizmann, the official residence of the 
President was also moved to Jerusalem, prompting Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to declare 
that “the status of Jerusalem now remains as settled as that of Rome or London.”113 Rapid 
Israeli moves to consolidate an official presence in Jerusalem, noted a disconsolate 
Schaefer, “appeared to put internationalization further off than ever.”114 In the winter of 
1952, she also noted to Carroll that she was witnessing “the very death throes” of 
internationalization at the UN.
115
 
Though the Vatican remained resolved to establishing an international Jerusalem, 
and the American bishops never relinquished their role as the primary advocates of such a 
policy, it was clear that by the winter of 1952-1953 that the issue had reached a 
deadening stalemate. Washington‟s acceptance of the status quo in Jerusalem, where 
Israel and Jordan had established a firm presence, dealt a fatal blow to any reversion to 
                                                          
112
 ‘Israel to Build a Capital City in Jerusalem’, Memo- NCWC Office for UN Affairs, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 
44, File 28. 
113
 See ‘Catholics Opposed Plan Periling Internationalization of Jerusalem’, Chicago Daily News, 29 
December 1952: 4. 
114
 Catherine Schaefer to Howard Carroll, 21 February 1951, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 159, File 14. 
115
 Catherine Schaefer to Howard Carroll, 21 January 1952, NCWC/OGS/ACUA, Box 164, File 40. 
334 
 
the November 1947 resolution. American support for the status quo, moreover, weakened 
the support of other states previously committed to corpus separatum. The Philippines, 
Mexico and Colombia, to name a few, appeared more anxious to stay onside with 
Washington as the Cold War congealed than to gain the good graces of the Vatican. 
Although a clutch of Arab states remained committed to the idea, they were increasingly 
“more interested in the repatriation of refugees than in the internationalization question,” 
as Schaefer reported in October 1952.
116
 
For the remainder of the decade, the NCWC resigned itself to defending the rights 
of Roman Catholic access to Holy Sites in the territory. One of its more notable victories 
concerned the Carmelite Monastery in Haifa, which had been seized and occupied by the 
Israeli navy since 1951. Following “repeated rude rebuffs by the Israelis to the local 
superior,” the NCWC‟s Legal Department took up the case in 1958 on behalf of the 
Vatican. Several months of intense negotiations, both with the State Department and with 
the Israeli government, yielded the withdrawal of the naval offices and an 
indemnification paid to the Carmelite Order.
117
 It was a small victory in a decade of 
rebuffs for the Vatican and the American Church.  
McMahon continued until 1955 to work tirelessly in directing the significant 
financial and material aid collected by the CNEWA, which a November 1956 estimate 
placed at twenty-six million dollars in cash, goods and services since 1948. “More than 
half of the money,” the report noted, “was donated by American Catholics.” After 1951, 
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however, the deadlock at the UN rendered his efforts on internationalization largely 
irrelevant. In late 1953, he compared the Vatican‟s feelings towards Israel‟s intransigence 
on Jerusalem to those of “a man looking into the window of his home to be told by 
intruders that he could have any compensation except the right of possession.”118 It was a 
prophetic observation that revealed both the failure of the Vatican and the American 
Church to extract even their minimum demands on Palestine, as well as the enduring 
frictions between the new state and its oldest adversary, tensions which would decades 
yet to abate.  
Conclusion 
 The publication of Robert F. Drinan S.J.‟s Honor the Promise: America’s 
Commitment to Israel in 1977 was emblematic of the sea-change in American Catholic 
attitudes towards Zionism and the state of Israel in the decades after the intense struggle 
for Jerusalem wound down in the mid 1950s.
119
 The weight of Christian responsibility 
and guilt for the Holocaust, contended Drinan, necessitated a new understanding between 
Christians and Jews, and a reparation that was “moral and material.” This reparation, 
however, should not be motivated by feelings of guilt since this alone “would be an 
unhelpful basis for Christian-Jewish understanding.” What was first required of all 
Christians, Drinan urged, “was a recognition of the righteousness of Zionism as the basis 
for the Jewish democratic state.”120 The Jesuit priest, Georgetown law professor and 
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congressman had, in fact, been expressing such notions publically for over a decade. On 
the need for Roman Catholic acceptance of Zionism, he was unequivocal. 
There is no doubt that Zionism as the basis for the establishment of a nation is   
unique in the annals of mankind. But so is the whole history of the Jewish people.   
Consequently, it is improper to adopt a procrustean attitude to insist that Israel   
conform to the usual model of a contemporary state...From the beginning, 
Judaism   was conceived as the interlinking of a people, a Torah, a land. The 
Hebrew   Scriptures, medieval and modern Jewish literature, the Talmud, and the 
Jewish   liturgy is replete with the idea of a return to Zion...Zionism and Judaism 
have always   been integral parts of each other. Since the Holocaust and the 
founding of Israel   the inseparability of Judaism and Zionism has never been 
clearer.
121
 
Though Drinan did not speak for the Vatican or for the American Episcopate on 
the issue, the lack of public rebuke from either body did signal the demise of the activist 
and near-monolithic Roman Catholic trans-nationalism that had characterized earlier 
periods. By the 1970s, it was evident that the ideological solidarity that had made the 
American Catholic Church such a valuable ally to Rome in the struggle for Palestine had 
run its course. Though many American bishops continued to adhere to the Vatican line on 
Israel and the Jerusalem question, the consensus of previous decades had been replaced 
by a plurality of nuanced views, which included outright support for Zionism and for the 
state of Israel. 
 The American Episcopal consensus that remained intact from the 1920s to the 
1950s was weakened in subsequent decades by a number of factors, not least the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965), the great renewal movement in the Roman Catholic 
Church that was called by Pope John XIII in 1959. A number of American bishops took 
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active roles at the Council, embracing its reformist zeal as evidenced by the promulgation 
of Dignitatis Humanae, a declaration on religious freedom conceived by John Courtney 
Murray and tabled by Archbishops Albert Meyer of Chicago and Joseph Ritter of St. 
Louis. Though Cardinal Spellman loomed large at the Council, and was undoubtedly the 
leader of the „conservative‟ faction of American bishops, there emerged in Rome a 
growing faction of liberal-minded bishops, which included Meyer and Ritter as well as 
Detroit‟s John Dearden and Kansas City‟s John Patrick Cody, who more openly took up 
the Council‟s mandate of revival and renewal. The post-Conciliar period, in fact, revealed 
a growing divide among „conservative‟ and „liberal‟ bishops in the United States on 
issues such as the Vietnam War, disarmament, contraception and the role of women in 
the Church. The near-monolithic American Church of the pre-Conciliar period had, by 
the late 1960s, given way to a plurality of views on a number of questions relevant to the 
Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church, including, as Drinan‟s work 
reveals, on Israel and Zionism.  
 The Second Vatican Council was also significant, moreover, for the promulgation 
of Nostra Aetate, a declaration on the relationship of the Roman Catholic Church with 
non-Christian religions. Notable was the fourth section, which dealt specifically with 
Judaism. It repudiated the centuries-old charge of deicide against the Jews, and stressed 
the religious and spiritual bonds shared by the faiths, reaffirming the eternal covenant 
between God and the people of Israel. It further dismissed the Catholic objective of trying 
to convert the Jews, a symbolic turning point if juxtaposed with Pope Pius X‟s 1904 
warning to Theodor Herzl that should the Jews return to Palestine, there would be 
“Catholic priests waiting there to baptize them all.” For the first time in history, Nostra 
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Aetate called for Catholics and Jews to engage in friendly dialogue and theological 
discussion to better understand each other‟s faiths. After intense debate, the declaration 
was adopted by the world‟s cardinals and bishops on 28 November 1965, a definitive 
turning point in the history of Catholic-Jewish relations. The conceptual underpinnings of 
Drinan‟s work in the 1970s, and the Vatican‟s diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel 
in 1993, could definitively be traced back to the seminal shift in Catholic-Jewish relations 
initiated by Nostra Aetate.  
 For nearly three decades between the 1920s and the 1950s, however, the Vatican 
could faithfully rely on the American Catholic Church, and particularly its bishops, to 
transmit uniquely Roman Catholic ideologies and policies to the most powerful nation in 
the world. As Peter D‟Agostino has skilfully demonstrated, this Roman Catholic trans-
nationalism manifested itself in the 1920s in the attitudes and opinions of American 
Catholics on the Roman Question (where American Catholics supported the creation of a 
sovereign territory for the papacy in Italy), and on Mussolini‟s Fascist regime, when 
many Catholics, particularly Italian-Americans, expressed open sympathy. Mussolini‟s 
success is resolving the „Roman Question‟ by granting the papacy sovereignty in the 
Vatican City in 1929 only increased his allure in American Catholic circles. In the 1930s, 
this trans-national relationship between the papacy and American Catholics congealed 
into a defined political lobby, when the American bishops, organized through the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), represented papal interests vis-à-vis 
Washington on Mexican anticlericalism, the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil 
War. As in the case of American Catholic sympathy for Mussolini and Italian Fascism, 
these positions created frictions with non-Catholics, and clearly delineated the Roman 
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sources of American Catholic policy. Also emerging in the 1930s was a rising chorus of 
American Catholic opposition to political Zionism, another position that appeared to take 
its inspiration directly from Rome, and which placed Catholics at odds with their Jewish 
fellow citizens.  
 The growing political stridency of the American bishops, as outlined in chapter 
one, was girded by a number of factors in the interwar decades. The organization of a 
bishops conference in 1920, the NCWC, undoubtedly provided an organizational nerve-
centre through which the episcopate could more concertedly, and forcefully, express a 
collective political will. The exponential growth of the Church, owing to migration and 
high birthrates, particularly in the northeast, facilitated a rapid institutional expansion in 
the interwar years, when Catholic schools, hospitals and colleges, not to mention new 
parishes, were built to accommodate this burgeoning population. The genuinely warm 
relationship between President Roosevelt and leading American bishops was further 
evidence of the growing clout of American Catholics. The Vatican, on its part, was 
clearly cognizant of the growing power of the American Church, and from the early 
1920s on sought to strengthen its ties with the American episcopate. In addition to its 
growing political influence, the Vatican was aware of the significant financial clout of the 
American Church, as evidence by the vast sums raised in the United States for the Papal 
Relief Mission to Moscow between 1922 and 1924. The ceding of perpetual control over 
the CNEWA to the Archbishop of New York in 1931 can directly be traced to the 
fundraising capacity of American Catholics. Roosevelt‟s appointment of Myron Taylor as 
his „personal representative‟ to the Holy See on the eve of the Second World War 
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appeared to cement the informal, yet ideologically cohesive, tripartite alliance of the 
Vatican, American Catholics and Washington.  
 Upon the American entry into the war in 1941, American Catholics heeded the 
call to duty issued by the bishops, who had abandoned isolationist leanings to wholly 
endorse the war effort. The course of the war, however, revealed the extent to which the 
bishops continued to “toe the Roman line,” actively in their protests of the allied bombing 
of Rome, and passively in their adherence to the established Vatican position on Zionism. 
Both from the Vatican and from the various organs of the American Catholic Church 
there emerged a distinctly dual response to the tragedy of Europe‟s Jews. On the one 
hand, expressions of sympathy for the Jewish plight were expressed both by Rome and 
the American bishops. American Catholics, in fact, expressed their revulsion at the Nazi 
persecution of Jews in particularly poignant and clear language, surpassing the Vatican‟s 
restrained expressions of sympathy and solidarity. On the substantive question of Jewish 
emigration to Palestine, and the creation of a Hebrew national home there, however, the 
American bishops remained resolutely in line with Rome. It was a policy that withstood 
the full airing of the tragedy of the Holocaust, and which stood firm against the rising tide 
of sympathy for Zionism in the United States, not just among Jews but among a growing 
segment of American Protestant Churches, Congress and even the Truman White House. 
Open expressions of sympathy for Zionism from the American bishops, in contrast, were 
virtually non-existent. When nonconformity did surface, as the case of New Orleans‟ 
Archbishop Joseph Rummel illustrated, it was quickly suppressed, further evidence of the 
unanimity the Vatican expected from the American episcopate.  
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 In the postwar years, as the Palestine question reached its most crucial phase, the 
American bishops adhered staunchly to papal opposition to the creation of a Jewish home 
in the Holy Land. At the root of this stance continued to lay an ancestral Roman Catholic 
refusal to yield the territory of Christ‟s birth, life and death to a faith and a people that it 
continued to hold responsible for deicide, an idea expressed clearly and consistently by 
American Catholic leaders after 1945. Catholic leaders in the United States, in fact, 
emerged as committed opponents of Zionism in an atmosphere of rising sympathy for 
that very cause. On this question the bishops, the diocesan press, independent Catholic 
journals, religious orders and a range of lay Catholic organizations exhibited a 
remarkable consensus, evidence of a resilient position on the Palestine question that 
clearly took its inspiration from the Vatican. The dearth of dissenting voices in the 
American Catholic Church only underscored the monolithic unanimity of American 
Catholic attitudes.  
 In this study, I have argued that not only did the various organs of the American 
Catholic Church support the papal position on Palestine, but also that Catholic leaders in 
the United States emerged as the primary advocates of this Vatican policy in the first 
decade of the Cold War. A number of factors placed American Catholics at the forefront 
of this Roman Catholic transnational lobby attempting to shape developments on the 
Holy Land. The withering of the British mandate for the territory after 1945, and the 
passing of the question to the UN made the United States the hub of the debate on the 
future of Palestine. The close ties of leading American bishops to the American 
government, the Vatican surmised, endowed them with a unique ability to transmit papal 
policy to the most powerful capital in the world. As both patriotic Americans and loyal 
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Roman Catholics, these figures brought a distinctive pressure to bear on Washington. 
Ideological affinities between Washington and the Vatican in the early postwar years, 
moreover, also raised hopes that the efforts of the American bishops on Palestine would 
bear fruit. Transnational Catholic unanimity on the Palestine question, of course, girded 
this international Catholic lobby led by the American Church.  
 That this transnational lobby was unable, ultimately, to secure its demands spoke 
volumes on the limits of Vatican diplomacy in the early Cold War. Despite musings on 
the nefarious politicking of the Vatican and its international bishops by polemicists such 
as Paul Blanshard, Pierre Van Paassen and Avro Manhattan, the Roman Catholic lobby 
was not able to claim any definitive victories on Palestine. From a policy of opposing the 
very creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land, to strenuously advocating for an 
internationalized zone encompassing Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, to finally 
demanding the working establishment of a circumscribed corpus separatum for 
Jerusalem‟s „Old City‟, Roman Catholic labours came to naught. Several factors militated 
against these efforts. The Vatican and American Catholic were met by a well-orchestrated 
and funded American Zionist lobby, which gradually gained the support of a number of 
mainstream Protestant Churches. The Holocaust itself, though not altering the Vatican‟s 
position, had also created a compelling logic for a Jewish state, and a significant 
groundswell of public support for Zionism among non-Catholics. Even Vatican demands 
for a functioning internationalization of Jerusalem, promised by three successive UN 
resolutions, met the reticence of the Truman administration. American troops needed to 
secure the city, along with the funds required to maintain such a force, was enough to 
give Truman and the American delegation to the UN pause. Finally, the fickle support of 
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a number of majority-Catholic states at the UN, eager to remain onside with the United 
States on Israel, ultimately stalled the creation of a corpus separatum for Jerusalem. 
 The American Catholic lobby on Palestine could, in retrospect, be credited with 
some modest victories. As this study has outlined, and as recent research by Uri Bialer 
has corroborated, the nascent Israeli state did consider the Vatican‟s efforts, and 
particularly the American Catholic lobby, as threatening to its interests. As a result, 
Israeli policymakers tried earnestly to forge a Jerusalem solution acceptable to the 
Vatican. Tel Aviv also encouraged, and funded, an American Zionist counter-lobby to 
blunt criticisms of Israel in the American diocesan press, which were considered 
detrimental to its reputation at the UN. Intense American Catholic lobbying also shaped 
the guarded and prudent Jerusalem policy of Warren Austin and the American delegation 
to the UN. Though Austin‟s delegation never cast a vote in favour of territorial 
internationalization, it was instructed not to counsel other delegations on the question, or 
to trumpet its policy too loudly. The divisiveness of the question in the United States, 
documents reveal, was at the root of this circumspection. Vocal disproval of the scheme 
from Austin might have sunk the corpus separatum much sooner, but intense Catholic 
lobbying managed to make the question politically volatile for Truman. As a result of 
American discretion, then, the Jerusalem question remained theoretically „in play‟ at the 
UN into the 1950‟s. 
 In the final analysis, however, it was, as Peter C. Kent has suggested, a “lonely 
Cold War” for the Vatican and the international Roman Catholic Church, as the case of 
Palestine illustrated. Though the transnational consensus on the Holy Land between 
Rome and its American Church remained firm, the American bishops and the various 
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organs of the American Catholic Church could not even secure the most modest of the 
Vatican‟s demands. The ideological transnationalism observed by Peter D‟Agostino on 
the Roman Question and Italian Fascism remained vigorous through the first decade of 
the Cold War, as the robust American Catholic lobby on Palestine attested. It was, 
however, to be the last stand of such a monolithic Catholic lobby. The Second Vatican 
Council, and its promulgation of Nostra Aetate, would herald the beginning of a new era 
both in relations between Catholicism and Judaism and, by extension, between the 
Vatican and Israel. The Council, moreover, would unleash a plurality of views in the 
Church that would preclude the survival of such a monolithic transnationalism. 
Consensus on issues such as disarmament, peace, and ecumenism only served to draw the 
Vatican and international Roman Catholics closer to faith groups, including Jews and 
Protestants, who sought similar ends.  
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